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Public Trial, Pseudonymous Parties: When
Should Litigants Be Permitted to Keep
Their Identities Confidential?
By JOAN STEINMAN*
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has been shaping
the concept of the public criminal trial.' The Court also has expanded
rights of access to judicial records and proceedings enjoyed by the public
and the press. At the same time, a growing number of federal litigants
have sought to sue, or occasionally to be sued, pseudonymously in order
to keep their true identities confidential from the public and, in some
instances, from their adversaries and the presiding judge.2
The desire to retain anonymity is attributable to a combination of
factors. Parties most often seek to sue under fictitious names when the
matters in suit are particularly private, stigmatizing, or so unpopular that
* Associate Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology Chicago-Kent College of
Law. A.B., 1969, University of Rochester; J.D., 1973, Harvard University. The author thanks
Lisa Liewald and Maria Bark, law students at Illinois Institute of Technology Chicago-Kent
College of Law, for their research assistance in the preparation of this Article. The author also
thanks her colleague, Margaret Stewart, for her insights and suggestions. The subject was
suggested to the author by Fidell, The Strange Case of John Doe: Getting Anonymity in Federal
Court, Nat'l L.J., March 5, 1984, at 20 col.l.
1. See infra notes 6-49 & accompanying text.
2. While federal decisions concerning Doe plaintiffs or known Doe defendants are rare
prior to 1969, such cases are common now. On the other hand, many federal cases have been
filed both before and since 1969 in which defendants were sued pseudonymously due to plain-
tiffs' ignorance of defendants' names. See generally Note, Designation of Defendants by Ficti-
tious Names-Use of John Doe Complaints, 46 IowA L. REv. 773 (1961); Comment, Unknown
Parties: The John Doe Defendant, 1970 LAW & Soc. ORD. 256. Problems created by suing
defendants pseudonymously, such as the difficulty of determining diverse citizenship for fed-
eral jurisdictional purposes under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982), are explored in federal practice
treatises. 2A J. MOORE & J. LucAs, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 8.10 (2d ed. 1985); 1 J.
MOORE, J. LUCAS, H. FINK, D. WECKSTEIN & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.74 [6.-7] (2d ed. 1985); 1A J. MOORE, B. RINGLE & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE f% 0.161 [2], 0.168 [3.-2] (2d ed. 1985); 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1321 (1969); 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, § 1659 (1972); 14 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, § 3642 (2d ed. 1985); 14 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3723 (2d ed. 1985). This Article does not
address the problems caused by suing defendants fictitiously because their true names are
unknown.
plaintiffs fear retaliation. 3 Yet before parties could use pseudonyms to
shield their rights to privacy, those rights had to be legally recognized. 4
Additionally, public law litigators, relying on judicial recognition of pri-
vacy interests in unpopular political and social associations, 5 have
attempted to expand the use of pseudonyms from the field of sensitive
private disputes to public interest controversies. Accordingly, the use of
pseudonyms stems in part from the recent use of the courts by political
and social activists seeking judicial intervention in public interest
matters.
The apparent tension between these two developments--expansion
of public access to the judicial process and the increasing frequency of
pseudonymous litigation-raises a number of questions. First, is this ap-
parent tension real in light of the existing and evolving contours of public
trial and public rights of access to judicial proceedings and records? Sec-
ond, under what circumstances should litigants be permitted to keep
their identities from the public? Third, what different considerations
should influence a litigant's ability to shield his identity from his ad-
versary or the court? Finally, what procedures should govern these
decisions?
Despite the large number of cases involving fictitiously named par-
ties, the courts have not yet refined an analysis for determining when
litigants may sue or be sued pseudonymously. Nor have courts carefully
explored the question of secrecy with respect to an opponent or the
court. Additionally, the current ad hoc procedures for handling pseudo-
nymity are unsatisfactory. The purpose of this Article is to provide
courts with an analytical framework for resolving these issues. The Arti-
cle also attempts to sensitize the bar and the judiciary to the first amend-
ment issues raised by the requests for pseudonymous litigation.
First, the Article analyzes the Supreme Court precedent involving
public rights of access to criminal proceedings and judicial records, and
demonstrates that courts should recognize an equivalent right of access
to civil proceedings and records. It then explains the tension between
3. See infra notes 181-375 & accompanying text.
4. The development of the right of privacy has been a function of increasing
governmental intrusion into traditionally private matters and of the increasing willingness of
litigants to protect privacy interests. Fidell, The Strange Case of John Doe: Getting Anonymity
in Federal Court, Nat'l L.J., March 5, 1984, at 20 col. 1.
5. The Supreme Court has afforded broad protection to these privacy interests. See, e.g.,
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam); In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971); Baird v.
State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Roberts v. Pollard, 393 U.S. 14 (1968) (per curiam);
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
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pseudonymous litigation and public access rights. Next, the Article pro-
poses a detailed analytical approach for courts to use in determining
when pseudonymity should be permitted in civil actions. The Article
then illustrates this analysis by examining various categories of cases in
which pseudonymity typically has been sought, and evaluates the courts'
approaches to those cases. Finally, the Article suggests procedures that
should apply to requests for pseudonymity and concludes that litigants
sometimes should be permitted to sue, or to be sued, pseudonymously in
order to protect security or privacy interests, but that pseudonymous liti-
gation should not be available on demand.
Public Access to Civil Judicial Proceedings and Records
Before evaluating the potential tension between pseudonymous liti-
gation and the public rights of access to judicial records and proceedings,
it is necessary to examine the public trial doctrine. The cases dealing with
the closure of trials and pretrial hearings are most pertinent. While
Supreme Court decisions in this area are confined to criminal cases and
thus do not directly address public access to civil litigation and records,
the Court's reasoning is nonetheless instructive. In articulating the basis
for public access to criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court has focused
upon structural constitutional considerations, the common-law tradition
of open trials, and the policy grounds for access. As discussed below,
these constitutional, historical, and policy considerations also apply to
the civil arena.
Constitutional Basis of Access Rights
The Court has held unconstitutional a variety of press and public
exclusions from criminal proceedings. The relevance of these decisions
to civil litigation depends largely on the constitutional provision upon
which the Court relied in upholding access rights. The first amendment,6
unlike the sixth amendment,7 applies in all litigation, including civil
suits. Thus, a right of access based on the first amendment's guarantees
has direct implications in the civil arena.
For example, in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Courts a seminal
first amendment closure case, the Supreme Court extended the guarantee
6. The first amendment states in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7. The sixth amendment states in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial .. Id. amend. VI.
8. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
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of public criminal proceedings to the voir dire examination of potential
jurors.9 The Court ruled that juror voir dire in a criminal trial must be
open unless the closure satisfies a three-part test. ' 0 First, the party seek-
ing closure must establish an overriding interest that is likely to be
prejudiced by an open proceeding." Second, closure must be essential
and no broader than necessary to preserve that interest.' 2 Indeed, the
trial court must consider specifically the alternatives to closure and find
them inadequate. 13 Third, the trial court must articulate the overriding
interest and make specific findings adequate to support the closure on
appeal.' 4 Press-Enterprise is an important precedent for civil litigation
because the Court relied heavily on the first amendment in reaching its
decision.' 5
9. Id. at 505.
10. Id. at 508.
11. Id. at 510-11.
12. Id. at 511-12.
13. Id. at 511.
14. Id. at 513; see also Waller v. Georgia, 104 S. Ct. 2210, 2216 (1984). In Press-Enter-
prise, all but three days of a six-week voir dire had been closed to the public. The trial court
also had denied media requests for the transcript. The Court held that the trial court's findings
failed to show that an open proceeding would have threatened either the defendant's sixth
amendment right to a fair trial or the potential jurors' legitimate privacy interests. The lower
court erred also by sealing more of the transcript than was necessary to protect the privacy of
the jurors, by failing to explain why withheld material was entitled to protection, and by failing
to consider such alternatives as disclosing sensitive voir dire answers to the press without juror
identification. Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 510-13. The trial court's failure to consider alter-
natives to closure rendered its order unconstitutional. For further discussion of Press-Enter-
prise, see generally Note, Access to Pretrial Documents Under The First Amendment, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1813 (1984).
15. Actually, the Court hedged in specifying the constitutional source of the right to
openness:
For present purposes, how we allocate the "right" to openness as between the ac-
cused and the public, or whether we view it as a component inherent in the system
benefiting both, is not crucial. No right ranks higher than the right of the accused to
a fair trial. But the primacy of the accused's right is difficult to separate from the
right of everyone in the community to attend the voir dire which promotes fairness.
Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 508.
The Court's primary reliance upon the first amendment, however, is suggested by several
facts. First, the Court stated that the question being addressed "focuses on First, rather than
Fifth, Amendment values and the historical backdrop against which the First Amendment was
enacted." Id. at 509 n.8. Second, it was at the insistence of a press organization, not at the
request of the defendant, that the Court found the trial court's closure of voir dire unconstitu-
tional. Although the press can assert first amendment rights, there is no reason to believe it
was being permitted to assert the defendant's fifth amendment right to due process or sixth
amendment right to a public trial. As Justice Stevens noted: "[i]f the defendant had advanced
a claim that his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated by the closure of the voir
dire, it would be important to decide whether the selection of the jury was a part of the 'trial'
within the meaning of that Amendment." Id. at 516 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis ad-
ded); see also id. at 518 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring). However, because the Court did not
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Later, in Waller v. Georgia,16 the Court unanimously held that clo-
sure of an entire suppression hearing over the defendants' objection vio-
lated their sixth amendment rights to a public trial. The Court
concluded that this sixth amendment right extends to pretrial suppres-
sion hearings,1 7 and that any closure of a suppression hearing over the
objection of the accused must meet the tests set out in Press-Enterprise.18
The closure in question failed these tests.19
Waller is not at first blush a useful precedent in the civil arena be-
cause it was decided under the sixth amendment, which applies only to
criminal prosecutions. The Waller Court, however, noted that it re-
cently had found that the press and the public had a qualified first
amendment right to attend criminal trials, including voir dire, and re-
marked that "the explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no
less protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment right
of the press and public."' 20 Although the Court declined to discuss the
Waller defendants' first amendment claim to an open trial,2 ' this lan-
guage certainly suggests that several of the Justices would, if necessary,
find a qualified first amendment right of public access to pretrial suppres-
sion hearings.22 Thus, Waller is also useful as a precedent in the civil
reach the question raised by Justice Stevens, it apparently did not rely on a sixth amendment
analysis. Finally, none of the justices took issue with Justice Stevens' emphasis upon the first
amendment roots of the Court's decision. He placed the case among those that protect free
public discussion of governmental affairs, as a guarantee that individuals can participate in
government. Id. at 516-18 (Stevens, J., concurring).
The precise constitutional source of the Court's decision is important because, as already
noted, the first amendment analysis applies directly to civil trials, while the sixth amendment
analysis applies only by analogy. See supra notes 6-7 & accompanying text. The first amend-
ment as a basis for a right of access will be discussed in detail infra text accompanying notes
35-49.
16. 104 S. Ct. 2210 (1984).
17. Id. at 2214-16.
18. See supra text accompanying notes 10-14.
19. The trial court had closed an entire seven-day suppression hearing to everyone except
witnesses, court personnel, the parties, and the lawyers when less than two and one-half hours
were actually spent playing recorded telephone conversations mentioning nonparties. Waller,
104 S. Ct. at 2213. The prosecutor had expressed concern that unnecessary "publication"
would render the tapes inadmissible under state law. Id. The Georgia Supreme Court had
relied on the "essentially identical interest in protecting the privacy of persons not before the
court" to justify the closure. Id. at 2216. The Court found that the closure was far more
extensive than necessary and that the trial court had failed to consider reasonable alternatives
to closure. Id. at 2216-17. The Court stated that the privacy of persons not before the court
may justify closing portions of a suppression hearing, but indicated that an insufficient showing
of need had been made here. Id.
20. Id. at 2215.
21. Id. at 2216 n.6.
22. Such a finding would be necessary when the public or press, rather than the accused,
challenged closure, and the Court refused to allow the public or press to assert the defendant's
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Two other recent Supreme Court cases also relied on the first
amendment in overturning exclusions of the public and press from crimi-
nal trials. First, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,2 3 the Court
held unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute excluding the press and
general public from the courtroom during the testimony of minor victims
of specified sexual offenses. The Court found that a right of access to
criminal trials was implicit in the first amendment, because such a right
is necessary to the enjoyment of the first amendment right to informed
"discussion of governmental affairs."' 24 The Court agreed that protecting
a minor from the physical and psychological trauma of testifying before
the press and the general public was a compelling interest. 25 That inter-
sixth amendment right to a public trial. As it happens, the Court recently has granted certio-
rari in a case that raises the question of whether the public's first amendment right of access to
criminal proceedings extends to preliminary hearings. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court,
37 Cal. 3d 772, 691 P.2d 1026, 209 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1984), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3244
(U.S. Oct. 15, 1985) (No. 84-1560). The Court traditionally has held that the sixth amend-
ment right to a public trial belongs exclusively to the accused. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443
U.S. 368, 379-81 & n.9 (1979); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 & n.25 (1948); see Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538 (1965); id. at 583 (Warren, C.J., concurring); id. at 588 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). The Court recognizes, however, that there may be an independent public "inter-
est" in the public trial guarantee. See Waller, 104 S. Ct. at 2216 n.5 ("To the extent there is an
independent public interest in the Sixth Amendment public-trial guarantee. . . it applies with
full force to suppression hearings."); Gannett, 443 U.S. at 383 ("[T]here is a strong societal
interest in public trials."); id. at 406-07, 412-33 (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, & White, JJ.,
concurring and dissenting) (Interests of the public and the press in open judicial proceedings
exist separately from the interests of the accused as a sixth amendment concern.).
23. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
24. Id. at 604-05. The Globe Newspaper Court explained that the constitutional right of
access is not absolute:
But the circumstances under which the press and public can be barred from a crimi-
nal trial are limited; the State's justification in denying access must be a weighty one.
Where . .. the State attempts to deny the right of access in order to inhibit the
disclosure of sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by
a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
Id. at 606-07.
25. Id. at 607. By contrast, the Court found that the interest in encouraging minor vic-
tims of sex crimes to come forward and to provide accurate testimony was unsupported empir-
ically as a ground for mandatory closure. Id. at 609. Moreover, the Court concluded that
closure was an ineffective means of advancing that interest. Id. at 610. The Court was also
concerned that this interest could be relied upon to support an array of mandatory closure
rules. Such an array would pose too great a threat to the " 'presumption of openness [which]
inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice.' " Id. at 610 (quoting
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) (plurality opinion)); see
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 555-57 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissent-
ing). In McKeiver, Justice Brennan concluded that due process in juvenile delinquency pro-
ceedings does not require the states to provide jury trials so long as the interests served by jury
trials are otherwise protected. Id. at 554. When no statutory ban on public admission to
juvenile trials existed, and when the record did not indicate that persons the accused sought to
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37
est, however, did not justify a mandatory closure rule.2 6 The Court held
that narrow tailoring requires the trial court to determine on a case by
case basis whether closure is necessary, after press and public representa-
tives have had an opportunity to be heard on the question of their
exclusion.27
Two years earlier, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,28 seven
Justices for the first time concluded that the first amendment guarantees
the public and press a right to attend criminal trials. 29 As a result,
"[a]bsent an overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a crim-
inal case must be open to the public."'30 The opinion reversed a closure
order in which the trial judge had made no findings to support closure
and had not considered whether alternatives, such as the exclusion of
witnesses from the courtroom or the sequestration of the jurors, would
have sufficed to ensure the defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair
trial.31
Finally, in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,32 the Court held that the
press did not have a sixth amendment right to insist upon a public trial
have admitted were excluded, Justice Brennan agreed with the majority's affirmance of the
judgment. When state law permitted or required exclusion of the general public and when the
trial court had closed the juvenile trial, Justice Brennan would have reversed the judgment.
Id. at 556-57. For further discussion of Globe Newspaper, see generally Comment, The First
Amendment Right of Access to Civil Trials after Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 51
U. CHI. L. Rnv. 286 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Right of Access to Civil Trials];
Comment, A First Amendment Right ofAccess to Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings, 132 U. PA.
L. REV. 1163 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Right of Access to Judicial Disciplinary
Proceedings].
26. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607 & n.19, 609 & n.25.
27. Ad at 609 & n.25.
28. 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion).
29. Id. at 575-80; id. at 582 (White, J., concurring); id. at 582-84 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring); id. at 585-98 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring); id. at 599-600 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring); id. at 604 (Blackman, J., concurring). In addition, Justice Powell, who took no part in
the consideration or decision of this case, already had adopted this position in Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 397-401 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
30. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581.
31. Id; see also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266-73 (1948) (The secrecy of petitioner's trial
for criminal contempt violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.); cf. Le-
vine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 615-19 (1960) (Exclusion of the public when defendant,
who did not request that the courtroom be opened, was adjudged guilty of criminal contempt
and sentenced did not invalidate his conviction.). For discussion of Richmond Newspapers, see
generally BeVier, Like Mackerel in the Moonlight: Some Reflections on Richmond Newspa-
pers, 10 HOFSTRA L. REv. 311 (1982); Cox, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term Foreword: Free-
dom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20-26 (1980); Fenner, Cox &
Koley, Access to Judicial Proceedings: To Richmond Newspapers and Beyond, 16 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 415 (1981); The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARv. L. RaV. 75, 149-59
(1980).
32. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
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or to attend pretrial proceedings. 33 In Gannett, a pretrial suppression
hearing was closed to the public and press at the unopposed request of
defense attorneys. The Court also held that, in denying access, the trial
court had given all appropriate deference to any first amendment rights
of the public and press.34
To the extent the Court has recognized a first amendment basis for
public and press access to criminal proceedings, its reasoning also pro-
vides a constitutional basis for access to civil proceedings because of that
amendment's structural role. In Richmond Newspapers, the Court rea-
soned that the freedoms expressly guaranteed by the first amendment
share a "core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters
relating to the functioning of government. '35 The conduct of criminal
trials is an aspect of government that is of great public concern. 36 Cases
prohibiting governmental restriction of information 37 and recognizing a
right to receive information and ideas 38 imply that the guarantees of
speech and press "prohibit government from summarily closing court-
33. Id. at 391. It appears that the Court does not adhere to this view. The opinion of a
unanimous Court in Waller stated that "[t]o the extent there is an independent public interest
in the Sixth Amendment public-trial guarantee . . . it applies with full force to suppression
hearings." Waller, 104 S. Ct. at 2216 n.5.
34. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on three factors: the trial court afforded
Gannett the opportunity to argue against closure; the trial court balanced the first amendment
right of access against the defendants' sixth amendment right to a fair trial; and the temporary
nature of the denial of access because a transcript of the suppression hearing was made avail-
able. Id. at 392-93. For discussion of Gannett, see generally Note, The Right to Attend Crimi-
nal Hearings, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1308 (1978); The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 62, 62-72 (1979). Subsequent cases, however, question Gannett's continued vitality. See,
e.g., Waller, 104 S.Ct at 2216 n.5 (suggesting that the Court would recognize a first amend-
ment right of access to suppression hearings); Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604-05.
35. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575.
36. Id.; see id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
37. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 19-38 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(Jail policies prohibiting news media from inspecting part of the prison abridges freedom of
speech.); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978) (statute prohibiting
corporation from communicating to the public its views on referendum subjects that did not
materially affect the corporation's business or property impermissible prohibition of speech);
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (attorneys' constitutional right to adver-
tise their prices for routine legal services); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850
(1974) (Brennan, Marshall, & Powell, JJ., dissenting) (Federal Bureau of Prisons' absolute bar
against personal interviews between designated inmates and news media impermissibly bur-
dens first amendment protections.).
38. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 757 (1976) (First amendment protection for advertisers wishing to disseminate pre-
scription drug price information can also be asserted by consumers as recipients of such infor-
mation.); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965) (A statute permitting the
government to hold "communist political propoganda" that arrives in the mails from abroad
unless the addressee affirmatively requested in writing that it be delivered to him placed an
unjustifiable burden on the addressee's first amendment rights.).
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room doors which had long been open to the public at the time that [the
first] Amendment was adopted."' 39 The reason was simple: "The explicit,
guaranteed rights to speak and to publish concerning what takes place at
a trial would lose much meaning if access to observe the trial could...
be foreclosed arbitrarily."''
In sum, the administration of justice concerns all citizens, as judicial
proceedings are governmental activities, and in this country the citizenry
is the final judge of governmental conduct.41
The Richmond Newspapers plurality also invoked the express first
amendment right of assembly, "an independent right but also. . . a cata-
lyst to augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment rights." 42
It argued that "a trial courtroom also is a public place where the people
generally-and representatives of the media-have a right to be present,
and where their presence historically has been thought to enhance the
integrity and quality of what takes place."'43
Justice Stevens, concurring, emphasized the first amendment's socie-
tal function in preserving not only unfettered, but informed, public de-
bate.44 "Without some protection for the acquisition of information
about the operation of public institutions. . . by the public at large, the
process of self-governance contemplated by the Framers would be
stripped of its substance. For that reason information gathering is enti-
39. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576.
40. Id. at 576-77. This view of open trials was articulated by Justice Brennan in his
concurring opinion:
[T]he trial. . . plays a pivotal role in the entire judicial process, and, by extension, in
our form of government. Under our system, judges are not mere -umpires, but, in
their own sphere, lawmakers-a coordinate branch of government. . . . Thus, so far
as the trial is the mechanism for judicial factfinding, as well as the initial forum for
legal decisionmaking, it is a genuine governmental proceeding.
It follows that the conduct of the trial is pre-eminently a matter of public interest.
I L at 595-96 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). Justice Brennan elaborated:
The interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory law, while not leg-
islation, is lawmaking, albeit of a kind that is subject to special constraints and in-
formed by unique considerations. Guided and confined by the Constitution and
pertinent statutes, judges are obliged to be discerning, to exercise judgment, and to
prescribe rules. Indeed, at times judges wield considerable authority to formulate
legal policy in designated areas.
Id. at 595 n.20. The pronouncement of pure common law is, of course, equally the making of
law.
41. See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606 ("[P]ublic access to criminal trials permits the
public to participate in and serve as a check upon the judicial process-an essential component
in our structure of self-government."); see also supra text accompanying notes 23-27.
42. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 577.
43. Id. at 578 (footnote omitted); see id. at 599-600 (Stewart, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 584 (Stevens, J., concurring) (incorporating by reference part of his dissenting
opinion in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1978)).
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tled to some measure of constitutional protection. '45 Justices Brennan
and Marshall strongly supported this position, characterizing it as the
structural role of the first amendment in securing and fostering our sys-
tem of self-government. 46
Finally, in Press-Enterprise, Justice Stevens, in his concurrence,
again emphasized the first amendment's structural role: "It follows that
a claim to access cannot succeed unless access makes a positive contribu-
tion to this process of self-governance. Here, public access cannot help
but improve public understanding of the voir dire process, thereby en-
abling critical examination of its workings to take place."'47
When one isolates the Court's reasons for access to criminal pro-
ceedings, it becomes clear that they support a first amendment guarantee
of access to civil proceedings. Civil litigation is an equally significant
sphere of government and lawmaking. Indeed, the decisions of civil
courts affect many more of us in our daily affairs than do decisions in
criminal matters. Whether the decision relates to a matter of private law,
such as contracts or torts, or to a matter of public law, in which govern-
ment regulation or constitutional rights are at issue, all Americans have
an interest and a stake.48 As genuine governmental proceedings, the con-
duct of civil trials is plainly a matter of enormous public interest. Such
trials also must be kept accessible so that the express first amendment
rights of speech, press, and assembly will maintain their meaning. Thus,
the structural function of the first amendment in securing and fostering
self-government is equally applicable to the realm of civil litigation.49
45. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 32 (1976) (footnote omitted); see Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862-63 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 728 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). ("News must not be unnecessarily
cut off at its source, for without freedom to acquire information the right to publish would be
impermissibly compromised. Accordingly, a right to gather news, of some dimensions, must
exist."). See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-Gov-
ERNMENT 26 (1948).
46. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587-88 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring); see
also Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604-05. In Globe Newspaper, the Court relied heavily upon
the reasoning in Richmond Newspapers. In explaining why the first amendment affords a right
of access to criminal trials, the Court particularly stressed the role of public access in a self-
governing society. Id. at 604.
47. Press-Enterprise, 104 S. Ct. at 828-29 (Stevens, J., concurring).
48. Decisions of public law issues directly affect masses of people. Even decisions of
private law issues affect many people through the operation of stare decisis.
49. See generally Note, Trial Secrecy and the First Amendment Right of Public Access to
Judicial Proceedings, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1899, 1899-1909, 1921-23 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Trial Secrecy]; Comment, Right of Access to Civil Trials, supra note 25, at 297-98. For
other legal commentary in accord with this conclusion, see generally Fenner, Cox & Koley,
supra note 31, at 430-32; Note, After Richmond Newspapers: A Public Right to Attend Civil
Trials?, 4 COMM/ENT L.J. 291 (1982); Comment, All Courts Shall Be Open: The Public's
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The Common Law Tradition of Open Trials
The Supreme Court has recognized that the tradition of open trials
derives from both English common-law and American legal history. In
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,50 for example, the Supreme Court found that
history demonstrates the existence of a common-law rule of open crimi-
nal trials.51 Significantly, the Court also recognized the historical exist-
ence of a common-law rule of open civil proceedings.5 2 Citing
seventeenth-century commentators, the Court observed that both civil
and criminal trials traditionally have been open to the public: "English
commentators. assumed that the common-law rule was that the pub-
lic could attend civil and criminal trials without distinguishing between
the two. . . . The experience in the American Colonies was analogous.
From the beginning, the norm was open trials."' 53 The Court concluded
that "there is no principled basis upon which a public right of access to
Right to View Judicial Proceedings and Records, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 311, 311-16, 320-22 (1979).
For an argument that the historical and structural emphases suggest different conclusions
when applied to the right of access to pretrial documents, see Note, supra note 14, at 1828.
Indeed, very recently several federal courts of appeal have begun to recognize expressly a
constitutional right of access to civil litigation. See, ag., Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733
F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984). In Publicker, plaintiff newspapers appealed from orders closing to
the press and public a hearing on preliminary injunction motions, sealing portions of the closed
hearing transcript relating to confidential information, and ordering the newspapers' counsel
not to disclose this information to their clients, even though the party seeking confidentiality
had revealed the information in its opposition memorandum. The Third Circuit reversed the
district court's orders. I. at 1061.
The court first held that the newspapers had a common-law right of access to civil trials,
id. at 1067, but it rested its decision on the first amendment. Based on English and American
legal history, on the values served by openness, and on the important role played by access to
civil trials in the free discussion of government affairs, the court concluded, as does this Arti-
cle, that "the public right of access to civil trials is inherent in the nature of our democratic
form of government." Id. at 1068-70. Following the Supreme Court's lead in Press-Enterprise,
the Third Circuit also discussed the qualified nature of the right of access as a right that may
be limited when an overriding interest in closure is demonstrated, supported by findings, and
when the closure imposed is narrowly tailored to meet that overriding interest. Id. at 1071.
Under this test, the Third Circuit reversed the trial court. Id. at 1073-74.
For additional cases inferring a right of access to civil proceedings, see In re Iowa Free-
dom of Information Council, 724 F.2d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 1984) (Holding that the first amend-
ment right of public access extends to contempt hearings which are partly civil, partly
criminal, in nature.); Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 800-02 (1 lth Cir. 1983) (Civil trials,
pertaining to the release or incarceration of prisoners and to the conditions of their confine-
ment, are presumptively open to the press and public.).
50. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
51. Id. 384-91. The Court found, however, that history failed to demonstrate either a
common-law right to attend pretrial criminal proceedings or the framers' intent to create a
sixth amendment right to attend criminal proceedings, enforceable by third parties. Id. at 385-
87.
52. Id. at 386 n.15.
53. I.d
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judicial proceedings can be limited to criminal cases if the scope of the
right is defined by the common law rather than [by] the text and struc-
ture of the Constitution. '54
While the Gannett Court declined to elevate the common-law right
of public access to a constitutional level,5 5 its historical observations are
important. In later cases, the Court relied heavily upon this English and
colonial history to find an implicit first or sixth amendment right of pub-
lic and press access to criminal proceedings. In Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia,56 for example, the plurality opinion described at length
the ancient history of open trials, criminal and civil, in Anglo-American
justice.5 7 The Court then stated that
[t]he Bill of Rights was enacted against this backdrop of the long his-
tory of trials being presumptively open. Public access to trials was then
regarded as an important aspect of the process itself; the conduct of
trials "before as many of the people as chuse to attend" was regarded
as one of "the inestimable advantages of a free English constitution of
government." . . . [T]he First Amendment guarantees of speech and
press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing
court-room doors which had long been open to the public at the time
that Amendment was adopted.5 8
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan similarly emphasized the
constitutional significance of this history:
[T]he case for a right of access has special force when drawn from an
enduring and vital tradition of public entree to particular proceedings
or information. . . . Such a tradition commands respect in part be-
cause the Constitution carries the gloss of history. More importantly,
a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of
experience. 59
Although the question of public access to civil cases was not raised
in Richmond Newspapers, the Court volunteered that historically, civil
54. Id.; see also id. at 418-21 (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall & White, JJ., concurring
and dissenting) (arguing that the tradition of conducting proceedings in public came about as
an inescapable concomitant of trial by jury). Juries were typical of the civil, as well as the
criminal, courts. See id. at 420.
55. Id. at 384, 386 n. 15. The Court left open the question of whether the first amendment
guarantees the public or press a right to attend criminal trials in the absence of a significant
governmental interest. The Court noted that, in earlier cases concerning access to prisons,
some Justices opined that the first amendment guarantees the public and press a right of access
that precludes their complete exclusion in the absence of a significant governmental interest.
Id. at 391-92; see Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 27-34 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 857, 859-64 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting). For a
discussion of these cases, see supra note 37.
56. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
57. Id. at 564-75.
58. Id. at 575-76 (citation omitted).
59. Id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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and criminal trials have been presumptively open.6° Justice Stewart went
further, explicitly opining that the first amendment clearly gives the press
and public a right of access to trials, civil as well as criminal. 61
In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,62 the Court again relied
upon history in interpretating the first amendment to embody a public
right of access to criminal trials.63 Similarly, in Press-Enterprise the
Court prominently used history in construing the public trial guarantee
of the first amendment.64 Given the Court's acknowledgement of the
parallel history of openness in civil trials, these cases all strongly imply
the existence of a historical public right of access to civil trials.65
The Shared Policy Grounds for Openness
The policies served by openness are as important to the Court's
criminal access cases as the common-law tradition. This section first de-
scribes those policies identified by the Court, some of which involve effec-
tive judicial administration, and then evaluates their relevance to civil
proceedings.
First, public scrutiny protects against judicial abuse. The right to a
public trial is "'a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as
instruments of persecution. The knowledge that every criminal trial is
subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an
effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power.' "66 This right is
aimed at assuring a fair trial,67 predicated upon the belief that" 'the pres-
ence of interested spectators will keep the triers keenly alive to their sense
of responsibility and to the importance of their functions.' "68 Thus,
60. Id. at 580 n.17.
61. Id at 599 (Stewart, J., concurring).
62. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
63. Id at 604-05 (quoting with approval Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring)).
64. Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 505-08.
65. See also Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FrC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177-79 (6th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1595 (1984). But cf Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 611
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I interpret neither Richmond Newspapers nor the Court's deci-
sion today to carry any implications outside the context of criminal trials."). See generally
Comment, Right ofAccess to Civil Trials, supra note 25, at 294-96 (Both historical and contem-
porary practice support constitutional right to attend civil trials.).
66. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 380 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948)). Similarly,
open proceedings help to protect the courts from false allegations of dishonesty. Richmond
Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569 n.7.
67. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569; Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1965)
(A public trial guarantees that the accused is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned.);
id. at 583 (Warren, C.J., concurring); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.25 (1948).
68. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.25 (1948) (quoting T. COOLEY & W. CARRINGTON,
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openness to the public plays "a fundamental role in furthering the efforts
of our judicial system to assure the criminal defendant a fair and accurate
adjudication of guilt or innocence."' 69 The public trial also protects the
integrity of the trial by guarding against corruption, bias, or partiality on
the part of the court.70
Public scrutiny does not restrain only judicial abuse or laxity. In the
criminal field, open judicial processes also deter prosecutorial and police
misconduct or incompetence. Justice Blackmun has stated that
[t]rials and particularly suppression hearings typically involve ques-
tions concerning the propriety of police and government conduct that
took place hidden from the public view. Any interest on the part of
the prosecution in hiding police or prosecutorial misconduct or inepti-
tude may coincide with the defendant's desire to keep the proceedings
private, with the result that the public interest is sacrificed from both
sides. 7
1
Second, the openness of criminal adjudications also promises to
"improve the quality of testimony, induce unknown witnesses to come
forward with relevant testimony, [and] cause all trial participants to per-
form their duties more conscientiously. ' 72 These desirable consequences
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 647 (8th ed. 1927)); see Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at
569.
69. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 593 (Brennan, J., concurring). Of course, when
an accused seeks to have criminal proceedings closed to the public, it is not his sixth amend-
ment right to a public trial that a court is protecting by requiring open proceedings. Rather, it
is the first amendment guarantees of speech and press that have been relied upon in denying or
disapproving closure in those cases. E.g., id. at 557-78.
70. Id. at 569; Gannett, 443 U.S. at 422 (citing M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW OF ENGLAND 344 (6th ed. 1820)) ("if the judge be partial, his partiality and injustice will
be evident to all by-standers"); Gannett, 443 U.S. at 428 (Blackmun, J., concurring and
dissenting).
71. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 428 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting); see also Waller,
104 S. Ct. at 2216 ("The public ... has a strong interest in exposing substantial allegations of
police misconduct to the salutary effects of public scrutiny."); Gannett, 443 U.S. at 445 (Black-
mun, J., concurring and dissenting) (prosecutor may fear reversal if he successfully resists
closure, or may improperly resist closure in order to disseminate prejudicial information about
an accused). Only an informed citizenry can intelligently keep public servants accountable
through the ballot box or otherwise. Id. at 428-49 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting)
(quoting Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975)). The fact that courts,
judges, prosecutors, and sometimes defense attorneys are publicly funded supports the conclu-
sion that the public has the right to ascertain by personal observation whether these partici-
pants in the criminal process are acting competently and responsibly. See Gannett, 443 U.S. at
432 n.12 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Commercial Printing Co. v. Lee,
262 Ark. 87, 553 S.W.2d 270 (1977)).
72. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 383; see Waller, 104 S. Ct. at 2215 & n.4; Press-Enterprise, 464
U.S. at 520 (Marshall, J., concurring); Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569 & n.7; id. at
596-97 (Brennan, J., concurring) (commenting upon the several benefits of accurate fact find-
ing, and quoting as still valid 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *373: "[O]pen examina-
tion of witnesses viva voce, in the presence of all mankind, is much more conducive to the
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advance both society's and the accused's interests in fair proceedings that
reach "correct" results based on truthful, complete facts73 and on excel-
lent legal arguments, rulings, and instructions.
Third, openness also promotes public respect for and confidence in
the judicial system:
The ability of the courts to administer criminal laws depends in no
small part on the confidence of the public in judicial remedies, and on
respect for and acquaintance with the processes and deliberations of
those courts. . . .Anything that impairs the open nature of judicial
proceedings threatens to undermine this confidence and to impede the
ability of the courts to function.74
By allowing the public and press to see that defendants are treated fairly
and not unjustly condemned, the system is strengthened. 75 Openness
thus promotes both the appearance and the reality of fairness.
Fourth, openness of the criminal justice system has therapeutic
value for the community. As Chief Justice Burger recently wrote for a
unanimous Court in Press-Enterprise:
Criminal acts, especially violent crimes, often provoke public concern,
even outrage and hostility; this in turn generates a community urge to
retaliate and desire to have justice done . . . . When the public is
aware that the law is being enforced and the criminal justice system is
functioning, an outlet is provided for these understandable reactions
and emotions. Proceedings held in secret would deny this outlet and
frustrate the broad public interest; by contrast, public proceedings vin-
dicate the concerns of the victims and the community .... 76
clearing up of truth, than the private and secret examination. . . where a witness may fre-
quently depose that in private, which he will be ashamed to testify in a public and solemn
tribunal."); Gannett, 443 U.S. at 421-22 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting). The
Supreme Court has recognized that in particular cases, the openness of criminal adjudications
may make some individuals reluctant to come forward and testify. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S.
at 610. However, in Globe Newspaper, the most pertinent case presented to the Court, the
majority rejected the contention that automatic closure would increase the number of victims
coming forward to testify, finding it to be "speculative in empirical terms, .. [and] open to
serious question as a matter of logic and common sense." Id at 609-10.
73. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606; Gannett, 443 U.S. at 428 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
74. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 429 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting) (citation
omitted).
75. See Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 508; Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606; Richmond
Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 570-72; id. at 594-95 (Brennan, J., concurring). In his concurrence in
Richmond Newspapers, Justice Brennan stated:
For a civilization founded upon principles of ordered liberty to survive and flourish,
its members must share the conviction that they are governed equitably. That neces-
sity. . . mandates a system of justice that demonstrates the fairness of the law to our
citizens. One major function of the trial. . . is to make that demonstration. ...
Secrecy is profoundly inimical to the demonstrative purposes of the trial process.
Id.; see also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.24 (1948).
76. Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 508-09 (citation omitted); see Richmond Newspapers,
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The policy grounds underlying open criminal trials also favor open
civil proceedings. Characteristically, no person is accused of a crime in
civil litigation; defendants7 7 do, however, stand accused of committing or
threatening civil wrongs-breaking contracts, violating civil statutory
duties, or abridging constitutional rights-to the detriment of one or
many individuals. Similarly, in civil litigation no one's life is at risk and
imprisonment is not in the civil court's remedial arsenal. 78 To a lesser
degree, however, litigants' freedom of action, or liberty, is subject to
court orders for injunction or specific performance, and defendants'
property is very much at risk. When the defendant is the government,
the expenditure of public funds may be in issue. Thus, in the civil realm,
as in the criminal, a great deal may be at stake.
As in the criminal realm, the judicial system seeks to assure civil
litigants a fair and accurate determination of the relevant facts and the
governing law. Public scrutiny serves these interests. It is in the interest
of effective and proper judicial administration that defendants not be
"persecuted," and that no litigant be victimized by abuses of judicial
power. Accordingly, an open trial-in which the presence of interested
spectators will keep the triers sensitive to their responsibilities-is a basic
safeguard against possible abuse of judicial power in civil as well as in
criminal litigation.
Although civil proceedings ordinarily do not afford the public an
opportunity to scrutinize publicly funded prosecutors or police,79 they
sometimes afford an opportunity to observe the performance of publicly
funded attorneys. When government is the defendant, civil proceedings
allow public scrutiny of challenged legislation and other government ac-
tion. Even in trials wholly between private parties who employ their own
counsel, the presence of interested spectators is likely to have a salutary
effect upon both the private participants and the judiciary, so that justice
will be better served.
Second, the tendency of open adjudications to discourage perjury
448 U.S. at 567-72 ("The crucial prophylactic aspects of the administration of justice cannot
function in the dark; no community catharsis can occur if justice is 'done in a corner [or] in
any covert manner.' . . . To work effectively, it is important that society's criminal process
.satisfy the appearance of justice,' . . . and the appearance of justice can best be provided by
allowing people to observe it." (quoting 1677 Concessions and Agreements of West New
Jersey, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 188 (R. Perry ed. 1959)); Gannett, 443 U.S. at
428 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
77. The term "defendants," as used here, includes all parties who are sued in civil courts:
defendants, counter-defendants, cross-defendants, third-party defendants, and others.
78. The only exception is for contempt of court.
79. In some civil actions, such as those involving civil rights violations, the conduct of
police and other government actors is under scrutiny.
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and otherwise improve the quality of testimony, to induce witnesses to
come forward, and to cause all trial participants to perform their duties
more conscientiously, applies equally to civil litigation. As Justice Bren-
nan noted in his Richmond Newspapers concurrence:
Of course, proper factfinding is to the benefit of criminal defendants
and of the parties in civil proceedings. . . . [M]istakes of fact in civil
litigation may inflict costs upon others than the plaintiff and defendant.
Facilitation of the trial factfinding process, therefore, is of concern to
the public as well as to the parties. Publicizing trial proceedings aids
accurate factfinding.80
The third factor supporting open proceedings also has its civil ana-
logue. The ability of the courts to administer civil laws depends, in part,
on public confidence, just as in criminal law administration. If parties
are to obey court orders, and if defendants are to recognize court author-
ity to impose and enforce money judgements, there must be public re-
spect for and acquaintance with civil court processes. Allowing the
public and press to observe court operations will enhance their under-
standing of, and hopefully their respect for, the civil judicial process.81
Finally, open civil proceedings also have some therapeutic value for
the community. For instance, torts that result in serious bodily injury or
harm to reputation may evoke outrage, hostility, and an urge to retaliate.
Even contract breaches may evoke considerable community desire for
redress. 82 The public has a great interest in righting constitutional and
statutory violations, ranging from antitrust or securities law violations to
civil rights violations.8 3 As in the criminal area, public awareness that
the civil court system is functioning affords an outlet to these reactions.
The concerns of victims and of the community are vindicated as they
could not be if proceedings were closed.
80. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 596 (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
81. See In re The Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1352 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (Wright, J., concurring and dissenting) (Civil adjudication, no less than criminal
trials, must maintain its public legitimacy.).
82. The impetus to afford a remedy is arguably strongest when the breach has resulted
not only in a loss to the promisee but also in an unjust gain to the breaching promisor. See
Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 1), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 56
(1936). The nature and extent of the promisee's injuries and the moral quality of the breach
are also among the factors influencing the conviction with which society feels that a judicial
remedy should be afforded. See generally E. FARNsWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 1.6, 12.1-.3
(1982); J. MURRAY JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS §§ 172, 219-23 (1974).
83. On public law litigation, see Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,
89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976). Civil suits frequently involve "issues crucial to the public,"
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1595 (1984), including school desegregation, race and gender discrimination,
electoral politics, environmental control, freedom of speech, and the constitutionality of tax
legislation.
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Thus, as with the history of public trials, the policy grounds favor-
ing open criminal trials also strongly favor open civil trials. 84
The Tension Between Pseudonymous Litigation and Public
Access
As demonstrated above, the Supreme Court's first amendment anal-
ysis in the context of public access to criminal trials is equally applicable
in the civil area. This section now addresses how pseudonymous litiga-
tion conflicts with the public trial concept.
One could dispute the tension between pseudonymous litigation and
the concept of public trials on the ground that, typically, the public and
press are as free to attend, observe, and report the courtroom proceed-
ings in pseudonymous litigation as they are in any other litigation. Yet
the public and press cannot learn pseudonymous litigants' true identities
by attending court proceedings.
This is without precedent in English or early American common
law, when the pseudonym "John Doe" was used only to designate a de-
fendant in the pleadings until his real name could be ascertained or to
designate the fictitious plaintiff in the action of ejectment. 85 Today such
pseudonyms are used to avoid identification. In addition to being incon-
sistent with the long tradition of identified parties, pseudonymous litiga-
tion to some extent undermines the values served by open civil
proceedings. 86 While the presence of spectators should continue to help
84. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1595 (1984):
The policy considerations discussed in Richmond Newspapers apply to civil as
well as criminal cases. The resolution of private disputes frequently involves issues
and remedies affecting third parties or the general public. The community catharsis,
which can only occur if the public can watch and participate, is also necessary in civil
cases. Civil cases frequently involve issues crucial to the public-for example, dis-
crimination, voting rights, antitrust issues, government regulation, and bankruptcy.
The concern of Justice Brennan that secrecy eliminates one of the important
checks on the integrity of the system applies no differently in a civil setting. In either
the civil or the criminal courtroom, secrecy insulates the participants, masking im-
propriety, obscuring incompetence, and concealing corruption.
Finally, the fact-finding considerations relied upon by Justice Brennan obviously
apply to civil cases. Openness in the courtroom discourages perjury and may result in
witnesses coming forward with new information regardless of the type of the
proceeding.
85. See I BouvIER's LAW DICTIONARY 912, 1696 (F. Rawle 8th ed. 1914); Note, supra
note 2, at 775; Annot., 8 A.L.R. FED. 675 (1971); 27B C.J.S. Doe, John 972 (1959). As an
example of a plaintiff's action in ejectment, see Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635 (1853).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 77-84; see also Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185
(5th Cir. 1981).
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assure fair and accurate findings of fact and governing law, that effect is
attenuated when the spectators do not know the identity of all parties.
For example, when a litigant is a public figure, the public and press may
be particularly inclined to scrutinize the participants' conduct, with a
salutary effect upon their performances. That extra measure of commu-
nity scrutiny will be absent so long as the identity and notoriety of the
litigant are shielded by a pseudonym.8 7
Similarly, the likelihood that the presence of spectators will discour-
age corruption, bias, or partiality on the part of the court is reduced
when the litigants' identities are unknown to the public but known to the
court. Ignorance of one or more of the parties' identities will impede the
efforts of the public or press to investigate whether there are relationships
or activities that might create bias, partiality, or corruption. Certainly
the notion that open adjudications induce unknown witnesses to come
forward with relevant testimony often loses its validity when litigation is
pseudonymous.88 Without a means of knowing who is suing whom, a
potential witness would be unlikely to recognize that he had relevant
testimony.
Moreover, use of pseudonyms may tend to undermine the confi-
dence of the public in the administration of the law. Intuitively, one feels
less able to judge the fairness of judicial proceedings pursued by un-
known parties. Even if the record reveals enough about the plaintiff or
defendant to allow an apparently adequate appraisal of the proceedings,
the record may not quell all suspicions that the secret identity of a party
or parties influenced the decision. The appearance of fairness is thus lost.
It seems likely that the therapeutic value promoted by open civil
proceedings also will diminish when the litigants bear fictitious names,
and that the catharsis involved will lessen when participants have been
depersonalized.8 9
Finally, secrecy hampers the structural function of the first amend-
ment. Thus, the guaranteed rights to speak and to publish information
about a trial lose some meaning when access to the parties' names is
87. Of course, once a public figure appears in person in connection with a judicial pro-
ceeding, any pseudonym would lose its efficacy.
88. In these days of wide ranging discovery, when litigants are entitled to demand of each
other the identity and location of all persons having knowledge of any matter relevant to the
subject of the pending action, FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), it is rather unlikely that there will be
unknown witnesses whom open judicial proceedings will induce to come forward. The histori-
cal view to the contrary consequently has lost much of its validity, even when names are not
hidden.
89. Cf Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 268 (1941) ("[P]ublic interest is much more
likely to be kindled by a controversial event of the day than by a generalization.").
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foreclosed. The role of the first amendment in fostering self-government
is, to a degree, frustrated because the discussion of governmental affairs
is less informal when parties' true identities are masked.90 It is therefore
not surprising that several courts have found first amendment guarantees
to be implicated by a pseudonymity request. 91
It is noteworthy, in this connection, that the vast majority of cases
in which pseudonymity has been sought either have challenged govern-
mental activity or otherwise have involved the government as a party.
This fact may make it particularly important that the judicial proceed-
ings be open for observation in order to ensure against favoritism toward
a coordinate branch, to encourage public scrutiny of government action,
and to foster informed public debate on societal issues.
Thus, pseudonymous litigation is in tension with the rights of public
access to judicial proceedings. At the same time, these concerns do not
completely conflict. As the Fifth Circuit has noted:
The equation linking the public's right to attend trials and the
public's right to know the identity of the parties is not perfectly sym-
metrical. The public right to scrutinize governmental functioning...
is not so completely impaired by a grant of anonymity to a party as it is
by closure of the trial itself. Party anonymity does not obstruct the
public's view of the issues joined . . . . These crucial interests served
by open trials. . . are not inevitably compromised by allowing a party
to proceed anonymously. 92
This too must be reflected in the standards that determine whether pseu-
donymity will be permitted.93
Tension Between Pseudonymous Litigation and Public Access to Judicial
Records
A litigant's request for pseudonymity similarly may conflict with the
90. See, e.g., Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185 (5th Cir. 1981) (As against a plaintiff's
asserted need to proceed anonymously, there remains a clear and strong first amendment inter-
est in insuring that what transpires in the courtroom is public property.); Doe v. Rostker, 89
F.R.D. 158, 160-61 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (public has legitimate interest in knowing all the facts
and events surrounding court proceedings).
91. See supra cases cited note 90; see also Free Mkt. Compensation v. Commodity Exch.,
Inc., 98 F.R.D. 311, 312-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Doe v. Bodwin, 119 Mich. App. 264, 326
N.W.2d 473 (1982).
92. Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185 (5th Cir. 1981). The Stegall court also said that
party anonymity does not obstruct the public's view of the court's performance, and that
"[t]he assurance of fairness preserved by public presence at a trial is not lost when one party's
cause is pursued under a fictitious name." Id. For the reasons stated throughout the text, the
author believes that, in those propositions, the court understated the relevance of party
identification.
93. See infra text accompanying notes 160-61.
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public's right of access to judicial records.94 Although legal writers often
speak of judicial records and proceedings in a single breath, there is a
separate right of access to judicial records that is distinguishable from the
right of access to proceedings. 95
94. The names of litigants normally first appear in pleadings and then in motions fied
with the court. Party names often appear later in discovery requests, responses, and
memoranda.
95. The public's right of access to at least some judicial records, however, is not as great
as its right of access to judicial proceedings:
[P]retrial depositions and interrogatories are not public components of a civil trial.
Such proceedings were not open to the public at common law. . . and, in general,
they are conducted in private as a matter of modern practice . . . . [R]estraints
placed on discovered, but not yet admitted, information are not a restriction on a
traditionally public source of information.
. .. mo the extent that courthouse records could serve as a source of public
information, access to that source customarily is subject to the control of the trial
court.
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. 2199, 2207-08 & n.19 (1984). Even in the context of
writings that are introduced into evidence, when the "record" and the proceeding tend to
merge, courts have drawn distinctions between the two for access purposes. In Nixon v.
Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978), a case that grew out of the Watergate
investigation, broadcasters petitioned for access to tape recordings that were played to the jury
and public in the courtroom and were admitted into evidence. Transcripts of the tapes were
furnished to the jurors, reporters, and members of the public present at the trial. The Supreme
Court observed that the courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy
public records and documents, including judicial records and documents. Id. at 597. While
the contours of the common-law right are unclear, id. at 597-99, the Court unequivocally
found that a qualified right to judicial records and documents exists. Id. at 598. The Court
cited a citizen's desire to scrutinize governmental agencies and a newspaper publisher's intent
to publish information concerning the operation of government as interests sufficient to compel
access. Id. at 597-98. These same interests were cited by the Court in its subsequent decision,
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 584, 592-93, in which the Court held that the public's
access to criminal trials is guaranteed by the first amendment. The Court stated that the
decision lies in the sound and informed discretion of the trial court. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599,
602-03. The trial court, in exercising its discretion, should balance the interests at stake and
consider alternative avenues of public access. &a at 603-08. The Court concluded, however,
that the common-law right of access to judicial records did not authorize the tapes' release
because Congress had prescribed an administrative procedure for processing and releasing to
the public all of the ex-President's historical materials, including the recorded conversations at
issue in Nixon. Id. at 608.
The Court's response to the contention that the first amendment required release of the
tapes was less than satisfactory. The Court pointed out that the press had not been precluded
from publishing the testimony and exhibits filed in evidence. Id. at 609. But it failed to ex-
plain how, if at all, the tapes in controversy differed in a legally significant way from other
exhibits filed in evidence. For purposes of the common law, the Court regarded the right of
access as applying to both the tapes and the documentary exhibits. Id. at 599 & nn.10-11;
accord Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 429 (5th Cir. 1981); In re National
Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609, 612 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 945,
950 (2d Cir. 1980). In concluding that "[tihere simply were no restrictions upon press access
to, or publication of, any information in the public domain," Nixon, 435 U.S. at 609, the Court
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The Supreme Court recognizes at least a common-law right of ac-
cess to judicial records and documents that is closely tied to the public
interest in overseeing governmental agencies.96 Although some appellate
courts have held that the right of access to judicial records and docu-
ments is not of constitutional stature,97 several courts have recognized
that the common law access right "supports and furthers many of the
same interests which underlie those freedoms protected by the Constitu-
tion." 98 The law regarding public access to judicial records, therefore, is
less clear than that regarding access to proceedings. Nevertheless, it does
begged the question of whether the tapes were not also in the public domain. Although it is
true, as the Court observed, that the public had never had physical access to the tapes, id., the
relevance of that fact is unclear. Thus, having concluded that the public had no right to the
tapes themselves, the Court relied on the principle that the first amendment grants the press no
greater right to information about a trial than that enjoyed by the public. Id. at 609. The
Court also rejected the argument that release of the tapes was required by the sixth amend-
ment's public trial guarantee. Id. at 610. The Court held that that guarantee is satisfied by
affording the public and the press the opportunity to attend trial and report what they have
observed, and that the sixth amendment does not require any part of a trial to be publicly
broadcast. Id. at 610; cf National Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d. at 614 (D.C. Circuit followed
the Myers ruling.); United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 822 (3d Cir. 1981) ("[Plublic forum
values . . . can be fully vindicated only if the opportunity for personal observation [of audio
and video tapes] is extended to persons other than those few who can manage to attend the
trial in person."); Myers, 635 F.2d at 952 ("[T]here remains a legitimate and important interest
in affording members of the public their own opportunity to see and hear evidence that records
the activities of a Member of Congress and local elected officials, as well as agents of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.").
96. See supra notes 50-65 & accompanying text.
97. See United States v. Edwards, 672 F.2d 1289, 1294 (7th Cir. 1982); Belo Broadcast-
ing Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 426-29 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[N]either the public nor the press
enjoys any constitutional right of physical access to exhibits introduced in evidence at a crimi-
nal trial."). But see United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 820 (3d Cir. 1981) (expressly not
reaching the question whether the first amendment affords a qualified right of access to judicial
records); United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (not reaching the
question whether the first amendment affords a qualified right of access to judicial records),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
See generally Note, Access to Taped Evidence: Bringing the Picture Into Focus, 71 GEO. L.J.
193 (1982).
98. United States v. Edwards, 672 F.2d 1289, 1294 (7th Cir. 1982) ("We recognize...
that the right here in question is of non-constitutional origin and that in a given case 'a number
of factors may militate against public access.' "(quoting Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654
F.2d 423, 434 (5th Cir. 1981)); United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 819 (3d Cir. 1981),
("The right to inspect and copy ... has been justified on the ground of the public's right to
know, which encompasses public documents generally, and the public's right to open courts,
which has particular applicability to judicial records."); id. at 820 ("[S]ome of the same policy
considerations identified as supporting open trials may be considered when the issue involves
the common law right of access to trial materials."); id. at 821 n.6 ("Arguably, the Richmond
Newspapers case could be viewed as supporting a right of the public to access to the tapes
through the medium of the broadcasters." (emphasis in original)); United States v. Mitchell,
551 F.2d 1252, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Common-law right to inspect public and judicial
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justify the conclusion that pseudonymity is in tension with public access
rights to judicial records containing identifying information.99
The Related Problem of Sealed and Pseudonymous Filings
Although the foregoing discussion of access to judicial records as-
sumes that identifying information is contained in at least some papers
filed with the court ° ° and in its "public" record, that assumption some-
records is "fundamental to a democratic state."); see United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 945, 949
(2d Cir. 1980) (characterizing the common-law right as "beyond dispute").
In In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1984), the Seventh Circuit
had the opportunity to decide whether a trial court had abused its discretion in granting public
access to a "confidential" document admitted into evidence. The document in question was a
report compiled by a special litigation committee formed by a corporate board of directors, the
committee's legal counsel, and accounting consultants. The committee was formed to evaluate
derivative claims, see FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1, which corporate shareholders sought to assert or
to force the corporation to assert. The report reported and defended the committee's conclu-
sions. Continental, 732 F.2d at 1304-05. The court affirmed the disclosure order, reasoning
that the presumption in favor of public access to judicial records is both fundamental to a
democratic state, id. at 1308 (quoting Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1258), and is of constitutional
magnitude. Continental, 732 F.2d at 1308. The court felt that the policy reasons for granting
public access to criminal proceedings apply to civil cases as well. Id. As a consequence, the
court balanced the public interests underlying access against appellant's confidentiality inter-
est, and ruled that the document in question had to be made available because no "exceptional
circumstances" required confidentiality. Id. at 1313-14.
99. For thoughtful treatment of the reasons for including pretrial documents within the
right of access, see Note, supra note 14, at 1821-28. The recent decision of the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia in In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773
F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1985), also dealt with this tension. The court considered a question of
timing; whether there is, prior to judgment, afirst amendment right of public access to court
records pertaining to private civil actions. Id. at 1326. The court concluded that there is no
such right, and consequently that reporters had no first amendment entitlement to a document
by document determination of the need for confidentiality prior to the dates that final judg-
ments were entered in the case. Id. at 1339. If the court is correct, then the tension between a
litigant's request for, and a court's grant of, pseudonymity and the public's qualified first
amendment right of access to judicial records need not be resolved until final judgment, at least
in civil suits wholly between private parties. Some federal courts, however, have extended a
conditional common-law right of access to various records prior to judgment. E.g., In re Con-
tinental Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984); Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177-80 (6th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 1595 (1984); In
re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prod. Antitrust Litig., 101 F.R.D. 34, 43
(C.D. Cal. 1984) (right of access attaches when documents are submitted to a court in connec-
tion with a motion). The courts could be called upon during the pendency of the case to
resolve the tension between pseudonymity and any such common-law right of access. More-
over, many of the cases in which litigants seek pseudonymity include governmental parties,
and the Reporters Committee court made clear that civil cases in which a government agency is
a party appear always to have been outside what it calls the "prejudgment nonaccess rule."
Reporters Comm., 773 F.2d at 1336 n.8.
100. That is often, but not always, true. See, eg., Roe v. Ingraham, 364 F. Supp. 536, 541
n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (court satisfied with plaintiffs' attorneys' representations to the court that
the fictitiously named plaintiffs were real and specific aggrieved individuals).
September 1985] PSEUDONYMOUS PARTIES
times may be false.' 0 l In order to preserve anonymity, a litigant may file
the first pleading or motion pseudonymously, while requesting leave to so
proceed in papers filed under seal, if they reveal the party's true iden-
tity.10 2 Thus, two inextricably related facets of pseudonymous litigation
are pseudonymous filings and sealed filings containing the party's iden-
tity. Consequently, in determining the appropriate barriers to litigant
anonymity, courts also should look to the common-law standards for is-
suing similar protective orders.
When deciding whether to allow materials to be filed under seal, the
courts are guided by the basic principles that "every court has supervi-
sory power over its own records and files," and that "the decision as to
access is one best left to the sound discretion of the trial court. °10 3 The
district court's discretion is circumscribed, however, by the public's pre-
sumptive right to inspect and copy judicial records. Recognizing the
common heritage of the right of access to judicial proceedings and to
court records, the values these rights commonly serve and their comple-
101. There is a growing body of law concerning which papers filed with the court are in its
public record and which are not. See, e.g., United States v. Myers, 653 F.2d 945, 952 (2d Cir.
1980) (videotapes admitted into evidence at a public trial open to public inspection even
though their admissibility subject to constitutional challenge); Wilk v. American Medical
Ass'n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1299 n.7 (7th Cir. 1980) (For access purposes, papers produced through
discovery are not in the court's "possession" prior to their admission into evidence.); United
States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1210-11 (5th Cir. 1977) (Courts may refuse to publicize
names and addresses of jurors; the press has no right of access to exhibits produced under
subpoena and not yet admitted into evidence; and the press has no constitutional right of
access to written communications between the judge and the jury.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968
(1978); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 98 F.R.D. 539, 543-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)
(documents attached to and referred to in the parties' summary judgment papers publicly
accessible despite their submission under seal, pursuant to a protective order); Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 897-901 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (Materials
not within the court's possession are not publicly accessible. It is unclear whether materials in
the court's temporary possession for purposes of evidentiary rulings must be made publicly
available. The right to inspect judicial records attaches to all materials filed with the court's
clerk, unless filed under seal pursuant to court order. That right also includes nonfiled materi-
als that have been relied upon by the court in a ruling or discussed in a published opinion.);
Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 88 F.R.D. 562, 564-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Deposition
transcript and answers to requests to admit became part of the public record when used by the
parties in their arguments or when considered by the court in deciding a motion.).
A complaint and a defendant's answer or motion in response to the complaint are nor-
mally part of a court's public record. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 191 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(Responses to document requests become part of the public record if a party relies on them in a
pleading.); Zenith, 529 F. Supp. at 897-98.
102. A named defendant who wished to remain anonymous would have to move that the
complaint be sealed, and perhaps, that an amended complaint be filed which would refer to the
defendant by a pseudonym. Of course, plaintiffs could undermine defendants' efforts to hide
their identity by publicizing the lawsuit prior to defendants' receipt of any other notice of the
litigation.
103. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1978).
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mentary support of the first amendment, 1°0 some courts, when asked to
"close" judicial records, purport to apply standards similar to those
enunciated in Press-Enterprise and adumbrated in earlier Supreme Court
cases.
For example, in In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co.,1°5 a plaintiff
bank was permitted to remove from the court's record two exhibits that
the bank had filed with its complaint. The Sixth Circuit held that only
the most compelling reasons could justify that removal. 10 6 The "pre-
sumptively paramount" public access right had to be weighed against the
competing privacy rights of bank customers whose names, along with
financial information, were included in the two removed exhibits.10 7 The
court nonetheless found that the customers' privacy interests, as recog-
nized and supported by congressional statutes and regulatory rules, con-
stituted a compelling interest that outweighed the public's interest in the
litigation. 0 8 The court ruled that the district court's order was tailored
narrowly to serve that interest.'0 9
Earlier cases recognized a presumptively paramount public inter-
est," 0 but they also reflected some categorical notions of interests that
may override the public's access rights."I For example, when disclosure
would reveal trade secrets or matters of national security, courts often
withhold judicial records." 2 Thus, the overriding interest can be a func-
104. See, eg., Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1066-71, 1073 (3d Cir.
1984); In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308-10 (7th Cir. 1984); Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177-79 (6th Cir. 1983); In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 98 F.R.D. 539, 543 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); see also Zenith Radio Corp.
v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 901-03, 913-16 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
105. 723 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1983).
106. Id. at 476.
107. Id. at 476-78.
108. The court so held even though the public had a special interest: the litigation had
been triggered by a governmental order to the bank to correct public statements and to fie
amended reports of condition and income. The bank's reliance upon a protective order in
filing its exhibits was a factor. Id. at 478. The court stressed the need for the public and press
to be heard on the question of their exclusion, and outlined a procedure to be followed when
litigants seek to have documents sealed. Id. at 475-76.
109. Id. at 476-77.
110. See, e.g., Crystal Grower's Corp. v. Dobbins, 616 F.2d 458, 461 (10th Cir. 1980)
(Although public interest is presumptively paramount, that interest would not be impaired by
retaining appellate documents under seal for a limited time.).
111. In Knoxville, for example, the court commented that "trial courts have always been
afforded the power to seal their records when interests of privacy outweigh the public's right to
know." 723 F.2d at 474.
112. Note, Trial Secrecy, supra note 49, at 1919-21; Note, First Amendment Interests in
Trade Secrets, Private Materials, and Confidential Information: The Use of Protective Orders in
Defamation Litigation, 69 IOwA L. REv. 1011, 1028-30 (1984); see also Nixon v. Warner
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tion of the content of the information at issue.' 13 The Supreme Court
has indicated that access also may be denied when there is reason to
believe that the court files would become "a vehicle for improper pur-
poses," such as gratifying private spite, promoting public scandal, or
publishing libel. 114 Conversely, an especially strong public interest in a
document's release, beyond the universally applicable interests, 115 can be
determinative. 116
Case law regarding protective orders sealing information obtained
through discovery1 17 is also useful by analogy. The question of pseudo-
nymity for litigants ordinarily does not arise during the discovery process
because litigants' names typically are known from the initial complaint
and summons.1 18 Protective orders may, however, implicate protected
Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978) (trade secrets); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 889-900 & n.42 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (trade secrets).
113. Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1073 (3d Cir. 1984). The court also
opined that the overriding interest can involve the relationship of the parties or the nature of
the controversy.
114. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978) (citing In re Cas-
well, 18 R.I. 835, 836, 29 A. 259, 259 (1893)); see Cianci v. New York Times Publishing Co.,
88 F.R.D. 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (The court sealed all depositions in a libel action in which the
plaintiff argued that sealing was necessary to protect against further libel and misuse of the
depositions. The court unsealed the documents after they became part of the public record.).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 66-76.
116. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1180-81 (6th
Cir. 1983) (The public had a strong interest in obtaining court record that showed "tar" and
nicotine contents of various cigarettes brands, reflected the government's response to allega-
tions of testing error, and showed the basis of the trial and appellate court decisions.); Joy v.
North, 692 F.2d 880, 894 (2d Cir. 1982) (ordering unsealing of a special litigation committee
report in a shareholders' derivative suit partly because the corporation was publicly owned and
the litigation directly concerned management's obligations to shareholders), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1051 (1983); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 98 F.R.D. 539, 547 (E.D.N.Y.
1983) (public interest in release of documents submitted on summary judgment motion partic-
ularly strong because of public interest in the chemical dioxin, which allegedly injured
thousands of veterans and their families).
117. Discovery is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-
37.
118. Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part: "In the
complaint the title of the action shall include the names of all the parties .... " Id. Rule
10(a). Rule 4(b) provides in pertinent part: "The summons shall ... contain. . . the names
of the parties, [and] be directed to the defendant .... " Id. Rule 4(b) Under Rule 4(d),
"[t]he summons and complaint shall be served together." Id. Rule 4(d). Absent class mem-
bers in class actions brought pursuant to Rule 23 are an arguable exception to the general rule
that the parties' names appear in the complaint. Id. Rule 3. However, such absent class mem-
bers may or may not be regarded as "parties," depending upon the context in which that
question arises. See generally Steinman, The Party Status of Absent Plaintiff Class Members:
Vulnerability to Counterclaims, 69 GEO. L.J. 1171 (1981). Moreover, when such absentees'
names are sought, that may or may not be "discovery," depending upon the purposes for
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first amendment rights. In In re Halkin,119 for example, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that an order
restraining the parties and their counsel from publicly disclosing docu-
ments and information obtained through discovery constituted govern-
ment action limiting speech that must be scrutinized carefully under the
first amendment. 120
The Supreme Court unanimously disapproved Halkin in Seattle
Times Co. v. Rhinehart.1 2 1 The Court addressed the question of whether
parties to civil litigation have a first amendment right to disseminate,
before trial, information gained through formal pretrial discovery. 122
The Court in Rhinehart recognized that orders prohibiting the dissemi-
nation of information and materials gained during discovery implicate
the restricted party's first amendment rights. 123 The Court emphasized,
however, that "[a] litigant has no First Amendment right of access to
which the names are sought. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 350-55
(1978).
Under Rule 26(c), upon motion by a party or person from whom discovery is sought, and
for good cause shown, a court "may make any order which justice requires to protect a party
or person from annoyance, oppression, undue burden or expense." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
Under this provision, courts do seal documents generated or produced in the discovery pro-
cess, and often concomitantly order the recipients not to utilize the information for any pur-
pose other than the litigation and not to disseminate the information except to specified
categories of persons. See, ag., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. 2199 (1984); In re
Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529
F. Supp. 866 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
119. 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
120. Id. at 182-83. Plaintiffs' suit charged that federal agencies had conducted unlawful
surveillance of political activists who opposed the war in Vietnam. Plaintiffs' counsels' propo-
sal to release some documents produced in discovery by the Central Intelligence Agency had
led to the order challenged on appeal. Id. at 179-82.
The court concluded that, to withstand such scrutiny, "the harm posed by dissemination
must be substantial and serious; the restraining order must be narrowly drawn and precise; and
there must be no alternative means of protecting the public interest which intrudes less directly
on expression." Id at 191 (footnotes omitted). The court elaborated: "the trial court must
.. .require a specific showing that dissemination of the discovery materials would pose a
concrete threat to an important countervailing interest," id. at 193, and must make adequate
findings in support of its conclusions. Id. at 194 n.42, 196-97. For a criticism of the Halkin
test, see Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 25
(1983).
121. 104 S. Ct. 2199 (1984).
122. Id. at 2206. The Court stated that it had granted certiorari to resolve the conflict
between the approaches taken by the Supreme Court of Washington in Rhinehart, the District
of Columbia Circuit in In re Halkin, and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in In re
San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108 (1981). In San Juan Star, the court found "the appropriate
measure of such limitations [on dissemination] in a standard of 'good cause' that incorporates
a 'heightened sensitivity' to the First Amendment concerns at stake." Id. at 116 (citations
omitted).
123. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. at 2207-08; see id at 2210 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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information made available only for the purposes of trying his suit,"' 124
and that liberal discovery is "a matter of legislative grace," which is
"provided for the sole purpose of assisting in the preparation and trial, or
the settlement, of litigated disputes."' 125 Thus, "continued court control
over the discovered information does not raise the same spectre of gov-
ernment censorship that such control might suggest in other
situations."1 2 6
The Court in Rhinehart rejected the heightened first amendment
scrutiny mandated in Halkin, and instructed courts to focus simply on
whether the "good cause" requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 26(c) has been met. 127 In addition, the Court dispensed with the
124. Id. at 2207 (citations omitted).
125. Id. at 2207-08.
126. Id. at 2207 (citations omitted). Looking to common law and contemporary practice,
the Court further reasoned that "pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not public compo-
nents of a civil trial." Id. at 2207. Consequently, restraints on the dissemination of such
materials do not restrict a traditionally public source of information. Id. at 2208. Nor is an
order limiting such circulation a classic prior restraint, which requires exacting first amend-
ment scrutiny, because the restricted party is free to disseminate the identical information if it
is gained independently of the court's processes. Id.
The Court concluded that the propriety of the limitation of first amendment rights should
turn on whether it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the
suppression of expression and on whether it is no greater than necessary to protect that gov-
ernmental interest. Id. at 2207 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974)).
The Court then found that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), authorizing protective or-
ders generally, furthers a substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of ex-
pression: the interest in preventing abuse of the discovery process through release of
discovered information that could be damaging to reputation and privacy. Rhinehart, 104 S.
Ct. at 2208-09. Thus, having found that Rule 26(c) passed constitutional muster, the Court
concluded that any protective order that conforms to the requirements of Rule 26(c) is proper.
In particular, when "a protective order is entered on a showing of good cause .... is limited
to the context of pretrial civil discovery, and does not restrict the dissemination of the informa-
tion if gained from other sources, it does not offend the First Amendment." Id. at 2209-10
(footnote omitted). The Court added that "heightened First Amendment scrutiny of each
request for a protective order would necessitate burdensome evidentiary findings and could
lead to time-consuming interlocutory appeals." Id. at 2209 n.3 (citation omitted).
Justice Brennan concurred on the ground that a substantial government interest sup-
ported the particular protective order at issue. Id. at 2210 (Brennan, J., concurring). In seek-
ing the protective order, plaintiffs had relied upon the rights of privacy and of religious
association, id. at 2203-04, and the trial court was correct to be concerned that a refusal to
enter the protective order would have "chilled" the right of persons to resort to the courts for
redress of grievances. Id. at 2210 n.24. The majority opinion also noted that the Washington
Supreme Court "properly emphasized the importance of ensuring that potential litigants have
unimpeded access to the courts." Id. at 2209 n.22.
127. Rhinehart suggests that the Court is in substantial agreement with parts of Judge
Wilkey's dissent in Halkin:
[T]he "good cause shown" standard in Rule 26(c) is less stringent than the standard
set forth in Nebraska Press Ass'n . . . . [I]n order to obtain a protective order under
Rule 26(c), it is not necessary to demonstrate the same exceedingly high probability
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need for "burdensome" evidentiary findings. While the Court noted that
the restriction on speech should be no greater than necessary, it did not
test the protective order challenged in Rhinehart against that standard.
The Court rejected the tripartite requirements of HalkinI28 because they
"would impose an unwarranted restriction on the duty and discretion of
the trial court to oversee the discovery process."' 2
9
The implications of Rhinehart for pseudonymous litigation are rele-
vant here. Such litigation will involve some combination of pseudony-
mous filings, sealed filings, and protective orders prohibiting the parties
and their counsel from disclosing the identities of the pseudonymous liti-
gants. Should a showing sufficient to justify the sealing of records identi-
of harm that may be needed to justify broader restraining orders. It may be enough
to show that the predicted harm is reasonably likely to occur unless a protective
order is issued. Second, it is not necessary. . . to show the same degree of serious
and irreparable harm called for under the Nebraska Press Ass'n standard. Less crip-
pling harm may do. Nor is it necessary under Rule 26(c) to invoke the same quality
of competing interest demanded by the Nebraska Press Ass'n standard. Somewhat
more mundane interests are cognizable; for example, an order may issue to protect
business information or even to protect against personal embarrassment. Third, it is
not necessary for district courts to make the same kind of formal and specific factual
findings or to articulate these findings as elaborately as has been required under the
Nebraska Press Ass'n line of cases. The district court's decision under Rule 26(c) is
discretionary and involves the balancing of various competing interests; it is enough
that the district court provide a record sufficient for meaningful review.
Halkin, 598 F.2d at 206 (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). The injury that will
result from disclosure must be shown with specificity; conclusory statements are insufficient.
See, eg., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsusita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp 866, 891 (E.D. Pa.
1981) (citing United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 90 F.R.D. 421, 425 (W.D.N.Y.
1981); Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 21, 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Hunter v.
International Sys. & Controls Corp., 51 F.R.D. 251, 255 (W.D. Mo. 1970)). See generally 8
C. WRIGr & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 2035, at 264-65 (1970). But as Judge Wilkey ob-
served, all that is actually required is "that the moving party provide the court with informa-
tion sufficient to enable it meaningfully to balance the moving party's interests against the
opposing party's interests." Halkin, 598 F.2d at 210 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). The degree of
specificity courts demand of the moving party probably will increase with the restrictiveness of
the requested protective order. Ida at 210-11.
The movant usually must show that disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious
injury. Zenith, 529 F. Supp. at 891 (citing Essex Wire Co. v. Eastern Elec. Sales, 48 F.R.D.
308, 310 (E.D. Pa. 1969); United States v. Lever Bros. Co., 193 F. Supp. 254, 257 (S.D.N.Y.
1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 932 (1962)). Some courts have required "very serious injury," see,
e.g., Citicorp v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 478 F. Supp. 756, 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (quoting United
States v. IBM, 67 F.R.D. 40, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)), but the kind of showing needed necessarily
depends upon the type of harm threatened: "Some kinds of harm are capable of clear objective
demonstration. . . . [O]ther kinds of harm are more subtle and less amenable to objective
demonstration. Annoyance, embarrassment, and harassment ...are relatively difficult to
demonstrate with particularity." Halkin, 598 F.2d at 211 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
128. See supra note 126.
129. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. at 2206. For one critique of Rhinehart, see Note, supra note 14,
at 1839-44.
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fying the litigants to the court and sufficient to justify a nondisclosure
order early in the litigation also suffice to justify the use of pseudonyms
throughout trial? If so, the more stringent tests for closure enunciated in
Press-Enterprise1 30 would be displaced in this context.
First, one must consider whether Rhinehart applies when the infor-
mation sought to be protected ordinarily would be revealed in the plead-
ings rather than through discovery mechanisms. The Court's
conclusions in Rhinehart were predicated in part on its finding that
discovery proceedings are conducted in private as a matter of both com-
mon law and modem practice.13' As a matter of custom, access is sub-
ject to the trial court's control.' 32 Although pleadings are similarly
drafted in private, they must be filed with the court and are ordinarily a
public component of contemporary civil litigation, immediately part of
the public record. 33 Pleadings have been sealed on occasion, so access
130. See supra notes 10-14 & accompanying text.
131. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. at 2207-08. One commentator has questioned the Court's con-
clusion by arguing that there traditionally has been some expectation of openness with respect
to discovery materials and by asserting that "[the presumption of openness of records and
documents was preserved as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted and
amended." Note, supra note 14, at 1826-27.
The Rhinehart Court further noted that, although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
may require parties to file certain responses to discovery requests, such as interrogatory an-
swers, responses to requests to admit, and deposition transcripts, the Rules need not so pro-
vide. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. at 2206.
132. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. at 2207 n.19. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
deposition transcripts always are supposed to be filed in securely sealed envelopes. FED. R.
Civ. P. 30(0, 31(b). Under Rule 26(c)(8), for good cause shown, the court may order "that
the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes
to be opened as directed by the court." Id. Rule 26(c)(8).
133. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pleadings must be filed. FED. R. CIV. P.
3, 5(a), (d). Pleadings need not be admitted into evidence, argued by the parties, or relied upon
in a judicial decision to become part of the public judicial record. See supra note 101. It is not
clear how long a tradition this modem practice reflects. The District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals recently observed that is was "certainly unaware of any tradition of public
access (pre- or post-judgment) to all documents consulted (or . . . consultable) by a court in
ruling on pretrial motions. If such a tradition existed, public files would presumably be filled
with complaints stricken as scurrilous .... " In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (emphasis added). The court's presumption seems
dubious; it cites no statistics reflecting large numbers of scurrilous complaints being filed, past
or present, and its lack of awareness does not establish that pleadings traditionally have not
been accessible to the public. Traditional practice is not easy to infer from the few reported
cases. The case of Schmedding v. May, 85 Mich. 1, 48 N.W. 201 (1891), for example, indicates
that it was customary for newspapers to gain access to civil court records, including pleadings,
from the time they were filed. Id. at 1-5, 48 N.W. at 201-02. The court in that case refused to
grant mandamus requiring the custodian of civil court records to make available to a newspa-
per reporter the notations concerning the filing of certain actions. Its reasoning, in part, was
that litigants, under the direction of the court, lawfully could withhold the records in the case
until they were made public by proceedings in open court or by consent of the parties. Id. at 7,
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is, as a practical matter, subject to the trial court's control. Still, plead-
ings are generally part of the public judicial record. Moreover, the sealing
of pleadings for the specific purpose of keeping party identities confiden-
tial is quite a recent phenomenon in the federal courts. 134 Hence, there is
no pertinent long-term custom undercutting the tradition of public access
to pleadings. Consequently, unlike restrictions on the dissemination of
discovery, restrictions placed on access to pleadings do restrict a tradi-
tionally public source of information.
The Rhinehart Court also relied upon the proposition that litigants
have no first amendment right of access to information made available
through discovery because they gain such information "only by virtue of
the court's discovery processes." 135 By contrast, plaintiffs learn defend-
ants' names without the aid of court processes. Although defendants ar-
guably learn the plaintiffs' identities because the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure require identification of the plaintiff in the complaint, 136 this
requirement is mandated by a due process right to know the identity of
their litigation adversaries. 137 Nevertheless, court control over the infor-
48 N.W. at 203. One could infer from this reasoning that there was an immediate, though
qualified, right of public access to civil court filings, which could be cut off when a court found
such action warranted under the circumstances.
Even the District of Columbia Circuit's conclusion was merely that it could not "discern
an historic practice of such clarity, generality and duration as to justify the pronouncement of
a constitutional rule preventing federal courts and the states from treating the records of pri-
vate civil actions as private matters until trial or judgment." Reporters Comm., 773 F.2d at
1336 (emphasis added). Even if the District of Columbia Circuit is correct on this point, the
public right of access to pleadings traditionally could be exercised, but only after trial or judg-
ment. Judge Wright, dissenting in part, was not persuaded that the historic common-law right
of access was not implicated prejudgment. Id at 1348 (Wright, J., concurring and dissenting).
His analysis of the nineteenth-century cases was that they limited access to pretrial pleadings
only before trial. Id. at 1348-51 & nn.17-18 (Wright, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge
Wright concluded that a review of precedent to the present "suggests a presumptive right of
contemporaneous access to the records of civil proceedings." Id. at 1351 (emphasis added)
(Wright, J., concurring and dissenting). Cases that refused access to civil court filings prior to
disclosure in open court also are distinguishable from most of the twentieth-century cases
involving pseudonymity. The later cases frequently include the government as a litigant while
the earlier cases emphasized that they were between private parties and that the public lacked
a legitimate interest in knowing the nature of the disputes. When government is suing or being
sued, there typically is a legitimate public interest, even in the allegations. The District of
Columbia Circuit in Reporters Committee recognized that civil matters in which a government
agency was a party appear always to have been outside what it called the pre-judgment nonac-
cess rule. Id. at 1336 n.8.
134. See supra text accompanying note 85.
135. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. at 2207.
136. See FED. R. Civ. P. 10 ("In the complaint the title of the action shall include the
names of all the parties.").
137. E.g., Kuhn v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 85 F.R.D. 86, 88 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (Due process
dictates that by "defendant be notified a reasonable amount of time before trial of the identity
September 1985] PSEUDONYMOUS PARTIES
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
mation arguably does not constitute impermissible censorship because
litigant identity, like "discovered" material, is made available only for
purposes of trying the lawsuit. As part of the pleadings, litigant identity
helps to give notice of the claims and defenses to be adjudicated, to frame
the issues, and to facilitate speedy resolution of insubstantial claims and
defenses. 138
The Rhinehart Court bolstered its conclusion by stressing the lim-
ited nature of the restraint: a party is free to disseminate any information
gained through means other than discovery. An equivalent limitation
probably would hold true in pseudonymous litigation. The only sources
for litigants' true identities as litigants are the court records and the liti-
gants themselves. If the litigants publicized their involvement in a law-
suit, the court would have no reason to keep that information con-
fidential.
Finally, the Court in Rhinehart implied that, just as litigants have
no first amendment right of access to information made available by dis-
covery, nonlitigants have no such first amendment right of access. It is
not so clear that the public today has no first amendment right of access
to litigants' names. 139 Moreover, once the judiciary acts, access promotes
public scrutiny of the judicial process, enhances both confidence in the
administration of the law and the therapeutic value of open proceedings,
and serves the structural function of the first amendment by enabling
informed discussion of judicial operations.140 These rationales do not ap-
ply before the court has acted.141
In sum, in view of the differences between pleadings and discovery,
of persons whose claims it must be prepared to defend against."); see also Brouillette v. Board
of Directors, 519 F.2d 126, 128 (8th Cir. 1975) (Due process required notice of the names of
those who had made allegations against a teacher.); Miller v. Dean, 430 F. Supp. 26, 28 (D.
Neb. 1976), affid per curiam, 552 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1977).
138. The parties' names, as part of the pleadings, may also help to decide questions of res
judicata and collateral estoppel. See C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 68 (4th
ed. 1983).
139. See supra note 133 & accompanying text.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 85-91.
141. See Marcus, supra note 120, at 11-15, 37-40. In discussing the pretrial discovery con-
text, Professor Richard Marcus has written that the goals of
heightening public respect for the judicial process and permitting public scrutiny of
judicial performance . ..ha[ve] little application . . . . Indeed, one objection to
allowing public access . . . is that in most cases no judge is present to rule on the
propriety of the inquiry being pursued. . . . A person observing a deposition would
garner only minimal insight into judicial decision-making.
Id. at 40. By analogy, pleadings and motions provide little insight into judicial decision mak-
ing. Hence, there need not be a constitutional right of immediate public access to such party-
generated papers. Moreover, the mere existence of a judicial decision allowing pseudonymous
filing should not create a right of access to filings that reveal the litigant's identity. That would
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it does not follow inevitably from Rhinehart that the unadorned good
cause standard of Rule 26(c) should apply to pseudonymous filings. The
differences between the two suggest that the higher standards of the
Court's access cases still could apply to pseudonymous and sealed filings
and to the related protective orders necessary to keep litigants' identities
from the public. 142
The Waiver Justification for Public Access
Those who oppose pseudonymous litigation argue that a plaintiff, by
initiating litigation, automatically waives any right to keep his identity
confidential from the public, his adversary, or the court. As noted above,
when a plaintiff brings suit and requests relief from the courts, he nor-
mally must identify himself to the court, the defendant, and the public at
large. On occasion, judicial opinions suggest that this always should be
so: when government is the defendant, "one who strikes the king should
do so unmasked or not at all;" 143 when a private party is the defendant,
basic fairness dictates that the defendant's accusers reveal their real
names. 144
These blanket arguments against pseudonymity should be rejected,
however, for they render too costly the exercise of the right to sue. Plain-
tiffs should not automatically be forced to choose between asserting their
substantive rights in court and thereby forfeiting their privacy or security
interests, and foregoing their substantive rights as the price of preserving
their privacy or security. The "either-or" approach interferes with plain-
tiffs' constitutional right to have claims adjudicated by the court, 145 and
obviously be self-defeating. Judicial decisions in a case, however, do implicate the first amend-
ment right of access.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14, 30.
143. Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 189 (5th Cir. 1981) (Gee, J., dissenting).
144. Southern Methodist Univ. Ass'n of Women Law Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d
707, 713 (5th Cir. 1979).
145. See Doe v. Bodwin, 119 Mich. App. 264, 266-70, 326 N.W.2d 473, 474-76 (1982)
(rejecting trial court's conclusion that plaintiff waived anonymity by fling suit, holding that
trial court had discretion to allow pseudonymous litigation, relying in part on-plaintifi's consti-
tutional rights to privacy and access to the courts). Individuals and groups have a constitu-
tional right of access to the courts, which includes a constitutional right to be heard on the
merits of their claims. The precise constitutional origins and scope of the right of access to the
courts are not clear. It may spring from the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974); Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371, 377 (1970).
In several early cases, the Court held the right to sue to be among the "privileges and
immunities" protected by article IV, section 2, paragraph 1, and by the fourteenth amendment
to the Constitution. See, eg., Chambers v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907).
The right of access to the courts also may be grounded in the first amendment. United
Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971) ("Collective activity undertaken
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minimizes the practical value of substantive rights accorded by legisla-
tures and courts. 146
It is particularly unacceptable to condition exercise of the right of
adjudication upon plaintiff's public disclosure of his identity when plain-
tiff sues to vindicate privacy rights. In such a situation, publicity would
inflict the very injury the litigant seeks to avoid by resort to the courts.
In some instances, this irony has not escaped the courts.147 Moreover,
insofar as the waiver argument automatically gives priority to the pub-
lic's claim of entitlement to know plaintiff's identity over plaintiff's claim
of entitlement to confidentiality, without examining the relative strengths
and weakness of those claims, it is bound to produce unjust and undesir-
able results. 148
Accordingly, the waiver argument should be rejected. Requests for
pseudonymity by plaintiffs or defendants should be treated equally. Both
plaintiffs and defendants should be required to demonstrate that the need
for confidentiality outweighs the public's interest in access to the liti-
gant's name. 149
to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the
First Amendment."); see California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unltd., 404 U.S. 508, 510
(1972) (right of access to the courts one aspect of the right to petition).
Finally, in some cases, a right of access to the courts is maintained without identifying the
specific constitutional source. See, e.g., McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 6 (4th Cir. 1972)
(Negligence by court clerk, which impeded filing of prisoner's petition for post-conviction re-
lief, violated his "constitutionality based" right of access to the courts.); see also 8 C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 2018, at 145 (1970) (referring to "constitutional right to bring
.an action").
146. When plaintiff sues to enforce a fundamental right, such as the constitutional right to
privacy, one could argue further that the first amendment and the due process clauses of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments forbid the courts from conditioning exercise of one funda-
mental right upon the waiver of another.
The first argument against waiver made in the text is weakest in cases in which plaintiffs
need not have joined the lawsuit in order for their rights to be protected. See, e.g., Southern
Methodist Univ. Ass'n of Women Law Students, v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707 (5th Cir.
1979); infra text accompanying notes 317-29.
147. Roe v. Ingraham, 364 F. Supp. 536, 541 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
148. See, e.g., Doe v. Bodwin, 119 Mich. App. 264, 270, 326 N.W.2d 473, 476 (1982)
(remanding for rehearing before a different judge because original trial judge had indicated
that he would never permit anonymity, and a proper exercise of discretion could result in
granting plaintiff's motion to proceed anonymously).
149. One might also suggest that pseudonymity sometimes, or even always, should be dis-
allowed as a way of screening out frivolous claims, on the theory that a claim to which a
plaintiff is unwilling to put his name is far more likely to be frivolous than is a claim that the
plaintiff is willing to publicly assert. This suggestion should be rejected as well. As discussed
below, there are many legitimate reasons for plaintiffs to seek pseudonymity, and there already
exist far more precise tools for identifying and quickly eliminating frivolous claims. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 56.
[Vol. 37THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
The Federal Rules' Lack of Guidance on Pseudonymity
Proponents of public access to all civil litigants' names also argue
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prohibit the use of pseudonyms
by parties. The Federal Rules nowhere authorize pseudonymous litiga-
tion. To the contrary, Rule 10(a) provides that "[i]n the complaint the
title of the action shall include the names of all the parties,"' 150 while
Rule 3 requires the complaint to be filed with the court in order to com-
mence a civil action. 5' Subsequent papers that are required to be served
on a party must also be fied with the court unless the court orders other-
wise, which it may do with certain discovery matters. 152 On rare occa-
sions, courts denying a request to allow a pseudonymous suit have
purported to rely upon the Federal Rules' failure to authorize the prac-
tice.' 53 Almost all courts that have considered this question, however,
have held that the Rules' silence on this issue, or even their contrary
implications, are not dispositive.' 54 These rulings reflect the better view.
Nothing in the Advisory Committee Notes to the Rules indicates that the
drafters were purporting to lay down an absolute rule that neither a civil
plaintiff nor a civil defendant ever could sue or be sued pseudonymously,
regardless of the particular circumstances. 55
Balancing the Interests in Confidentiality and Disclosure: A
Proposed Analysis
This Article has demonstrated the tension that exists between pseu-
donymous civil litigation and the first amendment rights of access to ju-
dicial proceedings, access to judicial records, and dissemination of
matters learned in litigation. It has examined case law in these areas to
ascertain the tests that courts should apply in determining whether, and
for how long, to allow particular civil cases to be conducted pseudony-
150. Id. Rule 10(a).
151. Rule 3 provides, "[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court."
Id. Rule 3.
152. Id. Rule 5(d).
153. E.g., Roe v. New York, 49 F.R.D. 279, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
154. See, eg., Coe v. District Court, 676 F.2d 411, 414 (10th Cir. 1982); Doe v. Stegall,
653 F.2d 180, 185 (5th Cir. 1981); Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 592 F.2d 1118, 1125
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 856 (1979); Free Mkt. Compensation v. Commodity Exch.,
Inc., 98 F.R.D. 311, 312-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Doe v. Rostker, 89 F.R.D. 158, 160-61 (N.D.
Cal. 1981) (Although the particular facts did not justify noncompliance with Rule 10(a), the
court recognized valid reasons for permitting plaintiffs to proceed anonymously.); Roe v.
Borup, 500 F. Supp. 127, 128-29 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (also rejecting the argument that the ab-
sence of true names on the summonses violated Rule 4(b)); Roe v. Ingraham, 364 F. Supp. 536,
541 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
155. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4, 10 advisory committee notes.
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mously. Neither present cases raising the pseudonymity issue nor the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide satisfactory guidance.
Accordingly, the author proposes that, at every stage of the proceed-
ings, the court should employ a balancing test that weighs the rights and
interests of each litigating party and the interests of the public. The
courts should not permit pseudonymous litigation on demand nor cate-
gorically disallow it. Very early in the litigation the public will have rela-
tively little interest in the litigants' names. Despite the fact that
pleadings and other filings that identify the litigants are historically part
of the public record,1 56 their accessibility, apart from any judicial deci-
sion in the case, does not promote the first amendment values and policy
grounds that form the foundation of public rights of access. 157 Conse-
quently, prior to judicial action, a balancing test that reflects the low
level of public interest in access and disclosure is appropriate: it should
suffice that the litigant show a legitimate interest that is rationally served
by pseudonymity. This can be called "cause." Because the historical
norm is for litigants to identify themselves, litigants seeking confidential-
ity should bear this burden of establishing a need for confidentiality.
By contrast, as the proceedings progress and the court decides issues
presented by the parties, the values served by public scrutiny of the judi-
cial process attach to an ever greater degree. Access to the identity of the
litigants is an ingredient of that public scrutiny. Though not as critical as
access to the proceedings, knowing the litigants' identities nevertheless
tends to sharpen public scrutiny of the judicial process, to increase confi-
dence in the administration of the law, to enhance the therapeutic value
of judicial proceedings, and to serve the structural function of the first
amendment by enabling informed discussion of judicial operations. In
light of these salutary effects, the balancing test should become more on-
erous to the party granted pseudonymity and seeking to maintain it, from
the time that the court renders any subsequent ruling or enters any sub-
sequent orders requested by any of the parties.
The proposed analysis does not require that, from that point on, the
party seeking to maintain confidentiality meet all of the tests of Press-
Enterprise.158 If Press-Enterprise would require that the litigant demon-
strate a high probability of irreparable harm to a compelling or an "over-
156. See supra note 133.
157. Similarly, the opposing litigant usually will not have any strong, legitimate first
amendment interest in publicizing the identity of his or her adversary. Certainly, an interest in
publicizing that information in order to harass the "pseudonymous" party, to deter other po-
tential plaintiffs, or to improperly influence the outcome of the litigation would be unworthy of
judicial recognition. But see infra text accompanying note 174.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14.
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riding interest"159 in order to maintain pseudonymity throughout the
litigation, it imposes an excessive burden in view of the limited impair-
ment of public scrutiny that pseudonymity entails. 6° A standard of
"reasonable probability of significant harm to an important interest," if
pseudonymity were denied, is more appropriate in light of this limited
impairment.1 61 In theory, the courts should allow only such confidenti-
ality as is necessary to preserve the important interest that has been
demonstrated. In the context of pseudonymous litigation, this limitation
does not appear to be meaningful. The court either will require that a
litigant's name be disclosed, or it will not. The disclosure is not a matter
of degree. 162 The remaining Press-Enterprise requirement, that the trial
court make findings adequate to support the "closure" on review,1 63
should be applied to the pseudonymity issue.
The public's first amendment right of access should prevail unless a
litigant demonstrates, under the standards set forth above, that his inter-
ests in privacy or security justify pseudonymity. This recommendation is
labelled the "substantial cause" standard.
The Interests Favoring Confidentiality
In determining whether a litigant has established "cause" or "sub-
159. It is not clear just what that formula requires. See Note, supra note 14, at 1846-47 &
n.198 ("The court noted in In re Herald Co., 734 F.2d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 1984), that the standard
suggested in the Richmond plurality--'an overriding interest articulated in findings,'-seems
conclusory unless it is intended to invoke the stringent "compelling interest" test required to
be met before conduct may be regulated by means that directly impair First Amendment free-
dom of expression.'" (citations omitted)).
160. See supra text accompanying note 92.
161. Cf In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
[E]ven if the most recent Supreme Court pronouncements on the subject can be said
to establish a rule of strict scrutiny, I would hesitate to apply that standard to issu-
ance of a provisional seaL Although the stricty scrutiny standard applied to closure
of criminal trials might appropriately be extended to permanent closure of civil trial
records, common sense suggests that a trial court ought to retain the flexibility to
issue provisional seals without meeting such an exacting test.
Id. at 1354 (Wright, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Wright would require the trial court
to conclude that the provisional seal was justified by a substantial government interest and that
there was no less restrictive means of accommodating that interest. I A statement by the
Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), which challenged the statutory disclosure re-
quirements imposed by federal election law, also is pertinent here. The Court said that "[t]he
evidence offered need show only a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure...
will subject. . . [people] to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials
or private parties." Id at 74.
162. However, the court should consider the alternative of identifying the litigant and
keeping from public scrutiny only those items of information about the litigant that warrant
protection.
163. See supra text accompanying note 14.
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stantial cause," the court should evaluate the magnitude of the pseudon-
ymous party's need to maintain confidentiality and the public interest in
his doing so. To make this appraisal, the court must consider a number
of factors.
First; the extent to which the identity of the litigant has been kept
confidential. If the information has been publicized or freely disclosed by
the party seeking pseudonymity, there is little privacy to protect. Addi-
tionally, the court should consider the feasibility of maintaining confiden-
tiality. Widespread knowledge of the litigant's identity as litigant or of
his connection with the matters in controversy renders "confidentiality"
relatively impracticable.
Second, the bases upon which disclosure is feared or sought to be
avoided, and the substantiality of these bases. Parties usually seek to sue
pseudonymously in order to preserve their privacy, 164 their security, or
164. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Supreme Court recognized a
constitutional right of privacy. The Court has since recognized that right to have two compo-
nents: the right not to disclose private information and the right to make personal decisions.
See Comment, The Constitutional Right to Withhold Private Information, 77 Nw. U.L. REV.
536, 537 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Private Information]; see also Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). The first component derives from the first, fourth, fifth, and
fourteenth amendments. Comment, Private Information, supra, at 554. It can be violated by
governmental collection and storage of data or by governmental release of data to the public or
to other government agencies. Id. at 537. Because the courts are part of the government, their
forced collection or release of personal data could violate the constitutional right not to dis-
close private information. If a court were to compel a litigant to disclose his identity or were
to release his identity to the public over the litigant's objection, this disclosure could violate the
litigant's constitutional right not to disclose private information. See generally Comment, A
Constitutional Right to Avoid Disclosure of Personal Matter: Perfecting Privacy Analysis in J.P.
v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981), 71 GEO. L.J. 219 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Com-
ment, Perfecting Privacy Analysis]; Comment, Private Information, supra.
Several cases illustrate the Court's view of the first component of privacy rights. In
Whalen, 429 U.S. 589, the Supreme Court first remarked that some of the cases protecting
"privacy" as a constitutional right protected "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters." Id. at 599. The Court implicitly acknowledged that interest was impaired
by a state statute that required physicians to disclose to the state the names and addresses of
patients and drugs prescribed for them. Id. at 593, 600. The patients, or their parents, feared
that the state records would be disclosed and would stigmatize those who had taken the drugs.
Id. at 595 & n.16. The Court held, however, that the statutory scheme did not on its face pose
a "sufficiently grievous threat" to this privacy interest to establish a constitutional violation.
Id. at 600. In so concluding, the Court relied upon two factors: the substantial security meas-
ures provided in the statute, and the unlikely possibility that administrators or judges would
fail to provide adequate protection against public disclosure. Id. at 593-95, 600-02. Compelled
disclosure merely to the state was not an impermissible invasion of privacy, the Court said,
because it was not significantly different from disclosures required under prior law nor from
"other unpleasant invasions of privacy ... associated with many facets of health care." Id. at
602.
The Court affirmed the constitutional nature of the interest in avoiding disclosure of per-
sonal matters in Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. at 425, 457 (1977), although
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both. In evaluating the substantiality of the interests asserted, the courts
can take some guidance from cases weighing privacy or security interests
in other contexts. 165 As shown below, the privacy and security interests
asserted by litigants seeking pseudonymity typically have been within the
ambit of the constitutional rights of privacy or liberty.166 Such interests
may override the first amendment based right of public access to judicial
the Court concluded that the particular challenged statute did not unconstitutionally invade
Mr. Nixon's right of privacy. Mr. Nixon claimed that the mandated archival screening of
certain documents and tape recordings made during his Presidency would violate his privacy
rights because the materials contained "extremely private communications between him and,
among others, his wife, his daughters, his physician, lawyer and clergyman, and his close
friends, as well as personal diary dictabelts and his wife's personal files." Id at 459. The
Court balanced the intrusion upon these privacy interests against the public interest in subject-
ing Presidential materials to archival screening and ruled against Mr. Nixon. Id at 455-65.
The other component of the right of privacy, the right to make personal decisions, has
generated more extensive judicial commentary. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), the Court struck down a statute forbidding the use, or aiding and abetting the use, of
contraceptives. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court held that the right to privacy
was "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy." Id. at 153. In general, the Court has afforded most protection to the right to make
autonomous decisions in areas such as marriage, procreation, contraception, family relation-
ships, childrearing, and child education. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invali-
dating a statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (invalidating a law prohibiting the private possession of obscene
material); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating a miscegenation statute); Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (affirming the right to decide how to educate one's
children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (affirming the decision to marry, establish a
family, and rear children). However, the Court has not limited the right not to disclose private
information to these fundamental rights. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 465; Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-
600. One commentator has argued for a right to avoid disclosure of personal matters, defined
as "information 1) that an individual wants to and has kept private or confidential, 2) that
except for the challenged government action can be kept private or confidential, and 3) that to
a reasonable person would be harmful or embarrassing if disclosed." Comment, Perfecting
Privacy Analysis, supra, at 238-40. This definition is reminiscent of the tort of public disclosure
of private information. The matter made public must be one that would be offensive and
objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 856-57 (4th ed. 1971).
It is clear then that the courts regard various matters as private and that they recognize a
constitutional right, of some dimension, not to disclose private information.
165. E.g., United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1364-65 (2d Cir. 1985) (Impanelling of
anonymous jury did not deprive accuseds of due process when court found a serious threat to
juror safety reasonably existed and took reasonable precautions to minimize the effect on the
jurors' opinions of the defendants.).
166. The interests in freedom from physical abuse, from harassment, and from interfer-
ence with the practice of an occupation, which typify certain pseudonymity cases, all have
roots in the "liberty" that is protected by the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitu-
tion. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), in which the court stated that
[liberty denotes] not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, to establish a home and bring up children, to worship
God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
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proceedings. 167
Third, the magnitude of the public interest in maintaining the confi-
dentiality of the litigant's identity.168 Some grounds for seeking anonym-
ity or pseudonymity may be more worthy of public support than
others. 169
Fourth, the undesirability of an outcome adverse to the pseudony-
mous party and attributable to his refusal to pursue the case at the price of
being publicly identified. A civil plaintiff could refuse to pursue a case
that would require his or her identification. A civil defendant could not
"opt out" in this fashion, but could choose not to defend on the merits.
The public, however, might have a stake in the litigation that would be
ill-served by either of these outcomes. 170  "Voluntary" dismissal of the
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happi-
ness by free men.
Id. at 399. And, in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), the court stated that
[the term liberty] is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the
enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and
work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any liveli-
hood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be
proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the
purposes above mentioned.
Id. at 589.
Disclosures compelled by the government, including the judicial branch, may constitute
violations of the rights to privacy and to "liberty," even when the objecting party is concerned
primarily about the knowledge thereby made available to, and the hostile reactions of, other
private individuals. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Buckley v. Valleo, 424 U.S.
1 (1975).
167. See Waller, 104 S. Ct. at 2216 (Privacy interests of persons not before the court may
justify closing portions of a suppression hearing.); Press-Enterprise, 484 U.S. at 512 (Privacy
interests of jurors may justify limited closure of voir dire.). It apparently does not matter
whether, in other contexts, the Court would characterize as "fundamental" the right of access
or some or all of the rights to privacy asserted in these cases. The Court characterizes consti-
tutional rights as "fundamental" or not to determine the stringency of the standard (rational-
ity, intermediate, or strict scrutiny) against which state imposed burdens will be tested. That is
not the context here. When there is tension between two constitutional rights, as there is here
between rights of access and rights of privacy or liberty, the Court uses a balancing approach.
See, e.g., Waller, 104 S. Ct. 2210; Press-Enterprise, 484 U.S. at 512.
If one were to pit a merely common-law right of access to judicial records against a consti-
tutional right of privacy or liberty, the latter necessarily would prevail. It seems unlikely,
however, that the right of access to judicial records will not be recognized to be of constitu-
tional stature, as its close relation, the right of access to judicial proceedings, has been held to
be.
168. See Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 592 F.2d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 856 (1979).
169. Compare infra text accompanying note 197 (public interests supporting pseudonym-
ity for women who challenge statutes regulating abortion) with infra text accompanying notes
200-03 (lesser public interests supporting pseudonymity for doctors making similar
challenges).
170. The public has a stake in civil rights litigation, for example, which may be ill-served
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action or entry of a default judgment could be worse than the impair-
ment of the public interest in access that would flow from maintaining
confidentiality. Consequently, to the extent that such dispositions would
not be in the public interest, and would be less desirable than permitting
the litigant to sue pseudonymously, there is greater reason for the court,
to permit and enforce pseudonymity.
Fifth, whether, because of the purely legal nature of the issues
presented, or otherwise, there is an atypically weak public interest in know-
ing the litigants' identities.
Sixth, whether the party seeking to sue pseudonymously has illegiti-
mate ulterior motives. A plaintiff might seek pseudonymity in an effort to
impair defendants' ability to defend themselves.1 71 A defendant might
seek pseudonymity as a diversionary tactic that would delay the litigation
and increase its costs to plaintiffs who would oppose the pseudonymity,
and to avoid appropriate public scrutiny of defendant's activities. 172 To
the extent these are the motivations, no cognizable need for pseudonym-
ity exists.
The Interests Favoring Disclosure
On the other side of the scale, the court should evaluate the interest
of the public in knowing the litigants' identifies. The court should con-
sider several factors.
First, the universal level ofpublic interest in access to the identities of
litigants. 173
Second, whether, because of the subject matter of the litigation, the
status of the litigant as a public figure, or otherwise, there is a particularly
by a plaintiff's voluntary or involuntary dismissal, or a defendant's default or refusal to defend
on the merits. Cf Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130, 657
F.2d 890, 904 (7th cir. 1981) (reversing dismissal of civil rights suit for failure of plaintiffs to
comply with discovery, stating that "[i]f there is any merit to the charges of discrimination
against minorities. . . the dismissal sanction rests too heavily upon the public"), cert denied,
455 U.S. 1017 (1982); Keller v. Hilgendorf, 79 F.R.D. 687, 689 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (Because
dismissal of a § 1983 action for plaintiff's failure to answer deposition questions would substan-
tially undercut § 1983, refusal to answer based upon fifth amendment privilege would not
result in dismissal unless questions posed were central to the plaintiff's claims.).
171. This motivation was charged in Southern Methodist Univ. Ass'n of Women Law
Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1979). See infra note 340.
172. Consider, for example, the case of Doe v. A. Corp., 709 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1983),
discussed infra text accompanying notes 360-68.
173. Waller, 104 S. Ct. at 2217 n.9 ("While the benefits of a public trial are frequently
intangible, difficult to prove, or a matter of chance, the Framers plainly thought them nonethe-
less real."). The Court also cited a case that spoke of "the great, though intangible, societal
loss that flows" from closing courthouse doors. Id. (quoting People v. Jones, 47 N.Y.2d 409,
416, 391 N.E.2d 1335, 1340, 418 N.Y.S.2d 359, 364, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 946 (1979)).
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strong public interest in knowing the litigants' identities, beyond the public
interest that normally obtains.
Third, whether the opposition to pseudonymity by counsel, the public,
or the press is illegitimately motivated. In particular, an opposing party
might be motivated by a desire to harass the party seeking to keep his
identity confidential and to force that party to drop his or her lawsuit or
defense in order to avoid disclosure. To the extent that the opposition to
pseudonymity is illegitimately motivated, no cognizable need for disclo-
sure exists.
When a plaintiff seeks to keep his identity confidential from his ad-
versary in litigation, as well as from the public, the court should also
consider the defendant's need for that information in order adequately to
prepare his defense. 174 In some situations, information about a plaintiff
other than identity or identifying traits would suffice to enable a defend-
ant to defend effectively. When the issues raised by a case are purely
legal, for example, defendants do not need information about a plaintiff
beyond that which determines whether plaintiff has standing and
whether a case or controversy exists. 175 In cases in which the claims are
dependent on factual issues peculiar to plaintiff's case, however, the de-
fendant's need to know his adversary's name may be such that refusal to
surrender that information would deny the defendant procedural due
process.176 Pseudonymity "may cause problems to defendants engaging
in discovery and establishing their defenses, and in fixing res judicata
effects of judgments."'' 77 The nature of the issues presented in each case
will determine whether pseudonymity vis-a-vis the litigation opponent
will pose such problems.
If a litigant, whether plaintiff or defendant, seeks to keep his identity
confidential from the courts, the judge must determine whether factors
peculiar to the functions of the court and the judicial system justify re-
quiring the litigant to reveal his true identity. 178 It may be necessary for
174. It is doubtful that a defendant could keep his identity confidential from the plaintiff,
because the plaintiff must have identified the defendant in order to commence the lawsuit. If
there is a way for a plaintiff to sue without identifying the defendant, the analysis in the text
would apply by analogy.
175. Campbell v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 515 F. Supp. 1239, 1246 (D.D.C.
1981).
176. See supra note 137 & accompanying text.
177. Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 592 F.2d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 856 (1979).
178. Some information about a plaintiff is necessary to enable the court to rule on disputed
questions such as whether the plaintiff has standing to sue, whether the "case or controversy"
requirement is met, and, in a class action, whether the plaintiff can adequately represent the
proposed class. This information can be restricted to the court, or to the court and defendant's
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the court to know the litigant's identity in order to ascertain whether he
has kept confidential both his identity as a litigant and his connection
with the matters in controversy. In some circumstances, knowing the
litigant's name also may aid the court in assessing the strength of the
grounds for pseudonymity and in judging whether there are illegitimate
or ulterior motivations behind the request.
Applying the Proposed Approach to Decided Cases
This section examines in some detail the types of cases in which
pseudonymity has been sought, 179 illustrates the application of the pro-
posed balancing approach to each category of cases, and identifies the
important competing interests in each factual setting. A review of the
cases addressing the question of pseudonymity reveals that they tend to
fall into one or more of several subject matter categories. Those catego-
ries are used here as an organizing principle, although the analysis pro-
posed above cuts across these groupings. The areas of federal litigation
in which pseudonymity most commonly has been sought involve: repro-
ductive rights; homosexuality and transsexuality; mental illness or defi-
ciency; drug use; criminality and unprofessional conduct; juveniles,
including delinquents, neglected, abused, and illegitimate children; pub-
lic aid; fears of bodily injury or economic or professional reprisal for ac-
tivity in the litigation; and corporate defendants who fear disclosure of
business information.180 The underlying concerns range across a spec-
trum from privacy interests to concerns about physical, emotional, and
economic security.
Reproductive Rights
Perhaps the best examples of the use of pseudonyms in cases involv-
ing reproductive rights are cases challenging the constitutionality of stat-
utes regulating abortion. In most of these cases, federal district courts
permitted the plaintiffs to proceed pseudonymously without any pub-
lished discussion of the reasons for, or methods of implementing, the de-
counsel. The fact that defendant makes an issue of these matters does not mean that a plaintiff
should be denied a pseudonym vis-a-vis the public, nor even, necessarily, vis-a-vis the defend-
ant or the court. See Campbell v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 515 F. Supp. 1239, 1246
(D.D.C. 1981); Doe v. Matthews, 420 F. Supp. 865, 873 (D.N.J. 1976).
179. In the vast majority of pertinent cases the courts have allowed, and perhaps some-
times disallowed, pseudonymity without analysis and consideration of the competing interests
in access. If analysis was done, it was not reflected in published opinions.
180. In state court proceedings, there are some additional categories of cases in which
pseudonymity and similar identity hiding devices have been used with some frequency. E.g.,
C. v. C., 320 A.2d 717 (Del. 1974) (a divorce action).
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cision. 181  Doe v. Deschamps'1 2 contains one of the most thorough
discussions. In Deschamps, a pregnant woman and her doctor sued as
Jane Doe and John Moe, respectively, to challenge the constitutionality
of Montana's abortion laws. After noting the recent practice of permit-
ting individuals to sue under fictitious names "where the issues involved
are matters of a sensitive and highly personal nature,"1 8 3 the court
opined that
[lawsuits are public events and the public has a legitimate interest in
knowing the facts involved in them. Among those facts is the identity
of the parties. We think that as a matter of policy the identity of the
parties to a lawsuit should not be concealed except in the unusual case.
The intensely personal nature of pregnancy does, we believe, create an
unusual case, and in such a case the general policy of full disclosure
may well give way to a policy of protecting privacy in a very private
matter. The doctor-plaintiff, however, does not bring his personal life
into the lawsuit. If a person, free to choose, intends to do a future act
which relates to his professional or economic life, we see no reason to
grant to him the privilege of anonymity in an action brought to deter-
mine the legality of that future act. 184
More frequently, the court's discussion of pseudonymity is fragmen-
tary. Thus, in Bossier City Medical Suite, Inc. v. City of Bossier City,185
the court allowed "Louise Doe," a pregnant woman, to act as class repre-
sentative in a suit against a city zoning department, which alleged dis-
crimination in the denial of a zoning certificate for an abortion clinic.
The court simply noted that "[t]he chilling effect of publicly airing so
private a matter as the decision to terminate a pregnancy may well pre-
clude a woman from seeking vindication of her constitutional rights in
181. See, e.g., Christensen v. Wisconsin Medical Bldg., 551 F. Supp. 565 (W.D. Wis.
1982); Doe v. Busbee, 471 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Doe v. Matthews, 420 F. Supp. 865,
873 (D.N.J. 1976); Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla.), af'd per curiam, 417 U.S.
279 (1974); Poe v. Charlotte Memorial Hosp., 374 F. Supp. 1302 (W.D.N.C. 1974); In re
Guardianship of Barbara Boe, 322 F. Supp. 872 (D.D.C. 1971); Doe v. Dunbar, 320 F. Supp.
1297 (D. Colo. 1970); Doe v. Randall, 314 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1970), affd sub nom. Hodg-
son v. Randall, 402 U.S. 967 (1971).
182. 64 F.R.D. 652 (D. Mont. 1974) (per curiam).
183. Id. at 653. An early and noteworthy state court case is Buxton v. Ullman, 147 Conn.
48, 156 A.2d 508 (1959), appeal dismissed, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), in which plaintiffs, a physician
and several of his patients, challenged the constitutionality of state legislation that forbade the
use and prescription of contraceptives. The court said:
Because of the intimate and distressing details alleged in these complaints, it is un-
derstandable that the parties who are allegedly medical patients would wish to be
anonymous .... The privilege of using fictitious names in actions should be
granted only in the rare case where the nature of the issue litigated and the interest of
the parties demand it and no harm can be done to the public interest.
Id. at 60, 156 A.2d at 514-15.
184. Deschamps, 64 F.R.D. at 653.
185. 483 F. Supp. 633 (W.D. La. 1980).
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Federal court." 18 6
Because the use of pseudonyms generally has not been appealed,
federal appellate decisions on reproductive rights typidally contain no
discussion of the issue or merely note the use of fictitious names. 18 7 In
Doe v. Poelker, s8  a case challenging policies and procedures that limited
the availability of nontherapeutic abortions in city hospitals, the Eighth
Circuit commented that the plaintiffs pseudonym had been used
throughout the litigation "to avoid harassment due to the controversial
nature of the subject matter of this action."'189 And, in Indiana Planned
Parenthood Affiliates Association v. Pearson,190 in which plaintiffs chal-
lenged a procedure for bypassing the prohibition against physicians per-
forming abortions on unemancipated minors without prior parental
notification, the court obseryed that "it is doubtful that a case involving
waiver of notification is a matter of general public interest, because...
only the minor, the parents, and the abortion provider have an interest in
the case. For reasons of confidentiality, the public is not even supposed to
know the identity of the minor."' 9 '
In most abortion cases, there was no vigorous opposition to pseudo-
nymity, so the courts were not pressed to analyze the issue thoroughly.
A more complete analysis, which should be sufficiently elastic to account
for factual variables, appears below.
Cases litigating abortion issues present strong interests favoring con-
186. Id. at 644 (citations omitted). For cases not on abortions but other aspects of repro-
ductive rights and sexual privacy, see Doe v. Delaware, 450 U.S. 382 (1981) (per curiam)
(parental rights of half brother and sister); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263
(7th Cir. 1983) (women who had been strip searched allowed to sue pseudonymously); Doe v.
United States, 718 F.2d 1039 (1lth Cir. 1983) (rape victim allowed to sue pseudonymously in
civil action); Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1981) (rape victim allowed to sue
pseudonymously in civil action). The Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise indicated that a ju-
ror's privacy interest in the information that she, or a member of her family, had been raped,
but had declined to seek prosecution because of the embarrassment and emotional trauma that
would flow from disclosure would be a "legitimate" interest that could properly lead to a
limited closure of voir dire. Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 512.
187. See. e.g., Akron Center For Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d
1198, 1210 (6th Cir. 1981), affd in part & rev'd in part, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Doe v. Charleston
Area Medical Center, Inc., 529 F.2d 638, 645 (4th Cir. 1975); Doe v. Ceci, 517 F.2d 1203 (7th
Cir. 1975); Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd mem., 428 U.S. 901 (1976); Noe
v. True, 507 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Doe v. Hale Hosp., 500 F.2d 144 (1st Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 907 (1975); Doe v. General Hosp. of D.C., 434 F.2d 427 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (class action);
188. 515 F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'dper curiam on other grounds, 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
189. Id. at 542 n.1.
190. 716 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1983).
191. Id. at 1136 (footnote omitted). This was not said in the context of discussing the
pseudonyms, however.
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fidentiality. In most such cases, the litigants' identities have been kept
confidential. The first question, then, is the substantiality of the bases
upon which the litigant seeks to avoid identification. A pregnant wo-
man's desire to keep confidential the fact that she seeks an abortion con-
cerns a fundamental right. 1 92 The United States Supreme Court has held
that the constitutional right to make personal decisions encompasses a
woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. 193 There is thus no ques-
tion that, although the state has an interest in the decision, this decision
is recognized as a personal matter that affects the physical, psychological,
and economic welfare of the woman. I94
Additionally, the decision to abort a fetus-indeed, the right of indi-
viduals to decide to abort-is a very controversial matter in our society
and can stigmatize the woman. Additional stigma may attach to unmar-
ried women and those who seek public funding or facilities for abor-
tions.' 95 Acts of harassment against women who plan, or have had,
abortions are not uncommon. 196 Under these circumstances, a reason-
able person could regard disclosure of her decision to challenge abortion
laws as embarrassing and harmful.
Because women have a qualified constitutional right to terminate
their pregnancies, there is also a public interest in maintaining the confi-
dentiality of these women litigants' identities. As recognized in Bossier
City, without such confidentiality women would be deterred from suing
to vindicate their constitutional rights. By the same token, the "volun-
tary" dismissal of these lawsuits, which might follow from requiring
pregnant plaintiffs to disclose their names publicly in order to pursue the
suits, would not advance the vindication of constitutional rights. 97
There is no indication in the cases that the women sought to sue pseu-
donymously for any illegitimate ulterior motives. In addition, the public
interest in access to these litigants' names is atypically weak because they
192. Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973).
193. Id. at 153.
194. Id.
195. See infra text accompanying notes 304-15.
196. See F. JAFFE, B. LINDHEIM & P. LEE, ABORTION POLITICS, PRIVATE MORALITY
AND PUBLIC POLICY 237-38 (1981) (describing harassment of patients, an invasion of an oper-
ating room that frightened and possibly endangered a patient, children chasing women leaving
an abortion clinic and shouting "murderers," and attacks on abortion clinics from vandalism
to arson); K. LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 217 (1984) (noting
attacks on abortion clinics by arsonists); L. WARDLE & M. WOOD, A LAWYER LOOKS AT
ABORTION 79, 81 (1982) (noting arguments against spousal participation requirements).
197. Some women, of course, would not be deterred by a disclosure requirement. More-
over, insofar as doctors are granted standing to assert the same or different claims also leading
to the invalidation of unconstitutional abortion legislation, the constitutional rights involved
would be vindicated. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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sue as fungible members of a class, whether or not the suit technically is
framed as a class action. They challenge statutes and government poli-
cies as facially unconstitutional. In such instances, neither first amend-
ment values nor the other policies supporting openness are substantially
served by identification of the litigant, unless she is a public figure. Igno-
rance of the plaintiff's identity will not make public discussion less in-
formed or substantially reduce the therapeutic value for the community.
When the issues presented are purely legal questions of interpretation
and constitutionality that will affect a whole class of persons, it is rela-
tively unlikely that judicial bias or partiality toward the plaintiff will af-
fect the decision. Accordingly, pseudonymity should not undermine
public confidence in the administration of the law. Nor will the public's
inability to identify the plaintiff be likely to affect the availability of rele-
vant testimony. Consequently, the public interest in access to the plain-
tiff's name is especially weak.
As indicated, the interests favoring disclosure in these cases are not
compelling. While there is great societal interest in the issue of abortion
generally and in the validity of particular abortion legislation, there is no
extraordinary public interest in knowing the identities of individual wo-
men who have initiated challenges. Certainly, a desire for identifying
information for the purpose of intimidating, harassing or retaliating
against plaintiffs is illegitimate motivation, which the courts should not
respect.
On balance, then, pseudonymity ordinarily should be granted to
pregnant women challenging abortion legislation, and in fact, it has been.
Such women usually will have demonstrable "substantial cause" to keep
their identities confidential from the public.
The cases indicate little about whether these women sought to keep
their identities confidential from the defendants or from the courts,
whether the defendants actively sought the information, or whether the
courts cared to insist upon it. At least some courts have been satisfied to
accept pseudonymous affidavits to establish the plaintiff's existence and
her pregnant state at the commencement of the action, so as to establish
standing and a constitutional case or controversy. 198 This procedure is
adequate to satisfy the needs of the judicial system in these areas. More-
over, because the issues raised on the merits of these cases are essentially
legal issues-the constitutionality of particular regulations-the identity
of the plaintiff is not essential for res judicata or collateral estoppel pur-
198. E.g., Doe v. Poelker, 497 F.2d 1063, 1065 n.2 (8th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds,
432 U.S. 519 (1977); Buxton v. Ullman, 147 Conn. 48, 156 A.2d 508, 515 (1959), appeal dis-
missed, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
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poses. Because these cases usually turn on legal issues and factual mat-
ters not peculiar to the plaintiff, the defendants ordinarily will not have a
great need to know the plaintiffs identity in order to adequately defend
the case.199
A second pseudonymity issue in the abortion cases involves doctors
seeking to use fictitious names when challenging abortion regulations.
Here, the balance is different. The doctors' personal privacy is not at
stake. Rather, the litigating doctors' desire for anonymity is predicated
on their concern that their advocacy of abortion will be unpopular, and
hence will adversely affect their professional status and economic well-
being. This is a security concern, broadly defined. In some circum-
stances, the doctors' allegations, made to establish their standing to sue,
might also subject them to the risk of criminal prosecution. 2°° Moreover,
because physicians have a right to practice their profession without un-
due infringement by the state,20 1 there is also a public interest in main-
taining the confidentiality of physicians' identities if they otherwise
would be deterred from suing when necessary to vindicate their rights.20 2
The interests favoring disclosure include the universal public inter-
est in access to litigants' identities, weakened to the extent that purely
199. In Doe v. Poelker, 497 F.2d 1063, 1065 n.2 (8th Cir. 1974), the court noted that Doe
was ready and able to appear for deposition or other discovery procedures. However, this does
not necessarily imply that her name would be among the factual information to be made avail-
able to the defendant. Id.
200. In Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the Court held that plaintiff physicians had
standing to contest the constitutionality of Georgia's abortion law that required a physician to
submit her or his individual judgment to committee approval. Id. at 188. The physicians
alleged that this law chilled and deterred them from practicing their profession and deprived
them of rights guaranteed by the first, fourth, and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 186. The
Court concluded that:
The physician is the one against whom these criminal statutes directly operate in the
event he procures an abortion that does not meet the statutory exceptions and condi-
tions. The physician-appellants, therefore, assert a sufficiently direct threat of per-
sonal detriment. They should not be required to await and undergo a criminal
prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.
Id. at 188 (citations omitted).
201. See id. at 199-200.
202. Some physicians, however, would not be deterred by a disclosure requirement. More-
over, insofar as pregnant women have standing to assert the same or different claims also
leading to the invalidation of unconstitutional abortion legislation, the physicians' rights in-
volved still would be vindicated. See, e.g., id. at 187. Although one might read Bolton to
indicate that certain aspects of Georgia's abortion law were stricken only because of the doc-
tors' rights, see id. at 198-200, the Court has explained in a later opinion that if the statutory
restrictions on abortion procedures "had not impacted upon the woman's freedom to make a
constitutionally protected decision, if they had merely made the physician's work more labori-
ous or less independent without any impact on the patient, they would not have violated the
Constitution." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604-05 n.33 (1977).
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legal issues are posed, but strengthened by the additional public interest
that might attach by virtue of the nature of the litigation and doctors'
service role in society. The public has an interest in knowing the identity
of doctors who champion causes such as abortion because patients have a
right to choose not to associate with physicians who hold views they find
abhorrent. They cannot exercise that right if they cannot determine
which doctors champion such views. Consequently, there is a particular
public interest in knowing doctors' identities in these cases. Indeed, the
public's interest in knowing is precisely the converse of doctors' fear of
disclosure because of its potential economic and professional ramifica-
tions. In these situations, the patients' interests are superior.20 3
If disclosure of a doctor's identity would also subject him to a seri-
ous risk of violent retaliation, however, resolving the issue of disclosure
becomes more complicated. As a practical matter, a court could not
limit access to the doctor's identity to persons with peaceful and proper
purposes while denying access to persons with illegal designs. The court
must hold either the risks to the doctor or the public interest in disclo-
sure paramount. Pseudonymity for the doctor also may be appropriate
when the suit entails a risk of criminal prosecution. In other contexts,
the courts have allowed plaintiffs to sue by pseudonym to protect their
fifth amendment right not to incriminate themselves. 20 4 That principle,
if valid, should apply to similarly situated doctors.20 5
Homosexuality and Transsexuality
There are a few cases in which transvestites, transsexuals, or persons
who had engaged in homosexual conduct sued under pseudonyms to
challenge adverse actions taken against them. As in cases involving
abortion, there is little significant discussion of reasons supporting the
pseudonymity.20 6 One recent district court case briefly discussed the is-
203. See, eg., Deschamps, 64 F.R.D. at 653.
204. See, eg., Doe v. Miller, 573 F. Supp. 461 (N.D. Ill. 1983), discussed infra text accom-
panying note 262-63.
205. The validity of the fifth amendment argument, however, is in doubt. The Supreme
Court's reasoning in a recent case, Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research
Group, 104 S. Ct. 3348 (1984), described infra note 270, might apply by analogy: compelling
physicians to identify themselves when alleging their violation of abortion laws does not violate
their fifth amendment rights because the physicians are under no compulsion to bring suit-
they could rely on women seeking abortions to do so. Furthermore, they can challenge the
constitutionality of the abortion laws in any criminal proceedings brought against them. Yet
the Supreme Court has held that physicians seeking to overturn abortion legislation should not
be required to await and undergo criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief. Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1983).
206. See, eg., Doe v. Department of Transp., 412 F.2d 674, 675 (8th Cir. 1969) (challeng-
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sue. In Doe v. McConn,20 7 a challenge to a city ordinance making it un-
lawful to appear in public dressed as a member of the opposite sex, the
court did explain that the transvestite plaintiffs were using fictitious
names in order "to insulate themselves from possible harassment, to pro-
tect their privacy, and to protect themselves from prosecution resulting
from this action. '20 8
Applying the proposed analysis to this situation, there is no sugges-
tion in the cases that the plaintiffs were commonly known to be homosex-
uals, transsexuals, or transvestites. If that fact was well known, however,
the plaintiffs had little privacy interest to protect. 20 9 Assuming that the
plaintiffs had kept their sexual or clothing preferences and their sexual
histories confidential, the next question is how substantial the bases were
upon which they sought pseudonymity. Thus far, most courts have re-
jected arguments that the constitutional rights of privacy to make per-
sonal decisions encompasses a right to engage in homosexual conduct.210
ing denial of medical certificate necessary for pilot's license because of homosexual activities
and conviction for sodomy); Doe v. Alexander, 510 F. Supp. 900 (D. Minn. 1981) (transsexual
challenged Army medical regulations disqualifying transsexuals from service); McClure v.
Harris, 503 F. Supp. 409, 412 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (plaintiff who was denied reimbursement
for a sex-change operation, challenged certain medicare hearing procedures), rev'd sub nom.
Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond,
403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (challenging constitutionality of statute that made sodomy
a crime), affd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976); Doe v. Chaffee, 355 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1973)
(homosexual challenged validity of his undesirable discharge from the Navy); see also Anony-
mous v. Macy, 398 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1968) (challenging discharge from civil service position
for alleged homosexual conduct), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1041 (1969).
207. 489 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
208. Id. at 77.
209. In Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 592 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 856 (1979), Lindsey was arrested by defendant store's security guard for allegedly
attempting to persuade him to engage in a homosexual act in the men's room. Thereafter,
Lindsey was acquitted in a state criminal action. He then sued claiming false imprisonment,
malicious prosecution, assault and battery, slander, and civil rights violations. Id. at 1120. He
attempted to sue pseudonymously, but the court clerk refused to accept the complaint and a
judge concurred with the clerk. Lindsey then substituted his true name and appealed the
judge's decision. The Tenth Circuit concluded that there had been no abuse of discretion. The
court stated that there did not seem to be "a social interest in the concealment of [plaintiff's]
identity." Id. at 1125. Furthermore, "Lindsey had already suffered the worst of the publicity
and embarrassment by being named a defendant in a state criminal trial. . . . [T]he only way
his reputation can be restored. . . is by a court ruling in his favor and name on his claims."
Id. (emphasis added). This is consistent with the argument that one has little privacy to lose if
his name already has become publicly associated with embarrassing facts.
210. In a case summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court, one district court upheld a stat-
ute making homosexual conduct a crime, after finding that homosexual conduct bears no rela-
tion to marriage, procreation, or family life. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond,
403 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 (E.D. Va. 1975), affd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976). In 1984, the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia also rejected the argument. Dronenberg v. Zech, 741
F.2d 1388, 1391-97 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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A shift has begun however; the Eleventh Circuit now has held that a
Georgia sodomy statute infringed upon fundamental constitutional rights
of practicing homosexuals, and that, in order to establish the statute's
validity, the state would be required to demonstrate a compelling interest
in regulating the proscribed conduct. 211 There is no recognized constitu-
tional right to become a transsexual or to behave as a transvestite.
212
Nonetheless, people may have a right not to disclose their sexual histo-
ries and preferences, and a strong interest in nondisclosure. Matters of
sexual identity and sexual preference are exceedingly personal. More-
over, homosexuality traditionally has been condemned in this country
and many people attach stigma to homosexual conduct. 213 Similarly,
while sex-change operations are too new to carry a long history of con-
demnation and stigma, the experience of homosexuals and transvestites
strongly indicates a similar public response. Further, the stigma attach-
ing to those whose sexual conduct does not conform to the mainstream
has often been accompanied by physical violence.2 14 In addition, when
homosexual activity or transvestism is unlawful, the disclosure of iden-
tity can subject individuals to the risk of prosecution. For these reasons,
211. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1212-13 (1lth Cir.), cert granted, 54 U.S.L.W.
3292 (U.S. Nov. 5, 1985) (No. 85-140). Courts also have found that other forms of discrimina-
tion against homosexuals violated various constitutional rights. See, e.g., Gay Alliance v. Mat-
thews, 544 F.2d 162, 167 (4th Cir. 1976) (refusal to allow homosexual student group equal
access to state university facilities invalidated under first amendment); benShalom v. Secretary
of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 969, 973-77 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (regulation requiring discharge
based on homosexual tendencies, desire, or interest, without overt acts, held unconstitutional
under first and ninth amendments and right to privacy.). See generally Note, The Constitu-
tional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARv. L.
REV. 1285 (1985) (arguing that courts should recognize homosexuality as a suspect classifica-
tion under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and should subject laws
that discriminate on the basis of sexual preference to heightened scrutiny).
212. The cases typically have involved allegations that discrimination based on transsexu-
ality violated Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1982). E.g., Sommers v. Budget
Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977).
213. Droneburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Bray v. United States, 515 F.2d
1383, 1391 (Ct. CI. 1975) (per curiam); see Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 122 (1967) (A
homosexual alien was excludable under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8
U.S.C. § 1251 (1982), as one "afflicted with [a] psychopathic personality"; Congress' purpose
was to exclude "all homosexuals and other sex perverts.").
214. Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 105 S. Ct. 1373, 1377 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("Because of the immediate and severe opprobrium often manifested against homo-
sexuals once so identified publicly, members of this group are particularly powerless to pursue
their rights openly in the political arena. Moreover, homosexuals have historically been the
object of pernicious and sustained hostility. ... ); CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON PERSONAL
PRIVACY, REPORT OF THE COMM'N 341, 375-85 (1982); Paul, Minority Status for Gay People.
Majority Reaction and Social Context, in HoMOSExuALITY: SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND
BIOLOGICAL ISSUES 359-61, 368, 369 n.10 (1982).
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a reasonable person challenging related laws or policies would regard dis-
closure of such sexual conduct as embarrassing and harmful. In addi-
tion, the claims being asserted are substantial; they present issues
seriously affecting the claimants' quality of life. It would not be in the
public interest to deter these plaintiffs from bringing their suits by cate-
gorically requiring them to sue in their true names or not at all.
The interests in pseudonymity must be balanced against the interests
in disclosure in these cases. When purely legal questions are presented,
the public interest in party identification is low.2 1 5 The public interest in
access is arguably supplemented by a particular interest in knowing the
identity of homosexuals, transsexuals, and transvestites in the commu-
nity. Those heterosexuals who so choose would then be free to avoid
their company. Absent a ground for avoidance beyond moral condemna-
tion, however, the author's view is that there is no supplemental public
interest in access to which the courts should defer. As was true with
doctors, the balance is affected dramatically when disclosure of identity
would subject the homosexuals, transsexuals, or transvestites to a serious
risk of violent retaliation to person or property.216
Courts and defendants will not have a strong interest in knowing
these plaintiffs' identities when purely legal issues are presented. To the
extent that claims are dependent on factual issues peculiar to plaintiff's
case, however, the need will be greater. The federal cases in this area do
not reflect any debate over these issues.
Mental Illness or Deficiency
Typically, as in the other categories of cases examined thus far,
cases involving mental illness or deficiency at most briefly mention the
interests supporting pseudonymity. 217 Some cases note the use of ficti-
215. See supra text accompanying notes 197-98.
216. The balance also is affected when a denial of pseudonymity would impose a risk of
criminal prosecution. See supra text accompanying notes 204-05.
217. Cases allowing pseudonyms without discussion include: Doe v. Anrig, 692 F.2d 800
(1st. Cir. 1982); Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981); Doe v. Marshall, 622
F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 993 (1981); Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704 (3d
Cir. 1979); Koe v. Califano, 573 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1978); Doe v. Hampton, 566 F.2d 265 (D.C.
Cir. 1977); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1977); Woe v. Cuomo, 559 F.
Supp. 1158 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, 729 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 339 (1984);
Doe v. Harris, 495 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926 (N.D.
Cal. 1979); Doe v. Gallinot, 486 F. Supp. 983 (C.D. Cal. 1979), affd, 657 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir.
1981); Doe v. Lally, 467 F. Supp. 1339 (D. Md. 1979); Woe v. Mathews, 408 F. Supp. 419
(E.D.N.Y. 1976), afl'd mem. sub nom. Woe v. Weinberger, 562 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1048 (1978).
There are also cases in which a deformed child who is technically not a party to the
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tious names to protect the plaintiffs' privacy, 218 or to avoid public embar-
rassment or ridicule.219 In others, the courts recognize the stigma or the
adverse economic ramifications of being labelled "mentally ill. ' 220 In at
least one instance, a state court held that when public identification of
the plaintiff would jeopardize her emotional stability and continued em-
ployment, the court could properly exercise its discretion to grant plain-
tiff's motion to suppress her name from public disclosure.221
In weighing the interests favoring confidentiality, none of the cases
suggests that the plaintiffs had failed to keep confidential their status as
mentally ill persons. Assuming that confidentiality had been maintained,
the next question is the substantiality of the bases for nondisclosure of
their names. Obviously, public disclosure of a person's mental illness,
emotional problems, or intellectual deficiencies often would be humiliat-
ing.222 It is equally true that the mentally ill or deficient are
stigmatized. 223
litigation is referred to by pseudonym only. See, e.g., United States v. University Hosp., State
Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984).
218. E-g., Doe v. Lawson, 579 F. Supp. 1314, 1315 n.1 (D. Mass.), aff'd mem., 745 F.2d
43 (1st Cir. 1984) (Parents of a severely retarded child challenged proposed change of his
educational placement under the Education of the Handicapped Acts, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461
(1982).); Doe v. Syracuse School Dist., 508 F. Supp. 333 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (Plaintiff claimed
school district failed to hire him as a teacher's assistant and substitute teacher because of his
prior mental illness, in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).);
Doe v. Bodwin, 119 Mich. App. 264, 326 N.W.2d 473, 474 (198"2).
219. See Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1120 (D. Hawaii 1976) (challenge to
constitutionality of state mental health law), affid in part & rev'd in part sub nom. Suzuki v.
Yven, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980).
220. See Doe v. Anker, 451 F. Supp. 241, 249-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
986 (1980) (Tenured teacher sued alleging violation of his constitutional and statutory rights in
his placement on involuntary health leave and in the termination of his employment upon a
finding that he was unfit to teach by reason of mental illness, schizophrenia, and severe emo-
tional disturbance. The court agreed that plaintiff had been denied a liberty interest in his good
name and reputation as a person presumably free from mental disorder, without due process of
law.).
221. Doe v. Bodwin, 119 Mich. App. 264, 326 N.W.2d 473 (1982) (Plaintiff desired to
avoid the sensational publicity that would accompany her allegation that a prominent psychol-
ogist had had sexual intercourse with her during therapy.).
222. See, e.g., Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565, 571 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). Society's
respect for privacy in this realm is manifested in the widespread recognition of a psychothera-
pist-patient privilege. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 98 (3d ed. 1984).
223. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 601 (1979) ("what is truly 'stigmatizing' is the
symptomatology of a mental or emotional illness"); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429
(1979) (a victim of debilitating mental illness not free of stigma); Johnson v. Solomon, 484 F.
Supp. 278, 284 n.4, 287 (D. Md. 1979) (Stigmatization can arise from involuntary commitment
to a mental hospital.); Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 459 F. Supp.
30, 39 (E.D. Pa. 1978) ("stigma attaches to institutional commitment whether the juvenile is
classified as mentally ill or mentally retarded" (footnotes omitted)), rev'd on other grounds, 442
U.S. 640 (1979); Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 449 (S.D. Iowa 1976) ("the legal and
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There is a considerable public interest in maintaining the confidenti-
ality of these litigants' identities, for preventing such stigma is in the pub-
lic interest as well as the litigants' private interest. Moreover, name
protection may be essential to avoid deterring the allegedly mentally ill
or deficient, or their families, from suing to vindicate established rights or
to establish new rights. Name protection also may be a factor in encour-
aging the mentally ill and deficient to seek and participate fully in treat-
ments and programs intended for their benefit.224 Pseudonymity in
treatment-related litigation would be part of the larger confidentiality
surrounding treatment programs. Finally, it often would not be in the
public interest for these plaintiffs to drop their lawsuits in order to pre-
serve their privacy, for the challenges they bring benefit society at large.
If emotionally disturbed or retarded children are not educated, all society
loses from their lessened abilities; if committed persons are given only
custodial care and not treatment, all society loses from their lessened
ability to work and to contribute.
The chief interest favoring disclosure is the general public interest in
access to litigants' names. There would not seem to be any extraordinary
public interest grounded in the nature of the litigation. Out of ignorance
or fear, some people might desire to avoid association with, or to harass,
the mentally ill or deficient, but those are not interests the court should
respect. If a particular individual who is a danger to others is free in the
community, that fact could furnish a reason to deny pseudonymity,
though far more effective protections should be afforded in such a case.
The public does have a particular interest in litigation that involves the
expenditure of public funds.225 That public interest in the litigation is
little served, however, by knowledge of the claimant's name. Thus, the
mentally ill and deficient often can establish "substantial cause" to sue
pseudonymously.
There is little indication in the cases as to whether the plaintiffs
sought to keep their identities confidential from the defendants or the
social consequences of commitment constitute a stigma of mental illness which can be as
debilitating as that of criminal conviction" (citations omitted)). See generally Gove & Fain,
The Stigma of Mental Hospitalization, 28 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 494 (1973);
Schwartz, Myers, & Astrachan, Psychiatric Labeling and the Rehabilitation of the Mental Pa-
tient, 31 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 329 (1974).
224. See, e.g., Doe v. Anker, 451 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Doe v. Bodwin, 119 Mich.
App. 264, 326 N.W.2d 473 (1982).
225. It does so, for example, when the appropriateness of the education plan for a handi-
capped child is at issue, when persons who have been civilly committed seek additional proce-
dural safeguards, when patients seek to improve conditions in institutions, and when patients
seek reimbursement for expenses incurred for their care. See supra notes 217-19.
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court.226 For cases in which the qualities of a particular individual are
central, such as those involving children's personalized education plans,
there is a strong argument for access by the defendant and the court to
the plaintiff's name. As previously noted, when a case presents a pure
legal issue there-is much less need for such disclosure.
Drug Use
A fourth category of cases in which plaintiffs have sought to sue
pseudonymously are those involving plaintiffs' legal or illegal use of
drugs. In some of the cases, plaintiffs sought reform of laws criminal-
izing drug use; in others, they sought to learn what information the
government had about their drug use; in a few instances, plaintiffs chal-
lenged reporting requirements.227 The factors favoring confidentiality in-
clude the fact that plaintiffs apparently had kept their drug use and their
lawsuits confidential. 228 The plaintiffs' wish for pseudonymity was based
in part on the desire for privacy with respect to health, medical treat-
ments, or drug use.229 Plaintiffs were concerned also about the stigma
that attaches to drug users.
These grounds for desiring to sue pseudonymously are often sub-
stantial. The Supreme Court in Whalen v. Roe 230 recognized that
mandatory disclosure to the government of legal use of particular pre-
scription drugs is an invasion of privacy, although not necessarily imper-
missible.231 Whether a reasonable person would regard disclosure of
drug use as embarrassing or harmful, however, depends on the drug in
question.232 As the Second Circuit noted in another case, "[i]t is immate-
226. There are exceptions. E.g., Suzuki v. Quissenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1120 (D.
Hawaii 1976) (mentioned that plaintiff's identity had been made available to the court).
227. See, eg., Roe v. Ingraham, 480 F.2d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 1973); Doe v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 93 F.R.D. 483, 484 (D. Colo. 1982); Louisiana Affiliate of Nat'l Org. for
Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Guste, 380 F. Supp. 404, 405 (E.D. La. 1974), affid mem., 511
F.2d 1400 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 867 (1975).
228. There are no indications to the contrary in the cases.
229. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 227.
230. 429 U.S. 589 (1977); see supra note 164.
231. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602.04. Justice Brennan added that "[b]road dissemination by
state officials of such information. . . would clearly implicate constitutionally protected pri-
vacy rights, and would presumably be justified only by compelling state interests." Id. at 606
(Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Stewart disagreed, emphasizing that there is no "general
constitutional 'right to privacy.'" Id. at 607-08 (Stewart, J., concurring). For cases discussing
the right to informational privacy with respect to medical records, see United States v. West-
inghouse, 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980); General Motors Corp. v. Director of NIOSH, 636 F.2d
163 (6th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 454 U.S. 877 (1981); Schachter v. Whalen, 581 F.2d 35 (2d
Cir. 1978). See generally Comment, Public Health Protection and the Privacy of Medical
Records, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 265 (1981).
232. For example, a reasonable person might not object to the disclosure that he occasion-
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rial that the ailment usually is not one that should arouse any emotion
toward the victim save sympathy; most people simply do not want their
ailments to be generally known. '233
Although the Whalen Court did not expressly agree that drug use
stigmatizes, it did not question the evidence that persons sometimes de-
clined treatment because of fear that misuse of the government collected
data could cause them to be labelled drug addicts.234 Accordingly, under
these circumstances, a reasonable person could regard disclosure of his
use of "controlled substances," by prescription or otherwise, as embar-
rassing and potentially harmful. A user of illegal drugs has an additional
fifth amendment interest in not incriminating himself.235
The public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of drug users'
identities depends upon whether purely legal issues are presented, to
which the particulars of plaintiff's situation are irrelevant, and upon such
factors as the ailments the drugs treat, the effects of the drugs, and the
legality of the drug use. For example, the public interest in preserving
the privacy of a cancer patient whose chemical treatments do not render
him dangerous may be greater than that of keeping confidential the iden-
tities of those who suffer from grave contagious illnesses, whose drug use
endangers others, or whose drug use is illegal.
Similarly, the degree to which it would be undesirable to force a
plaintiff to choose between his lawsuit and his privacy interests varies. A
case like Whalen v. Roe,2 36 for example, had substantial public utility. It
would have been undesirable to force plaintiffs to surrender the very pri-
ally takes aspirin, while he might object to the disclosure that he is taking drugs for the treat-
ment of cancer or venereal disease.
233. Roe v. Ingraham, 480 F.2d 102, 108 n.7 (2d Cir. 1973).
234. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 595 n.16. The Court commented that "disclosures of private
medical information. . . are often an essential part of modern medical practice even when the
disclosure may reflect unfavorably on the character of the patient." Id. at 602.
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), illustrates the stigma attached to drug use.
In Robinson, the Court struck down a statute that made it a crime for a person to have the
"status" of being addicted to narcotics. Justice Douglas' concurrence criticized the attitude
that addicts are people "who could, if they would, forsake their evil ways," or are people with
a psychiatric disorder. Id. at 668-70, 672 (Douglas, J., concurring). In either event, he wrote
that "[a] prosecution for addiction, with its resultant stigma and irreparable damage to the
good name of the accused, cannot be justified as a means of protecting society." Id. at 677
(Douglas, J., concurring). As Robinson makes clear, in some instances the stigma attached to
drug use resembles the stigma attached to criminal activities generally. Other cases recogniz-
ing the stigma attached to drug use include: Coe v. Reynolds, 529 F. Supp. 488, 489-90
(D.N.H. 1982); Churchwell v. United States, 414 F. Supp. 499, 503 (D.S.D. 1976), affd, 545
F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1976); Committee for G.I. Rights v. Callaway, 370 F. Supp. 934, 938
(D.D.C. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
235. But see infra note 270.
236. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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vacy and security interests they sought to protect in bringing litigation as
the price of continuing to press their case. On the other hand, when the
public interest in name disclosure is greater,237 it is less problematic to
force a party to choose between his claim or defense and his privacy.238
Opposing the drug users' interests in privacy and security, there is
the general public interest in disclosure of litigants' names, attenuated if
pure legal issues are presented. Beyond that factor, the level of public
interest varies. The public interest in disclosure is heightened when the
drug user suffers from a grave contagious disease, uses drugs illegally, or
endangers others. In these circumstances, members of the public have
legitimate reasons to avoid the drug user in order to preserve their
health, safety, and reputation. 239 Occasionally there is an additional
public interest in disclosure, arising from the public role of the party
seeking a pseudonym. For example, in Doe v. United States Department
of Justice,24° plaintiff, a state court judge, filed a Freedom of Information
Act 24' ("FOIA") case without disclosing his true name. Plaintiff sought
to discover the information and documents about him possessed by the
Drug Enforcement Administration. Plaintiff argued that public revela-
tion of his efforts to discover this information would embarrass him, prej-
udicially affect his privacy rights, and cast a "shroud of suspicion over
his office," in contravention of his duty to promote public confidence in
judicial integrity.242 The court rejected this argument on the ground that
"the public interest in the conduct of its business by public officials is of
paramount importance. '243
As with previous categories of cases, the need for party identifica-
tion to the opposing litigant and the court will depend on the issues in the
case. There is little need to know the plaintiff's identity to determine
legal issues such as those raised in Whalen v. Roe, or in cases seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief against federal and state criminal stat-
utes prohibiting the private use and possession of marijuana by adults. 244
237. See supra text accompanying note 235; infra text accompanying notes 240-43.
238. See, eg., text accompanying notes 240-43.
239. On the other hand, the public interest may not be very strong even in these circum-
stances because of the possibility of exposure to unidentified others with the same illnesses or
drug uses.
240. 93 F.R.D. 483 (D. Colo. 1982).
241. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
242. United States Dep't of Justice, 93 F.R.D. at 483-84.
243. Id. at 484. Additionally, public officials have a reduced expectation of privacy. See,
e.g., Nixon v. Administration of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 458-65 (1977).
244. Louisiana Affiliate of Nat'l Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Guste, 380 F.
Supp. 404 (E.D. La. 1974), affi'd mem., 511 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 867
(1975).
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If factual matters peculiar to the party are in controversy, there is a
greater need for disclosure. Parties seeking pseudonymity from the pub-
lic often agree to disclose their true identities to the court, if not to their
adversaries. 245
Criminality and Unprofessional Conduct
4
There is a substantial group of cases in which persons suspected, or
who feared they might be accused, of criminal activity or unprofessional
conduct sought to sue or be sued pseudonymously. Usually, courts
granted these requests. For example, in Doe v. United States Civil Service
Commission2 46 the court permitted a finalist in the White House Fellow-
ships competition to sue pseudonymously when she claimed that the
agency violated her statutory and constitutional rights by recording and
disseminating false derogatory statements about her, without affording
her an opportunity to refute the allegations. 247 The court merely noted
that plaintiff had chosen to use a pseudonym to protect her identity, and
that she had submitted her real name to the court in camera.
2 4 8
Similarly, in In re Doe249 a psychiatrist appealed from a civil con-
tempt order for failure to comply with a grand jury subpoena. The sub-
poena was issued in an investigation of a medical clinic that allegedly
served as a front for the illegal sale of quaaludes. Without discussion, the
court allowed the psychiatrist to sue as "Doe." In another case,2 5 0 an
attorney sought review of a district court's refusal to quash a grand jury
subpoena that sought work product. The grand jury was investigating
allegations that the attorney had advised a client to lie and to bribe wit-
nesses and had otherwise attempted to procure false testimony.25 ' The
court explained that it did not reveal the actual names of those involved
in order to protect the secrecy of the continuing grand jury investigation
245. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Justice, 93 F.R.D. 483; Louisiana Affiliate of Nat'l
Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Guste, 380 F. Supp. 404, 405 (E.D. La. 1974) (plaintiff
planned to reveal his identity to the court in a sealed affidavit), afld mem., 511 F.2d 1400 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 867 (1975); Roe v. Ingraham, 364 F. Supp. 536, 541 n.7 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (court satisfied with plaintiffs' attorneys' representations that the fictitiously named
plaintiffs were real and specific aggrieved individuals).
246. 483 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
247. Id. at 546, 548. The derogatory statements were that she had committed petty theft,
had a propensity to steal, was schizophrenic, and was a kleptomaniac. Id. at 547.
248. Id. at 546 n.1; see also Doe v. United States Dep't of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1095
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (Former Justice Department attorney who had been discharged amidst alle-
gations of unprofessional conduct and dishonesty sued claiming, among other things, that her
liberty interest in reputation was infringed without due process.).
249. 711 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir. 1983).
250. In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982).
251. Id. at 1076.
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and to insulate the appellants from adverse publicity in the event that the
grand jury did not return indictments.252 Finally, one court permitted a
corporation to sue as "John Doe Corporation" when appealing a civil
contempt judgment for failure to produce certain documents and failure
to make an employee available for grand jury testimony.253 Here, too, no
indictments had yet been returned. To preserve secrecy, the court, in its
opinion, referred to the corporation and the individuals involved by
pseudonyms. 254
In an additional group of cases, courts permitted attorneys and doc-
tors to sue pseudonymously in actions to enjoin disciplinary proceedings,
to challenge subpoenas, or to prevent disciplinary tribunals from relying
upon grand jury materials. 255 Most of these opinions contain little or no
discussion of the reasons for allowing pseudonymity. In Coe v. United
States District Court,256 however, the Tenth Circuit explained its reason-
ing on the pseudonymity issue. The appellate court held that the district
court had not abused its discretion in refusing to allow Dr. Coe to file a
section 1983257 action under a fictitious name or in sealed pleadings.
Complaints alleging that Dr. Coe was guilty of professional misconduct
had led to threatened formal disciplinary proceedings. 258 Dr. Coe sued
to restrain the state from conducting a public hearing, but the district
252. Id. at 1076 n.1; see also In re Doe, 551 F.2d 899, 900 n.1 (2d Cir. 1977) (On appeal
from order holding attorney Doe in contempt for refusing to testify before a grand jury, the
court indicated that "of necessity" his true name had to appear in any formal orders.).
253. In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1982). The grand jury was investigating
whether the corporation had paid money to a lawyer to enable him to bribe or attempt to bribe
administration officials in a position to settle a controversy over its liability to a governmental
body.
254. Id. at 483 n.1; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 725 F.2d 1110 (7th
Cir. 1984) (corporation permitted to sue anonymously to challenge a grand jury subpoena
duces tecum).
255. E.g., Doe v. Board of Professional Responsibility, 717 F.2d 1424 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(attorney moved to quash subpoenas for financial records); ACLU v. Bozardt, 539 F.2d 340
(4th Cir.) (attorney Koe sought to block disciplinary proceedings as unconstitutional), cert
denied, 429 U.S. 1022 (1976); Anonymous J. v. Bar Ass'n, 515 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.) (attorney
sought to enjoin use of grand jury testimony), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975); Anonymous v.
Ass'n. of the N.Y. Bar, 515 F.2d 427 (2d Cir.) (attorney sought to enjoin use of grand jury
testimony), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975); Doe v. State Bar, 415 F. Supp. 308, 309 n.1
(N.D. Cal.) (An attorney sought to enjoin disciplinary proceedings on constitutional grounds.
The court looked with "great disfavor" upon "John Doe" pleadings, but noted that plaintiff
had been allowed to maintain his anonymity in state court proceedings due to the possible
adverse impact on his reputation.), af#'d, 582 F.2d 25 (9th Cir. 1976); Doe v. Rosenberry, 152
F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y.) (attorney sought to enjoin use of grand jury testimony), affd, 255
F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1957).
256. 676 F.2d 411 (10th Cir. 1982).
257. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
258. Coe, 676 F.2d at 412.
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court dismissed his pseudonymous complaint on the ground that the
public interest in access, including the interests of Coe's present and po-
tential patients, outweighed Coe's privacy interest.2 59 The Tenth Circuit
agreed with the use of a balancing test and found no error in the district
court's conclusion.2 60 The court also found that neither the state board's
refusal to close its proceedings nor its offer to close the proceedings if Dr.
Coe would suspend his medical practice pending the outcome of the pro-
ceedings, violated Coe's due process rights or constituted an abuse of
discretion.261
In some cases, courts have allowed pseudonyms in order to protect
plaintiffs' fifth amendment rights not to incriminate themselves. In Doe
v. Miller,262 for example, parents sought to enjoin implementation of a
state policy that forced them either to withdraw food stamp applications
on behalf of their eligible citizen children or to disclose to federal author-
ities information about their own illegal alien status. To prevent the pub-
lic disclosure of their true names and to protect their right not to
incriminate themselves, the court allowed the action to proceed pseudon-
ymously.26 3 Similarly, in Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v.
Selective Service System 264 male college students subject to the Military
Selective Service Act,26 5 who needed to apply for federal financial aid in
order to complete their education but who could not truthfully attest to
compliance with the Act, challenged the constitutionality of a federal
statute that linked the availability of student financial aid to draft regis-
tration. The court permitted them to sue pseudonymously, apparently to
protect their fifth amendment rights because plaintiffs otherwise would
have been forced to identify themselves as out of compliance with the
259. Id. at 414; accord supra text accompanying note 203.
260. Coe, 676 F.2d at 418.
261. Id. at 417. Notably, Dr. Coe argued that public disclosure of his true identity would
destroy the very property and liberty interests he sought to protect by seeking an injunction
against a public disciplinary hearing. Id. at 413. Such arguments are ordinarily forceful. See
supra text accompanying note 147. This reasoning did not prevail here, however, at least in
part because the federal courts recognized the state board's right to conduct public disciplinary
proceedings.
262. 573 F. Supp. 461 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
263. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 572 (E.D. Tex. 1978), affd, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), was
a similar case. In Plyler, children of illegal aliens challenged their statutory exclusion from
Texas schools. The court's protective order limited revelation of plaintiffs' names, but was not
binding on United States immigration officials. See also Doe v. Boyle, 494 F.2d 1279 (4th Cir.
1974) (taxpayer allowed to sue pseudonymously in order to avoid an admission of failure to file
timely returns).
264. 557 F. Supp. 923 (D. Minn. 1983); see Doe v. Selective Serv. Sys., 557 F. Supp. 937
(D. Minn. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 3348 (1984); Minnesota Pub. Interest
Research Group v. Selective Serv. Sys., 557 F. Supp. 925 (D. Minn. 1983).
265. 50 U.S.C. §§ 451-471(a) (1982).
[Vol. 37THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
law.2 6
6
Applying the proposed analytic scheme to these cases, plaintiffs ap-
parently met the first requirement of keeping their identities confidential
as persons suspected, or fearing accusation, of criminal or unprofessional
conduct. They sought continued secrecy in order to maintain good per-
sonal and professional reputations and to avoid stigma for violating crim-
inal laws or professional ethical standards. Those whose pseudonymous
lawsuits were brought to protect their good reputations were faced with a
particular dilemma.267 Others, who feared accusation of illegal activities,
also sought to avoid prosecution. All of these plaintiffs would reasonably
regard public disclosure of their identities as embarrassing and harmful
because of the likely adverse effects on their professional and personal
lives.
Public interests often complemented the private interests in nondis-
closure. For example, maintaining the secrecy and limiting the uses of
grand jury testimony and materials serves several public policies, particu-
larly protection of the innocent from disclosure of the fact that they were
under investigation. 268 In a number of the cases, the doctors and lawyers
who sought pseudonymity had not yet been indicted, and the grand jury
might have exonerated them. To have required them to identify them-
selves in related civil proceedings would conflict with the objectives of
grand jury secrecy.269 Moreover, the fifth amendment adds a constitu-
266. With respect to the fifth amendment argument, see Doe v. Selective Serv. Sys., 557 F.
Supp. at 946-50.
267. See, eg., Doe v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 483 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
268. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958). Additional objectives
are
"'(I) to prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2)
to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent
persons subject to indictment or their friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3)
to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may testify
before grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage
free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have information with respect to
the commission of crimes; (5) to protect the [exonerated] innocent . . . from the
expense of standing trial where there was no probability of guilt.'"
1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.5, at 629 (1984) (quoting Procter &
Gamble, 356 U.S. at 681-82 n.6 (quoting United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir.
1954))).
269. It also would have been inconsistent with the judicial doctrines governing the permis-
sible scope of disclosure of grand jury matters to third parties. Normally, third parties may
obtain federal grand jury materials only when the disclosure is preliminary to or in connection
with a judicial proceeding. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i). Such parties must show that the
material they seek is needed to avoid possible injustice in another judicial proceeding, that
disclosure outweighs the need for continuing secrecy, and that their request is narrowly drawn.
Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops N.W., 441 U.S. 211 (1979). According to Professors LaFave
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tional prohibition against forcing persons to incriminate themselves
through their own mouths.270 Requiring such plaintiffs to sue in their
true names would create the risk of prosecution based on self-incrimina-
tion, and alternatively, would inhibit the pursuit of important statutory
challenges.
On the other hand, there is the strong public interest in access to
litigant identity. Although there is also a public interest in knowing the
names of persons who might be guilty of unprofessional or illegal con-
duct, this public interest does not outweigh an individual's privacy and
security interests until he has been formally charged with wrongdoing. 271
As the cases described above suggest, plaintiffs suspected or fearing accu-
sation of criminal activity or unprofessional conduct often are able to
establish "substantial cause" to sue or be sued pseudonymously.
When one turns to secrecy from the adversary and the court, one
finds that, in several instances, the defendant already knew the plaintiff's
identity and the plaintiff did not resist disclosure to the court.272 By con-
trast, in certain actions challenging governmental policies and statutes,
when plaintiffs invoked the fifth amendment in support of their requests
for pseudonymity, 273 neither the defendants nor the courts had strong
reason to know plaintiffs' identities because pure legal questions were
presented and the particular plaintiffs were fungible with similarly situ-
ated individuals. 274 Plaintiffs successfully resisted disclosure to the de-
fendant; it is unclear from the opinions whether they resisted disclosure
and Israel, the need for secrecy is greatest when the grand jury is still considering whether to
indict. On the other hand, when an "administrative proceeding requires a judicial determina-
tion for enforcement, as in attorney disbarment, disclosure to assist the agency in the proceed-
ing ordinarily would be within the Rule. Even then, however,. . . disclosure could not yet be
viewed as preliminary to a judicial proceeding." W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 268, at
640-41 (footnotes omitted).
270. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE--CRIMINAL § 407 (2d ed. 1982)
(The privilege of the accused not to be compelled to be a witness against himself reaches an
accused's communications.).
The privilege is also available to witnesses whose responses would support a conviction for
a past crime or would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute. Id. § 447. A
denial of pseudonymity, however, does not necessarily force plaintiffs to incriminate them-
selves, because they are free to drop their lawsuits. See Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub.
Interest Research Group, 104 S. Ct. 3348, 3358 (1984) (A statute compelling non-registrants
with the Selective Service to acknowledge their failure to register when applying for financial
aid did not violate their fifth amendment rights because the non-registrants were under no
compulsion to seek financial aid.).
271. See, e.g., Coe, 676 F.2d 411; supra notes 255-61 & accompanying text; see supra text
accompanying notes 268-69.
272. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 246-63.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 264-66.
274. See supra text accompanying note 197.
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to the court.275
Juveniles
A sixth category of cases in which parties have sought pseudonym-
ity involves juveniles, including delinquent, neglected, abused, or illegiti-
mate children. In this group of cases, the pseudonymous party was
usually a defendant rather than a plaintiff.
Some of the federal court cases involve juveniles embroiled in the
juvenile justice system. The cases were in federal court pursuant to the
Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act,276 the Federal Youth Corrections
Act,277 or because they raised federal constitutional or statutory
claims.278 These cases are in many respects essentially criminal, 279 and
commentators have argued that the reasons for open criminal trials are
applicable equally to juvenile delinquency hearings.280
275. See supra text accompanying notes 264-66.
276. Pub. L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat. 1138 (1974) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042 (1982),
amended by Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2013, 2031 (effective Nov. 1, 1986). This is the main
statutory embodiment of federal juvenile delinquency policy.
277. Pub. L. No. 94-233, 90 Stat. 231, 232 (1976) (formerly codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-
5026), repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2027 (1984).
278. E.g., Roe v. New York, 49 F.R.D. 279 (S.D.N.Y.) (1970) (action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1982) alleging inadequate rehabilitative treatment); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105
S. Ct. 733 (1985) (appeal from adjudication of delinquency); United States v. Doe, 627 F.2d
181 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Indian Boy X, 565 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1977), cert denied,
439 U.S. 841 (1978).
279. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 531 (1975) (Juvenile proceedings are essentially crimi-
nal for purposes of the double jeopardy prohibition.); see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365
(1970) (Due process guarantees juveniles the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 35-57 (1967) (Due process guarantees juveniles the rights to notice of
charges, to counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and to avoid self-incrimination.).
But see McKiever v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543-47 (1971) (Due process does not require
sixth amendment right to jury trial at delinquency adjudication hearings.).
280. Note, Press Access to the Juvenile Courtroom: Juvenile Anonymity and the First
Amendment, 17 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 287, 333-39 (1982); Comment, The Right of
Access and Juvenile Delinquency Hearings: The Future of Confidentiality, 16 IND. L. Rv.
911, 913, 935-40 (1983); see Note, supra, at 344 n.402 (citation of additional publications
advocating variations of press access to juvenile proceedings for "no-names" reporting).
One commentator has explained:
Publicity is said to give the juvenile respondent a self-image of criminality and to
stigmatize him, thus causing him to commit more delinquent acts. In addition, ad-
verse publicity may create future disabilities for a juvenile by limiting employment
and educational opportunities. .. . [E]xposure to adverse publicity is seen as a form
of punishment. Moreover, advocates of closed proceedings claim that it is cruel and
counterproductive to punish the parents of delinquents by publishing the child's mis-
behavior. Finally, it is alleged that some delinquents want attention and recognition;
therefore, publicity may reward or contribute to delinquent behavior.
The first flaw in these arguments is that rehabilitation is no longer the sole goal;
. . . an equally compelling goal is protecting the public and preventing juvenile
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Many writers who favor some form of press access to delinquency
hearings, however, also favor maintaining the confidentiality of accused
juveniles' names. 28 I Both society and the juvenile possess the same inter-
ests in confidentiality: to avoid stigmatizing the youth and to foster his
rehabilitation. 282 The interests favoring disclosure of the juvenile of-
crime, which may be furthered by the deterrent effect that publicity would have.
Moreover, . . confidentiality and rehabilitation are only impaired by the publica-
tion of the identity of the juvenile respondent, not by mere access alone. Juvenile
court confidentiality involves two concepts, access and publication. Only the latter
directly affects rehabilitation ....
Moreover, the Supreme Court's decisions in Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District
Court, and Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co ... favor. . . the public's right to
know the juvenile offender's name . . . . Therefore, excluding the press and the
general public from juvenile court hearings is likely to be ineffective in protecting the
identity of juveniles . . . because the press is likely to learn of the juvenile respon-
dent's identity through lawful means, such as interviewing witnesses at the scene of
the incident.
Comment, supra at 938-39 (footnotes omitted). The commentator concludes that the constitu-
tional right of access should be extended to include juvenile delinquency hearings. Id. at 940.
281. See Note, supra note 280, at 344 n.402.
282. Congress, like most state legislatures, has sought to treat and to rehabilitate juveniles.
Both the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042 (1982), and the Federal
Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1982), are aimed at rehabilitation rather than
punishment. For discussion of the underlying congressional policy of rehabilitation, see, e.g.,
Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d 1226, 1234-36 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Ha Yau-Leung v. Soscia, 500 F.
Supp. 1382, 1386-89 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 649 F.2d 914 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 971 (1981). To that end, Congress has built extensive mechanisms for pre-
serving confidentiality into the procedures governing federal juvenile delinquency hearings. 18
U.S.C. § 5038 (1982). The courts are required to seal the entire file and record when a delin-
quency proceeding has been completed and may release the records only to statutorily speci-
fied persons on specified occasions. Id. § 5038(a). During the course of the proceeding, the
records are similarly guarded. Id. § 5038(c). Unless otherwise authorized, information about
the record may not be released when the request is related to an application for employment,
license, bonding, or any civil right or privilege. Id. § 5038(a). Specifically, with respect to
publication of the youth's name, the statute provides that unless the juvenile is prosecuted as
an adult, "neither the name nor picture of any juvenile shall be made public by any medium of
public information in connection with a juvenile delinquency proceeding." Id. § 5038(d)(2).
Section 5038(d)(1) proscribes the taking of the juvenile's fingerprints or photograph without
the written consent of the judge. Id. § 5038(d)(1). Subsection (d) was upheld against a consti-
tutional challenge in Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 1255 (D. Okla.
1981).
Although the foregoing provisions reflect a strong spirit of confidentiality, none addresses
the specific question of whether in juvenile delinquency and related proceedings, or in pub-
lished court opinions, the juvenile should be referred to by a pseudonym. Several courts have
allowed the use of pseudonyms or initials in these cases, sometimes citing 18 U.S.C. § 5038
(1982). E.g., United States v. B.N.S., 557 F. Supp. 351 n.* (D. Wyo. 1983) (ruling against
motion to transfer juvenile to adult status); United States v. E.K., 471 F. Supp. 924, 924 n.*
(D. Or. 1979) (ruling against motion to transfer juvenile to adult status); United States v. Doe,
385 F. Supp. 902, 903 (D. Ariz. 1974) (defendant's identity withheld because these were juve-
nile proceedings). Generally, however, there is no explanation. See, e.g., United States v. Doe,
701 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1983) (affirming adjudication of juvenile delinquency); United States v.
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fender's name, however, are weaker than the general interests in access to
the proceedings. Even if the juvenile's name is kept out of the proceed-
ings, many of the functions of access can be substantially served.28 3
Thus, the balance shifts toward maintaining the confidentiality of
names. 284 Consistent with this view, Justice Rehnquist has written:
This insistence on confidentiality is born of a tender concern for
the welfare of the child. . . . The prohibition of publication of a juve-
nile's name is designed to protect the young person from the stigma of
his misconduct and is rooted in the principle that a court concerned
with juvenile affairs serves as a rehabilitative and protective agency of
the State . . . Publication of the names of juvenile offenders may
seriously impair the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system
and handicap the youths' prospects for adjustment in society and ac-
ceptance by the public. . . . This exposure brings undue embarrass-
ment to the families of youthful offenders and may cause the juvenile
to lose employment opportunities or provide the hardcore delinquent
the kind of attention he seeks, thereby encouraging him to commit fur-
ther antisocial acts. . . . Such publicity also renders nugatory States'
expungement laws, for a potential employer or any other person can
retrieve the information the States seek to "bury" simply by visiting
the morgue of the local newspaper. The resultant widespread dissemi-
nation of a juvenile offender's name, therefore, may defeat the benefi-
cent and rehabilitative purposes of a State's juvenile court system.
By contrast, a prohibition against publication of the names of
youthful offenders represents only a minimal interference with freedom
of the press. . . . The press is free to describe the details of the of-
fense and inform the community of the proceedings against the juve-
nile. It is difficult to understand how publication of the youth's name is
in any way necessary to performance of the press' "watchdog" role. In
Doe, 642 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir.) (affirming adjudication of juvenile delinquency), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 817 (1981); United States v. Doe, 631 F.2d 110 (9th Cir.) (affirming adjudication of
juvenile delinquency but reversing the sentence), cert denied, 449 U.S. 867 (1980); United
States v. J.D., 525 F. Supp. 107, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (transferring juvenile to adult status;
same practice as to names); United States v. J.D., 525 F. Supp. 101, 104, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(Statute outlining prerequisites for federal jurisdiction over juvenile defendants and procedure
for transfer of juvenile to adult status was not void for vagueness and did not violate the sixth
amendment right to counsel; on consent of all attorneys, the opinion was submitted for publi-
cation with the defendants' names withheld.); Doe v. United States, 520 F. Supp. 1200, 1202-
03 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Plaintiff had cause of action under Federal Tort Claims Act when proba-
tion department's negligent failure to inform FBI of setting aside of his conviction under Fed-
eral Youth Corrections Act caused him to lose his job.).
In several cases in which youthful offenders sued for expungement of their convictions,
which had been set aside, the courts on their own motion substituted a pseudonym for plain-
tiff's true name in the reported opinions. See, eg., Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir.
1979); United States v. Doe, 579 F. Supp. 1351, 1351 n.l (N.D. Ill. 1984); United States v.
Doe, 496 F. Supp. 650 (D.R.I. 1980). To do otherwise would invite the very stigma expung-
ment seeks to prevent.
283. See supra text accompanying note 92.
284. See, eg., Note, supra note 280, at 330, 344.
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those rare instances where the press believes it is necessary to publish
the juvenile's name, the West Virginia law, like the statutes of other
States, permits the juvenile court judge to allow publication. The juve-
nile court judge, unlike the press, is capable of determining whether
publishing the name of the particular young person will have a delete-
rious effect on his chances for rehabilitation and adjustment to soci-
ety's norms. 2 8 5
That analysis fails to address other important public interests. As
one commentator has noted:
If attempts at rehabilitation are as fruitless as many suggest, it may no
longer be sensible to argue that publicizing the identities of juveniles
should be prohibited because it interferes with attempts to rehabilitate
the child . . . . As the crime gets more serious and the number ofjuvenile court appearances by the juvenile increases, public interest in
the case and [in] the juvenile is likely to increase . . . . In addition,
the juvenile court may feel that publicity will be a deterrent to recidi-
vism or at least not harm any rehabilitative possibilities, if they exist.
The juvenile court should have the discretion to release the name of
the juvenile if the situation is sufficiently compelling.286
In view of these questions concerning the linkage between confiden-
tiality of judicial proceedings and rehabilitation,287 the courts should em-
ploy a sensitive balancing test in this context.
Juvenile delinquency cases should be determined on a case by case
basis in the federal courts. The courts should first consider the extent to
which the accused offender has been identified publicly, because the
greater the previous identification, the weaker the interest in pseudonym-
ity. Next, the court should consider the strength of the interest in pre-
serving the secrecy of the juvenile's identity. This determination would
turn on an appraisal of the youth's chances for rehabilitation, 288 and the
likelihood that use of the juvenile's name would harm his chances for
rehabilitation.
The strong public interest in disclosure appropriate to proceedings
of this nature, which are neither truly criminal nor civil, must be weighed
against the interest in pseudonymity. The public's interest in knowing
285. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co, 443 U.S. 97, 107-09 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., con-
curring) (footnotes omitted).
286. Note, supra note 280, at 289, 317; see id. at 345.
287. See supra text accompanying note 286.
288. In this regard, many of the factors federal courts consider when assessing a transfer
to the conventional criminal system would be relevant. These factors include
the age and social background of the juvenile; the nature of the alleged offense; the
extent and nature of juvenile's prior delinquency record; the juvenile's present intel-
lectual development and psychological maturity; the nature of past treatment efforts
and the juvenile's response to such efforts; the availability of programs designed to
treat the juvenile's behavioral problems.
18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1982).
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the juvenile's name might increase with such factors as the nature of the
alleged offense and the nature and extent of the juvenile's prior delin-
quency record, because these indicate the degree to which the juvenile is
dangerous. Therefore, particularly in these cases, whether there is "sub-
stantial cause" for pseudonymity is a very individual determination.2 89
Other pseudonymous suits in federal court arise out of govern-
mental involvement with abused, neglected, or illegitimate children, or
simply because minors are subject to special disabling legislation. 290
Only some published opinions in this area explain the use of pseud-
onyms. In Moe v. Dinkins, 91 for example, the court permitted an un-
289. This position is consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in Globe Newspaper Co.
v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607-11 (1982), that safeguarding the physical and psychologi-
cal well being of a minor is a compelling interest, but must be determined case by case. In these
cases there is no question of pseudonymity vis-a-vis the executive branch of the government, or
the court; each must know the juvenile's identity in order to prosecute and decide the case.
In Roe v. New York, 49 F.RD. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), plaintiffs who sued under the Con-
stitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) and argued that they were not receiving adequate reha-
bilitative treatment, were not allowed to sue pseudonymously. Roe, 49 F.R.D. at 280-82.
Plaintiffs argued that publicizing their commitment to state facilities would subject them to
embarrassment, harassment, and ridicule, and that it would hamper their assimilation into the
community. Id. at 280. The court, citing only factually different cases, found these reasons
insufficient. Id. at 281-82. Although the court was persuaded that "sound public policy would
appear to require that a complaint identify by true name at least one of the plaintiffs if the
filing is to commence an action," it generally seemed to be quibbling with the particular proce-
dure plaintiffs had chosen. Id. at 282. The court stated that "[i]f an action had been com-
menced. . . , then amendments could be permitted or protective orders made, on a proper
showing, which would shield the identity of plaintiffs from the public while permitting this
necessary knowledge to the Court and to the defendants." Id. at 281. In fact, given the nature
of the allegations, the plaintiffs' names probably were needed for an adequate defense, res
judicata, and other judicial purposes.
290. E.g., Doe v. Staples, 706 F.2d 985 (6th Cir. 1983) (class action challenging welfare
department policies permitting certain children to be removed from their natural parents'
physical custody without prior written notice or an opportunity for a hearing; no discussion of
the pseudonym); Doe v. New York Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981) (Foster
child sued agency for failure to adequately supervise placement.); Candy H. v. Redemption
Ranch, 563 F. Supp. 505, 508 (M.D. Ala. 1983) (Plaintiffs, pregnant girls who alleged that
they were induced to enter defendant's home for girls, brought a civil rights action alleging
corporal abuse and violation of their right to travel; in support of using partial names, the
court cited Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1981), discussed infra notes 342-52 & accom-
panying text.); Smith v. Grossmann, No. C-1-81-547 (S.D. Ohio April 26, 1982) (child, taken
into the government's custody based upon probable cause that he was in immediate danger
from his surroundings, claimed deprivation of liberty without due process and unconstitutional
application of Ohio juvenile rules of procedure; no explanation of pseudonyms but court noted
that records reflecting the true names had been sealed and preserved'for appellate review);
Child v. Beame, 412 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (class action alleging denial of a fundamen-
tal constitutional right to be placed in a permanent home rather than in foster homes; no
explanation of pseudonyms).
291. 533 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Plaintiffs, a mother and her intended husband
who sought to remove the stigma of illegitimacy from their son, challenged constitutionality of
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married young couple expecting a child to sue pseudonymously because
the case concerned matters of a "highly sensitive and personal nature
such as marriage and illegitimacy. ' 292  Their complaint satisfied the
court that plaintiffs had standing to sue because they had submitted
sealed affidavits, signed in their true names, attesting to the accuracy of
their allegations, and their attorney, by affidavit, had stated that plaintiffs
were real people. 293
In Roe v. Borup,294 a child and its parents brought a section 1983295
civil rights suit against the state department of social services for remov-
ing the child from her parents' custody for several weeks, alleging sexual
abuse. The court permitted plaintiffs to sue pseudonymously because an
important privacy interest was present and because plaintiffs sought to be
shielded from additional psychological harm. Plaintiffs had alleged that
they would be subjected to harassment and embarrassment if the serious
allegations involved here were revealed. 296 The court rejected as unsup-
ported defendants' argument that a damages claim should preclude the
use of fictitious names, 2 97 and it refused to adopt a "highly mechanical"
interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which would nec-
essarily require the dismissal of the complaint. 298
As with other categories of cases, the courts should balance the in-
terests involved in deciding whether to permit such plaintiffs to proceed
pseudonymously. Assuming plaintiffs have kept their identities confiden-
tial, the next question is the substantiality of the reasons for seeking ano-
nymity. Despite its irrationality, 299 society has stigmatized illegitimate
children. 300 Although illegitimacy may be more socially acceptable today
a statute prohibiting marriage by a woman under 18 without parential permission.), on remand
from 635 F.2d 1045, 1047 n.1 (2d Cir. 1980) (allowing original plaintiffs to sue pseudon-
ymously), aft'd, 669 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 827 (1982).
292. Id. at 625-27
293. Id. at 627.
294. 500 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
295. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
296. Borup, 500 F. Supp. at 129-30. The court also noted that, because a juvenile was
involved, state law required the records of the underlying action, which temporarily had re-
moved the child from her parents' custody, to be kept confidential. Id. at 129.
297. Id. at 129-30.
298. Defendants argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case and
personal jurisdiction over the parties because plaintiffs' true names were not used in the com-
plaint, and that the absence of true names on the summonses rendered them insufficient under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b). Id. at 128-29.
299. In Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 n.6 (1968), the Court injected: "We can say
with Shakespeare: 'Why bastard, wherefore base? When my dimensions are as well compact,
My mind as generous, and my shape as true, As honest madam's issue? why brand they us
with base? with baseness? bastardy? base, base?' King Lear, Act I, Scene 2."
300. See, e.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 353 (1979) (plurality opinion) (referring to
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than it once was,301 the illegitimate child still risks ridicule, harassment,
and ostracism. In addition, illegitimate children have a privacy interest
in the circumstances of their birth that is impaired if they must reveal
this status.30 2 Hence, their interests in privacy and security are substan-
tial, and the societal interest in the well-being of these youngsters sup-
ports the withholding of their names. Moreover, plaintiffs in these
actions typically alleged violations of their civil rights. It would not
serve the public interest for such suits to escape adjudication on the mer-
its because of a requirement that plaintiffs disclose their identities.
While there is, on the other hand, the usual public interest in know-
ing the litigants' identity, there is no extraordinary public interest in
knowing who is illegitimate. A desire for identifying information for the
purpose of harassing an illegitimate child is obviously unworthy of re-
gard, and assistance can be afforded without indiscriminate publicity.
Hence, the balance ordinarily favors pseudonymity. The parents' identi-
ties could not be disclosed without identifying the child. Accordingly,
parents should be allowed to proceed pseudonymously for the benefit of
an illegitimate child.
Abused or neglected children may suffer less stigma than those iden-
tified as illegitimate, but they have at least as strong a privacy interest in
keeping that information confidential. Their desire to sue under a pseu-
donym similarly should be respected unless the public interest in disclo-
sure outweighs the litigants' privacy interests. The societal interest in the
well-being of these youngsters supports the withholding of their names.
Moreover, plaintiffs in these actions typically alleged violations of their
civil rights. It would not serve the public interest for such suits to escape
adjudication on the merits because of a requirement that plaintiffs dis-
close their identities. There are public and governmental interests in
identifying abusive and neglectful parents so that they can be educated,
helped, or, in some instances, punished. Insofar as this interest is primar-
the stigma of bastardy); accord Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76
(1972).
301. Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L. REv.
663, 715 (1976). The Supreme Court has struck down legislative classifications based on ille-
gitimacy as violating the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. E.g., Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 763-66, 769-73, 776 (1977) (striking down provision of Illinois Probate
Act that allowed illegitimate children to inherit by intestate succession only from their
mothers); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 165 (1972) (striking down provi-
sion of Louisiana workmen's compensation statute that allowed unacknowledged illegitimate
children to recover only in limited circumstances). But see Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532
(1971) (upholding statute adversely affecting some illegitimate children).
302. Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aft'd, 669 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.),
cerL denied, 459 U.S. 827 (1982).
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ily governmental and not public, however, the identities need not be dis-
closed to the general public. To the extent that there is a legitimate
public interest, it is in helping rather than in punishing. With or without
the urging of the court or other governmental agencies, however, an abu-
sive or neglectful parent, or an abused or neglected child, can obtain help
from the private sphere without disclosing the identity of the abused or
neglected child to the public at large. Consequently, the child's interest
in privacy outweighs the public interest in knowing his identity, either
for its own sake for or the sake of identifying his parents. Pseudonymity
ordinarily should be permitted with respect to the public. The nature of
the case will sometimes require the defendants and the court to know
plaintiffs' identities, depending on whether it raises factual issues peculiar
to the plaintiffs or, at the other extreme, purely legal questions.30 3
Public Aid
In several cases, recipients of public aid have sought pseudonym-
ity. 3°4 These litigants usually have been successful in their efforts to
conceal their identities. In Campbell v. United States Department of Ag-
riculture,30 5 for example, plaintiffs sued to compel promulgation of regu-
lations that would allow eligible social security income ("SSI")
applicants and recipients to apply for food stamps at their social security
offices. 30 6 The two individual plaintiffs, one of whom sued as Jane Doe,
alleged that they were SSI recipients eligible for food stamps, but could
not participate in the program because of their disabilities. Their
problems would have been obviated if food stamp applications could
303. See supra note 290. Compare Doe v. Staples, 706 F.2d 985 (6th Cir. 1983) (a largely
legal case), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1301 (1984) with Candy H. v. Redemption Ranch, 563 F.
Supp. 505 (M.D. Ala. 1983) (a highly factual case).
304. There are cases in which persons who were permitted to sue pseudonymously had
more than one reason for seeking anonymity. See, e.g., Doe v. Mathews, 420 F. Supp. 865
(D.N.J. 1976) (challenging law precluding use of appropriations to pay for abortions except
when necessary to avoid endangering the life of the mother); Doe v. Flowers, 364 F. Supp. 953
(N.D. W. Va. 1973) (class action challenging state welfare regulation requiring unwed mothers
to help identify putative fathers), afl'd, 416 U.S. 922 (1974); Doe v. Norton, 356 F. Supp. 202,
203 n. 1 (D. Conn.) (same; in permitting pseudonyms, court emphasized that plaintiffs, mothers
of illegitimate children, sued on behalf of their minor children), modified, 365 F. Supp. 65, 68
n.l (D. Conn. 1973), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Maher v. Doe, 422 U.S. 391 (1975);
Doe v. Lavine, 347 F. Supp. 357, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (same); Doe v. Swank, 332 F. Supp. 61
(N.D. Ill.) (same), afld sub nom. Weaver v. Doe, 404 U.S. 987 (1971); Doe v. Kurtis, 306 F.
Supp. 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (same); Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761, 762 n.2 (D. Conn. 1969)
(same), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 488 (1970).
305. 515 F. Supp. 1239 (D.D.C. 1981).
306. Id. at 1241.
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have been processed at their local social security offices. 307 The court
allowed Doe to sue pseudonymously, keeping her identity from both the
public and the defendant, in order "to protect sensitive personal informa-
tion and to shield her from feared abuse and harassment from her neigh-
bors, the media, and the public. ' 30 8 Although the court was willing to
make plaintiff's true name and address available to defendants upon a
showing of necessity, it found that they could not make that showing in
this case.309 The court thus rejected defendants' argument that their
right to know the plaintiff's identity should not be conditioned upon a
showing of necessity.310
The Campbell court did not address the public interest in plaintiff
Doe's identity.3 1 Although the universal minimum of public interest is
present, no extraordinary interest appears to exist. Although the public,
which is taxed for social security and food stamp programs, certainly has
an interest in the programs' implementation, it does not have an overrid-
ing interest in knowing which individuals are most inconvenienced by the
inability to get food stamps at a social security office. Although the pub-
lic interest in access was unexceptional, the court did not explain why
Doe's argument for pseudonymity was persuasive. What was the "sensi-
tive personal information" sought to be shielded and was there reason to
fear that its disclosure would cause plaintiff to suffer abuse and harass-
ment? If the sensitive and personal information was that plaintiff had
307. Id.
308. Id. at 1245.
309. Id. at 1245-46.
310. Id. at 1245. Defendants argued that "the concealment of plaintiff's true identity de-
prives them of their rights to know against whom they are litigating, to determine whether the
anonymous allegations are based on fact, to gather contrary evidence, and to determine who is
precluded from relitigating issues decided in their favor." Id. The court responded that the
issues in the case were legal issues, turning upon an interpretation of the Food Stamp Act of
1977, Pub. L. No. 99-113, 91 Stat. 979 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2029 (1982)), and conse-
quently, the only need defendants could have for information about Jane Doe would be to
challenge her standing to sue. The court held, however, that because organizational plaintiffs
had standing, and the declaratory and injunctive relief they sought would identically affect all
Social Security Income recipients eligible for food stamps, it was inconsequential whether Doe
also had standing. Campbell, 515 F. Supp. at 1246. Under these circumstances, defendants
failed to show any necessity for learning Doe's identity.
311. The court arguably should have considered this question first, because if the public
interest in disclosure outweighs the litigant's interests in confidentiality, the question of secrecy
from the opposing litigant is moot. Only if a litigant's identity is to be kept from the public
does the question of secrecy from the adversary arise. On the other hand, the adversary will
always have a greater interest than the public in knowing the "pseudonymous" party's iden-
tity. Therefore, if the adversary's interest in disclosure is inadequate, a fortiori the public's
interest in disclosure is outweighed. This supports the court's decision to consider the adver-
sary's interest first.
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health problems and disabilities that impeded her access to food stamps,
this privacy interest in health is not absolute. 312 If the information in-
volved plaintiff's receipt of social security income or eligibility for food
stamps, the privacy interest in financial condition also is not absolute.31 3
Neither health problems nor financial need necessarily subjects one to
abuse and harassment. Finally, if the sensitive and personal information
was that plaintiff was bringing this lawsuit, there is nothing in the opin-
ion that substantiates that such conduct would subject her to harassment
or abuse, nor would she have any recognized privacy interest. Plaintiff's
privacy or security interests might have outweighed any public interest in
knowing her identity, but the Campbell court did not shed much light on
these issues.3 14
Other cases challenge certain eligibility requirements in state welfare
regulations, such as the cooperation of aid recipients, usually mothers, in
obtaining support from legally responsible persons, usually fathers. 31 5
The opinions do not explain the reasons for allowing the use of pseu-
donyms. One can infer that the supporting interests are privacy interests
in either financial condition or the spouse's failure to fulfill his moral and
legal support obligations. Pseudonymity might save the custodial parent
and the children from embarrassment, ridicule, or stigma. The courts
have not explicitly weighed these interests against the general public in-
terest in knowing the litigants' identities. As with other challenges to
statutes governing the use of public funds, the public has a particular
interest in litigation that affects public expenditures because taxpayers
ultimately foot the bill. The public does not, however, have a strong
interest in knowing precisely who seeks public aid or who challenges par-
ticular eligibility requirements. Any individual recipient has a very small
312. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
313. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64-84 (1976) (act requiring disclosure of polit-
ical campaign contributions upheld against claims that first amendment rights of minor parties
and independent candidates could be infringed); Du Plantier v. United States, 606 F.2d 654
(5th Cir. 1979) (act requiring federal judges to report their personal finances not violation of
right to confidentiality because public interest in impartial judiciary outweighed infringement
on privacy), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1076 (1980); Plante v. Gonzales, 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir.
1978) (act requiring state senators to disclose financial information not violation of right to
privacy, which was outweighed by the public interests in discouraging corruption, bolstering
confidence in government, and aiding prosecutions), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979).
314. Unlike in Campbell, the court in Male v. Crossroads Assocs., 320 F. Supp. 141
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), did not allow the plaintiffs, welfare recipients, to sue pseudonymously. Id. at
143.
315. E.g., Doe v. Carleson, 356 F. Supp. 753 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Doe v. Gillman, 347 F.
Supp. 483 (N.D. Iowa 1972); see also Doe v. Schmidt, 330 F. Supp. 159 (E.D. Wis. 1971)
(challenging miscellaneous eligibility requirements); Doe v. Hursh, 337 F. Supp. 614 (D.
Minn. 1970) (challenging 90-day waiting period from father's absence).
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impact on total public aid expenditures, while identifying information
easily could be put to abusive purposes. In these cases, the courts will
have to examine the evidence and the arguments closely as to the privacy
and security interests at stake to determine whether they outweigh the
general public interest in knowing who is litigating.
Fears of Physical, Economic, or Professional Reprisal
Fear of Reputation as a Troublemaker
There are some cases in which plaintiffs sought to sue pseu-
donymously because they feared reprisal from certain powerful institu-
tions that might brand them as troublemakers or traitors. Examples
include prison inmates' challenges to conditions of their confinement,
and employment discrimination suits. 316 -In Southern Methodist Univer-
sity Association of Women Law Students v. Wynne & Jaffe,317 a Southern
Methodist University ("SMU") women's law association sued two Dallas
law firms, alleging sex discrimination in the hiring of summer law clerks
and regular associates.318 Four female lawyers sought to be added as
pseudonymous plaintiffs ("Lawyers A-D"). They were willing to dis-
close their identities to defense counsel provided that counsel would be
prevented from disseminating the information.319 The trial court refused
to allow the pseudonymity. 320
On appeal, plaintiffs argued that disclosure of the four lawyers' iden-
tities would "leave them vulnerable to retaliation from their current em-
ployers, prospective future employers and an organized bar that does 'not
like lawyers who sue lawyers.' ",321 In particular, they argued that disclo-
sure would cause them economic and social harm, that they would be
"eased out" or "assigned less desirable matters" by their employers, and
316. E.g., Doe v. District of Columbia, 697 F.2d 1115, 1120-21 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (inmates
in class action against District of Columbia contended that a protective order forbidding de-
fense counsel to disclose to defendants certain information obtained during discovery neces-
sary to prevent risk of violent reprisal; appellate court vacated district court's protective order
because alternative methods available to prevent retaliation); United States v. Doe, 655 F.2d
920, 922 n.1 (9th Cir. 1980) (inmate who had served as a government witness and faced a risk
of serious bodily harm if that was disclosed to other inmates permitted to sue pseudony-
mously); Glover v. Johnson, 85 F.R.D. 1, 2 n.1 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (inmates, alleging fear of
retaliation if their participation in the suit became known to defendants, permitted to sue
pseudonymously).
317. 599 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1979).
318. Id. at 708-10.
319. Id. at 710.
320. The court reasoned that the lawyers were in danger of economic and social harm,
rather than physical harm, and that "the mechanics of non-disclosure would further compli-
cate" the cases. Id.
321. Id. at 713.
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that their firms might lose business. 322 If disclosure did have such ad-
verse effects, plaintiffs argued that other professionals would become re-
luctant to sue for alleged discrimination. 323
The Fifth Circuit first noted that neither the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure nor Title VI 324 provides for anonymous plaintiffs as an excep-
tion to the general principle that " 'the identity of the parties to a lawsuit
should not be concealed.' "325 The court found that the cases allowing
pseudonymity shared several characteristics missing here:
The plaintiffs in those actions, at the least, divulged personal in-
formation of the utmost intimacy; many also had to admit that they
either had violated state laws or government regulations or wished to
engage in prohibited conduct. Here, by contrast, to prove their case A-
D need not reveal facts of a highly personal nature or express a desire
to participate in proscribed activities. Furthermore, all of the plaintiffs
previously allowed. . . to proceed anonymously were challenging the
constitutional, statutory or regulatory validity of government activity.
While such suits involve no injury to the Government's "reputation,"
the mere filing of a civil action against other private parties may cause
damage to their good names and reputation and may also result in
economic harm. Defendant law firms stand publicly accused of serious
violations of federal law. Basic fairness dictates that those among the
defendants' accusers who wish to participate in this suit as individual
party plaintiffs must do so under their real names. 326
In addition, the court noted that other women had filed sex discrimina-
tion suits against large law firms in their real names, and Lawyers A-D
faced no greater threat of retaliation than had those others.327 The court
concluded that because there was "neither an express congressional grant
of the right to proceed anonymously nor a compelling need to 'protect[ ]
privacy in a very private matter,' "328 plaintiffs would not be permitted to
sue under fictitious names. 329
322. Id. at 711.
323. Id. Plaintiffs also were concerned about an invasion of privacy: if their names were
revealed to the public, their law school grades and class ranks would be "bandied" about in
public. Brief for Appellants at 9.
324. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1982).
325. Southern Methodist University, 599 F.2d at 712 (quoting Doe v. Deschamps, 64
F.R.D. 652, 653 (D. Mont. 1974)).
326. Southern Methodist University, 599 F.2d at 713 (footnotes omitted). The court was
rightly concerned about the fairness of allowing "accusers" to keep their identities confidential
while publicly naming private defendants accused of serious violations of federal law. The law
firms, however, had not requested pseudonymity. Had they done so, the court then could have
analyzed the firms' claim to pseudonymity on its merits. That approach would have been
preferable to denying plaintiff pseudonymity to avoid asymmetry.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 713 (quoting Doe v. Deschamps, 64 F.R.D. 652, 653 (D. Mont. 1974).
329. At the same time, the court recognized that, without a protective order, women
would be reluctant to join or work for the co-plaintiff association of women law students for
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37
The Fifth Circuit overstated the shared characteristics of the cases
allowing pseudonymity. They did not all involve disclosure of personal
information of the utmost intimacy,330 and many did not involve an ad-
mission that plaintiff had engaged, or wished to engage, in prohibited
conduct. 331 The fact that similarly situated plaintiffs in other cases were
less fearful and therefore dared to sue under their own names, has not
been determinative. 332 Almost all of the cases allowing pseudonymity,
however, have involved challenges to a governmental body or activity.
333
Lawyers A-D's claims to pseudonymity can be analyzed under the
proposed balancing approach. Plaintiffs sought to keep their identities
confidential because they were concerned about their careers, their desir-
ability as employees and ultimately as partners, and their professional
growth. In nearly all of the cases in which pseudonymity has been
granted, the courts have protected social, psychological, and economic
interests; 334 they have not always demanded proof of threats to the plain-
tiffs' physical security nor have they always required threats to privacy
rights. Federal courts freely use protective orders to guard against eco-
nomic injuries in other kinds of cases. 335 Moreover, in cases that have
involved the constitutional right of associational privacy, 336 the Supreme
fear of retaliatory discrimination. The court prohibited defendant counsel from disclosing
membership information to anyone other than two named partners of the defendant law firm.
The two partners could release that information only upon the court's order. Southern Meth-
odist University, 599 F.2d at 713-14.
330. See, for example, the cases involving juveniles accused of delinquency, discussed
supra notes 276-89 & accompanying text; cases involving adults accused of unprofessional
conduct, discussed supra notes 246-61 & accompanying text; and cases involving drug use,
discussed supra notes 227-45 & accompanying text.
331. See, for example, the abortion cases, discussed supra notes 181-205 & accompanying
text; the cases involving mental illness or deficiency, discussed supra notes 217-26 & accompa-
nying text; the drug use cases, discussed supra notes 227-45 & accompanying text; the cases
involving abused, abandoned or illegitimate children, discussed supra notes 290-303 & accom-
panying text; and the cases involving public aid, discussed supra notes 305-14 & accompanying
text.
332. See, e.g., Campbell v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 515 F. Supp. 1239 (D.D.C.
1981) (one of two individual plaintiffs sued pseudonymously); supra text accompanying notes
305-14. Other plaintiffs have feared to bring suit in their own names alleging sex discrimina-
tion. See, e.g., Doe v. First City Bancorp. of Tex., 81 F.R.D. 562 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
333. For cases involving private parties only, see, e.g., Doe v. A Corp., 709 F.2d 1043,
1044 n.1 (5th Cir. 1983); Doe v. A Corp., 330 F. Supp. 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), affid sub nom.
Hall v. A Corp., 453 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1972); see infra notes 357-65.
334. These interests were endangered in the cases concerning abortion, homosexuality and
transsexuality, mental illness or deficiency, drug use, criminal and unprofessional conduct,
juveniles, and public aid.
335. In many cases the courts have entered protective orders to guard against the disclo-
sure of trade secrets in order to avoid economic injury. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 112.
336. See generally Steinman, Privacy of Association: A Burgeoning Privilege in Civil Discov-
ery, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 355, 359-71 (1982).
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Court has recognized that the danger of economic reprisal should be
weighed against the interests supporting compelled disclosure of identify-
ing information. 337 Associational privacy cases almost always have in-
volved fears of harassment and reprisal that were not merely
economic. 338 For Lawyers A-D, however, more than mere economic
ramifications were involved. The feared reprisals would also endanger
their opportunity to develop as lawyers and to gain a sense of profes-
sional competence and respect. While these concerns are not as funda-
mental as the interest in physical security or as compelling as the interest
in privacy with respect to intimate matters, they are nevertheless sub-
stantial interests in avoiding stigma and its consequences. Further, inso-
far as the vindication of the right not to be discriminated against depends
upon allowing plaintiffs' pseudonymity, there is a public interest that
supports pseudonymity. 339
Competing with plaintiffs' interests in pseudonymity is the general
public interest in access to litigants' identities. Because these lawyers es-
sentially sought to sue as members of a class of women law students and
lawyers and because they sought only injunctive relief, their individual
identities had no special importance to the general public and, at the
least, plaintiffs' interest in avoiding retaliation outweighed the bar's inter-
est in avoiding professional relationships with them.34° In view of the
337. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 462-66 (1958) (Based
upon the NAACP's "uncontroverted showing that on past occasions revelation of the identity
of its rank-and-file members has exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of employ-
ment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility," the Court
found that compelled disclosure of its Alabama membership was unconstitutional.); cf. Na-
tional Org. for Women v. Sperry Rand Corp., 88 F.R.D. 272 (D. Conn. 1980) (The National
Organization for Women ("NOW") alleged sex and race discrimination. In granting defend-
ant's motion to compel disclosure of NOW's branch membership list, the court belittled the
retaliation NOW members feared-removal of job duties, sabotage of work, and denigration of
plaintiffs' character and competence. The court did, however, prohibit defendant's counsel
from communicating the information to anyone except upon court order.) For further discus-
sion of this case, see Steinman, supra note 336, at 421-24.
338. See Steinman, supra note 336, at 359-371, 401-27.
339. This public interest may be slight, however, given the number of Title VII cases
brought by named plaintiffs and the ability of the EEOC to sue alleged discriminators. 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1982).
340. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit seems to have conceded as much by restricting the dissemi-
nation of the names of the women law students whose association initially commenced the
lawsuit. See supra note 329. The defendants' reasons for opposing confidentiality are unclear.
Perhaps they resented the inequality of being publicly charged with sex discrimination by
anonymous plaintiffs, or perhaps they felt that their ability to defend themselves in these ac-
tions would be impaired if the court ordered the tightly restricted disclosure of identities that
plaintiffs sought. Brief for Appellee at 23-26, Southern Methodist Univ. Ass'n of Women Law
Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 2d 707 (5th Cir. 1979). Defendants were concerned that if
their lawyers could not disclose the identities of appellants A and B, they would be unable to
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plaintiffs' interest in confidentiality and the weakness of the interests in
unrestricted disclosure, the Fifth Circuit may have erred in disallowing
the use of fictitious names. Given its other rulings, however, the court
may have been influenced by the fact that the Association was able to
continue the suit for the benefit of all women, including Lawyers A-D.341
Fear of Expressing Unpopular Political or Social Views
In some cases, plaintiffs sought to sue pseudonymously because they
feared reprisal based on their political or social views. The Southern
Methodist University case might fall into this category. The prime exam-
ple of such a case, however, is Doe v. Stegall.342 In Stegall, the Fifth
Circuit decided that a mother and her children could sue under fictitious
names to challenge the constitutionality of the daily broadcasting of reli-
gious ceremonies over the public address system at the children's
school.3 43 Plaintiffs agreed to disclose their identities to the defendants
and to the court in order to establish standing and to facilitate discov-
ery. 344 They sought to keep their identities confidential only from the
general public because they feared harassment and violence. Plaintiffs
furnished the court with documents to demonstrate the reasonableness of
their fears. 345
The Fifth Circuit held that the trial court had erred in concluding
that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case absent public identification of
sufficiently investigate and fully prepare the defense. It is possible, however, that defendants
wanted to see those who had dared to accuse them pay a professional price.
341. In Free Mkt. Compensation v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 98 F.R.D. 311 (S.D.N.Y.
1983), the court followed Southern Methodist University in refusing to allow a John Doe plain-
tiff to be added. The court, stressing that matters of a sensitive and highly personal nature were
not involved, held that the fear that Doe's ability to continue supplying confidential informa-
tion would be compromised did not outweigh the public's interest in disclosure. Id. at 313. In
view of the allegations of securities fraud and manipulation against the publicly identified de-
fendants, the court found Doe's desire to avoid professional embarrassment and economic loss
to be insufficient grounds for allowing pseudonymity. Id. Finally, though Doe was prepared
to identify himself to the court and to defendants' counsel under protective order, the court
found that the pseudonym might frustrate the defendant's ability to make discovery and to
establish defenses, privileges, and counterclaims, and might cause problems in determining the
judgment's res judicata effects. Id.
For another case in which plaintiffs sought pseudonymity in order to avoid retaliation for
their lawsuit, see Doe v. Hodgson, 344 F. Supp. 964, 969 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (Migrant agri-
cultural laborers challenged legislative exclusions of benefits and protections from agricultural
workers.), af'd, 478 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 1096 (1973).
342. 653 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1981).
343. Id. at 181-82.
344. Id. at 182 & n.5.
345. Id. at 181, 182-83 & n.6.
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the plaintiffs. 346 The court recognized the limitations of its Southern
Methodist University decision, and rejected a rigid three-pronged test,
saying that Southern Methodist University never purported to establish its
three "common factors" as prequisites to bringing a pseudonymous
suit.347 The court instead relied on the confluence of several factors.
First, plaintiffs challenged governmental activity. Second, plaintiffs'
complaint concerned a "quintessentially private matter"-religion.
Third, by revealing their personal beliefs and practices through their law-
suit, plaintiffs had invited serious opprobrium and had demonstrated the
likelihood of harassment or even violent reprisals if their identities were
publicly disclosed. Finally, the plaintiffs were children, and thus were
both especially vulnerable and members of a class of litigants that the
state shielded from identification in various circumstances. 348 The court
concluded that, under these circumstances, the Does should have been
permitted to sue under fictitious names, for their interests outweighed the
public's right to know their identity.349
Stegall is noteworthy, if for no other reason than that the court rec-
ognized the first amendment public interest in disclosure of litigants'
identities, and explicitly balanced it against the plaintiffs' interests in pri-
vacy and security. Even if the dissent correctly concluded that plaintiffs'
privacy of religious beliefs was minimally threatened, 350 plaintiffs' stance
in the litigation threatened their social and physical welfare, and that
346. Id. at 184-85.
347. Id. at 185; see supra note 326 & accompanying text.
348. Id. at 186.
349. Id.; accord Doe v. Aldine Indep. School Dist., 563 F. Supp. 883 (S.D. Tex. 1982)
(court allowed a pseudonymously filed suit in challenge to recitation of prayer on school dis-
trict property).
Stegall was a rare pseudonymity case because it provoked a dissent. Judge Gee ques-
tioned many of the premises upon which the majority opinion was based. He believed that the
record of threats was inadequate, even taking into account the "inherent difficulty of making
such proof while preserving one's anonymity." Stegall, 653 F.2d at 187 (Gee, J., dissenting).
He argued that plaintiffs had disclosed nothing of their private religious beliefs "beyond a
belief that the Constitution forbids what the defendants are requiring pupils to do." Id. at 188.
Finally, he argued that the children were not necessary plaintiffs at all, because their parents
had standing to complain of the alleged constitutional violations. Judge Gee acknowledged,
however, that "as a practical matter, if parents incur sufficient opprobrium, it may well be that
the children may suffer, whether made plaintiffs in the suit or not." Id.
While Judge Gee criticized the majority for offering no objective formulas for deciding
claims to pseudonymity, asserting that "it is just such formulas, or at least a sketching of their
outlines, that we sit to provide," id., he offered even less guidance. Wavering on whether the
courts should require people to stand up to such menaces as plaintiffs feared, as both the price
and the seedbed of fortitude, id. at 189, Judge Gee concluded: "I need not decide; in my view,
the showing made here is insufficient on any mode of reckoning." Id.
350. See supra note 349.
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alone could justify pseudonymity. 351 The suit raised important constitu-
tional issues that it was in the public interest for the courts to address,
and there were no strong public interests in knowing plaintiffs' identities,
as their claim did not depend on facts unique to plaintiffs' situation. The
majority's conclusion seems correct in light of the reduced public interest
in plaintiffs' identities and the plaintiffs' showing of threatened harm.352
Another example of pseudonymous litigation based on fears of retal-
iation for unpopular views is Doe v. Rostker.353 Plaintiffs, who had com-
plied with draft registration requirements, alleged that the presidential
proclamation ordering the draft violated various federal statutes, and re-
quested expungement of their names from registration records. The
court said that "the common thread running through [the] cases is the
presence of some social stigma or the threat of physical harm to the
plaintiffs attaching to disclosure. '354 The court found neither present
here. Moreover, this was not a case in which disclosure of identity would
vitiate the interests plaintiffs sought to protect. If they prevailed on the
merits, plaintiffs' names would be expunged from Selective Service
records; if they lost, their claim to anonymity from the Selective Service
System would be defeated and their names would be known. The court
also noted defendants' interest in knowing who was suing them.355 The
court rejected plaintiffs' argument that they feared "reprisals which may
jeopardize their attempts to obtain conscientious objector status," be-
cause such reprisals were speculative, prospective, and remediable should
they occur.356
It is difficult to assess whether the court fairly evaluated plaintiffs'
reasons for seeking pseudonymity. They argued in part that the chal-
lenged presidential proclamation resulted in government possession of in-
formation to which it had no right, in violation of plaintiffs' rights of
privacy. It is unclear whether the expungement of their names from the
351. The social and physical welfare of plaintiffs, influential factors in nearly all pseudony-
mous litigation, played an especially significant role in allowing juveniles accused of delin-
quency and persons seeking the protection of the United States Witness Protection Program,
18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1982), to use pseudonyms. See also Doe v. Lally, 467 F. Supp. 1339 (D. Md.
1979) (homosexual rape of prisoner); Glover v. Johnson, 85 F.R.D. 1 (E.D. Mich. 1977)
(prison inmates' fear of retaliation for participating in lawsuit).
352. See text accompanying note 197; see also Doe v. Martin, 404 F. Supp. 753 (D.D.C.
1975) (Doe and the Socialist Workers' party alleged that disclosure requirements of campaign
finance reform act would subject named contributors to governmental and private harassment.
The opinion contains no discussion of why Doe was permitted to sue pseudonymously.).
353. 89 F.R.D. 158 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
354. Id. at 161.
355. Id. at 161-62.
356. Id. at 162.
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Selective Service records would deprive the government of that informa-
tion. It is possible that, by virtue of being denied pseudonymity and of
being subject to discovery, plaintiffs would be forced to disclose the very
information they sought to keep from the government. Similarly, it is
unclear whether plaintiffs would have an adequate remedy if they ulti-
mately were denied conscientious objector status and suspected foul play.
Inasmuch as plaintiffs were asserting public rights, dropping the lawsuit
to avoid such retaliation would not serve the public interest. In addition,
although the court asserted that the government had a strong interest in
knowing who challenged the proclamation requiring certain males to reg-
ister, it is unclear what relevance that information would have to the
merits of plaintiffs' claims. 357
In cases of this sort, the plaintiffs are concerned primarily about
physical and other reprisals, unless they happen to be suing to preserve
privacy interests. 358 Consequently, in evaluating the substantiality of the
basis for pseudonymity, the courts should look for evidence showing a
reasonable probability that plaintiffs will suffer significant reprisals if
they are denied pseudonymity. 359 If the plaintiffs raise purely legal is-
sues, that tends to weaken the public interest in access to their names,
but the subject matter of the litigation is likely to be of particular interest
to someone; otherwise, feelings would not be running so high that plain-
tiffs would have reasonable grounds to fear reprisal. In evaluating
whether plaintiffs' interests override the interests in access, the courts
also should be vigilant in examining the motivations of those who oppose
pseudonymity because, in cases such as these, they may seek to harass
the plaintiffs and to force them to drop their lawsuit to avoid
identification.
357. In a final set of cases in which pseudonymity was sought because of the "unpopular-
ity" of plaintiffs' activities, persons promised protection under the federal government's Wit-
ness Protection Program, 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1982), have sued pseudonymously to obtain the
promised protection. Their need for pseudonymity stems from the same basis as their accept-
ance into the program: substantial fears of violent retaliation for cooperation with the authori-
ties. Doe v. Civiletti, 635 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1980); Doe a/k/a WC0612 v. United States
Witness Protection Program, 221 Ct. Cl. 940, 941-42 (1979). The public's interest in their
identities cannot be satisfied without endangering the Program and those it seeks to protect.
These plaintiffs thus have "substantial cause," and the courts properly have permitted pseudo-
nymity in these cases. The policies that support both the Witness Protection Program and
pseudonymity in these cases include protecting individuals from the threat of violent reprisal
to encourage individuals to testify, aiding the criminal justice system, and furthering the public
interest in the suppression of organized crime. See Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 585-
86 & 586 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
358. See Doe v. Rostker, 89 F.R.D. 158 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (both privacy and security at
stake).
359. See supra notes 161, 349 & accompanying text.
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Corporate Defendants
A final category of cases involves requests by defendant corpora-
tions sued by insiders to proceed pseudonymously to protect allegedly
confidential information. In Doe v. A Corporation,36° for instance, a for-
mer in-house counsel, on behalf of himself and others, sued for benefits
allegedly due under corporate pension and life insurance plans. The
Fifth Circuit seemingly approved the district court's grant of pseudo-
nymity: "To prevent identification of the company and the possible dis-
closure of confidential information concerning its affairs, the district
court granted the defendant corporation's motion to seal the record;
[and] require the suit to be prosecuted without revealing the name of
either the lawyer or the corporation. '3 61
The appellate court's reasons, however, are unclear. Although the
corporation had an interest in maintaining attorney-client confidentiality,
the court declared that, "[a] lawyer. . . does not forfeit his rights simply
because to prove them he must utilize confidential information. '362
Moreover, "[t]here is no social interest in allowing the corporation to
conceal wrongdoing, if in fact any has occurred. ' 363 It is possible that
the court sought to facilitate confidentiality in case wrongdoing was not
established. Even then, it is difficult to reconcile this result with the
Southern Methodist University364 and Stegal3 65 cases. Intimate personal
information was not at risk, governmental activity was not challenged,
children were not involved, and the injuries threatened were largely eco-
nomic. While the defendant was accused of violating federal and state
law, the legal system has never kept the identities of those so accused
confidential or every lawsuit could involve a pseudonymous defendant.
The parties were on an equal footing because plaintiff was given a pseu-
donym as well, but that appears to have been done for the protection of
the defendant corporation rather than at plaintiff's request. The court
could have better served the public interest by designing a system to pro-
tect the particular information in which defendant had a legitimate confi-
360. 709 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1983).
361. Id. at 1044 n.l. The opinion does not reveal what secrets Doe learned while in de-
fendant's employ, except for his allegation that "X Insurance Company had paid dividends to
A Corporation, which A Corporation retained without disclosing their receipt to its employees
or to 'the appropriate federal and state agencies.'" Id. at 1045.
362. Id. at 1050.
363. Id.; accord Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th
Cir. 1983) (that information would harm company's reputation was no reason to seal it); Joy v.
North, 692 F.2d 880, 894 (2d Cir. 1982) (that an internal report would disclose poor manage-
ment was no ground to withhold it), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
364. 599 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1979); see supra notes 317-29 & accompanying text.
365. 653 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1981); see supra notes 342-49 & accompanying text.
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dentiality interest without keeping the identity of the corporation from
the public. 366
In sum, it is entirely unclear why the court permitted the defendant
corporation to avoid public identification. Although there is a long tradi-
tion of protecting sensitive commercial information, a corporation's pri-
vacy rights are weaker than those of an individual. 367 While there may
have been "substantial cause" to seal parts of depositions, to close parts
of hearings when confidential information would be disclosed, and to
take other similar precautions against the disclosure of confidential infor-
mation, there does not appear to have been "substantial cause" for af-
fording pseudonyms to the parties. The court's order was not narrowly
tailored to protect cognizable corporate interests, and thus infringed on
the public's right of access to party name. 368
In general then, when defendant businesses seek to be sued pseudon-
ymously, courts should apply the same balancing analysis set forth and
illustrated above. The party seeking pseudonymity should establish that
it has kept confidential the information it seeks to protect, and it should
establish the reasonable likelihood of a serious harm should disclosure
result. In this category of cases particularly, the courts should satisfy
themselves that pseudonymity does not give the corporate defendant un-
necessarily broad shelter from public scrutiny. It should consider the
alternative of identifying the party and keeping from public scrutiny only
those particular items of confidential business information that there are
good reasons to protect. It should examine the corporate motivations for
366. See Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984), in which the court
observed that
federal courts should not deny access to trial evidence of a bad business practice
. . . . The presumption of openness plus the policy interest in protecting unsuspect-
ing people from investing in Publicker in light of its bad business practices are not
overcome by the proprietary interest of present stockholders in not losing stock value
or the interest of upper-level management in escaping embarrasment.
Id. at 1074; see also Doe v. A Corp., 330 F. Supp. 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), affd sub nom. Hall v.
A Corp., 453 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1972) (Derivative and class action suit alleging fraud, breach
of fiduciary duty and violations of federal securities laws, brought by attorney who acquired
information while doing legal work for defendant, a publicly held corporation. The court did
not discuss the use of pseudonyms.).
367. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can be used to protect sensitive commercial
information. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7). A corporations' right of nondisclosure, however, is
weaker than an individual's. California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 65-66 (1974)
("[C]orporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to
privacy.").
368. In addition to the universal baseline of public interest in party identity, the public has
an interest in knowing of the defendant's allegedly bad business practices to guide its invest-
ment and its purchasing decisions. See Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1074
(3d Cir. 1984).
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seeking to be sued under a pseudonym, for it may find them unworthy of
support. At the same time, the court's analysis should reflect both the
universal level of public interest in knowing who litigants are and the
special public interests that may be present because of the interests of
employees, the investing public, and the consuming public.
Summary
As demonstrated above, the single most important factor in the
argument for pseudonymity is the substantiality of the bases upon which
the request is grounded. Judicial attempts to define the sufficiently sub-
stantial bases for pseudonymity, however, have under-described the rele-
vant universe. The cases granting pseudonymity have not always
entailed disclosure of intimate information, illegal conduct, or other mat-
ters that invite analogous opprobrium. Nor have they always involved
fears of retaliatory harassment. Similarly, they have not always sought
declaratory or injunctive relief, nor have they always been against the
government. Further, the cases have not always involved especially vul-
nerable litigants, nor would party identification always violate the very
interests plaintiffs sought to vindicate. Nevertheless, one or more of these
factors is present in each case.
In the future, courts must not decide automatically the pseudonym-
ity issue based on whether a case falls into a familiar fact pattern. Courts
should consider whether a party seeks to protect a substantial privacy
interest, such as exists in the cases involving abortion, homosexuality,
mental illness or deficiency, and juveniles. They should also consider
whether a party seeks to protect a substantial interest in physical well-
being, as in cases involving prison inmates, witness protection, and un-
popular political or social views. There are, however, other subtler, yet
substantial, bases for seeking pseudonymity. The courts have been will-
ing to protect litigants from "stigma," even when physical violence was
unlikely or highly personal matters were not involved. Such "stigma"
played a part in many of the above categories, including abortion, homo-
sexuality, mental illness or deficiency, drug use, alleged criminality and
unprofessional conduct, and juvenile delinquency. The courts protected
litigants from psychological injuries, ostracism, and other negative reac-
tions, including adverse economic ramifications. The courts have not,
however, forthrightly held that stigma and its consequences alone are
sufficient to justify pseudonymity. 369 Usually, the courts have not been
369. The lack of any clear judicial statements on the sufficiency of stigma and its conse-
quences as a basis for affording pseudonymity makes the hardest cases today those that involve
primarily economic effects or ostracism plus ecomonic effects, such as Southern Methodist
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forced into that position because other interests were involved: privacy,
security, grand jury confidentiality, fifth amendment rights, protection
from defamation, or juvenile record confidentiality.
There are important arguments against pseudonymity as well. There
is always a public interest in access to the litigants' names, and it is im-
possible to quantify or to articulate precisely how much weight that in-
terest should receive. As a practical matter, because it is amorphous, this
interest generally is subordinated when a relatively concrete and immedi-
ate threat to a litigant's interests in privacy or security has been
demonstrated.
This is particularly true when the plaintiff is a fungible member of a
class, whether or not the suit technically is framed as a class action.
Thus, when undistinguished plaintiffs challenge statutes and government
policies on their face, there is little public interest in who happens to sue.
In such a case, the salutary affects of public scrutiny are little influenced
by public knowledge or ignorance of the plaintiff's identity. Because the
decision of the case will directly affect a whole class of persons, it is rela-
tively unlikely that judicial bias or partiality toward the plaintiff will af-
fect the decision. Because the issues are predominately, if not entirely,
legal questions of interpretation and constitutionality, the public's inabil-
ity to identify the plaintiff is unlikely to affect the availability of relevant
testimony. Accordingly, pseudonymity should not undermine public
confidence in the administration of the law, nor should it affect the well-
informed discussion of judicial matters. The first amendment right of
access to litigants' identities is therefore particularly weak when plaintiffs
are fungible class members, and should be subordinated to demonstrated
privacy and security interests, including the avoidance of stigma.370
The cases also suggest when there is a greater than ordinary public
interest in disclosure of a litigant's identity. Cases that involve govern-
ment officials, such as judges, 371 members of Congress, or public servants
in a broader sense, such as doctors372 or lawyers, often are in this cate-
gory. By virtue of their societal roles, such persons have a reduced ex-
pectation of privacy as to some matters because the public has a
legitimate interest in their activities. Similarly, the public has a special
Univ. Ass'n of Women Law Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1979), and Doe
v. A Corp., 709 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1983).
370. For these reasons, even government involvement in a lawsuit does not so increase
public interest in the opponent's identity that the court must necessarily deny pseudonymity.
371. See, e.g., Doe v. United States Dep't of Justice, 93 F.R.D. 483 (D. Colo. 1982); supra
text accompanying notes 240-43.
372. See, e.g., Doe v. Deschamps, 64 F.R.D. 652 (D. Mont. 1974) (per curiam); supra text
accompanying notes 182-84.
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interest in knowing of activities of such people that carry stigma, so that
it can vote them out of office, withhold patronage, or take other appro-
priate action. The public corporation has a similarly reduced expectation
of privacy and the investing and consuming public has a special interest
in knowing of allegedly improper corporate activities in order to make
well-informed investment and purchasing decisions. 373
There is also an unusually great public interest in the litigant's iden-
tity when the litigant poses a threat to the community. Thus, there is a
public interest in knowing who is likely to be physically dangerous be-
cause of drug addition374 or mental illness, and in knowing who has al-
legedly acted criminally or in violation of professional ethics. 375 Beyond
societal consensus of danger reflected in laws and ethical canons, the
courts should avoid judging who is "morally" dangerous. Given the di-
versity of views on immorality, the courts should not find a public inter-
est in a litigant's identity based on the argument that he poses a moral
danger to the community. At the extreme, there is arguably a greater
public interest in knowing the identity of defendants than of plaintiffs,
because only defendants are accused of wrongdoing, and wrongdoers
pose varying degrees of threat to the public.
Despite the absence of bright line tests, this effort to isolate the most
substantial bases for pseudonymity and the characteristics of the weakest
and strongest cases for public access to litigants' names should assist the
courts in their efforts to grapple with these issues.
The Need for Procedures
Although the main task of this Article is substantive analysis of
pseudonymous litigation, the procedural aspect of that issue should not
be ignored. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not address it.
More surprisingly, in view of the number of "Doe" cases that have been
filed over the past fifteen years, it appears that the federal courts have
promulgated no local rules to govern the matter.376
Given the volume of cases affected, clear procedures should be es-
373. See, eg., Doe v. A Corp., 709 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1983); supra text accompanying
notes 357-65
374. See supra text accompanying notes 237-39.
375. See supra text accompanying notes 256-61, 271.
376. In June 1984, the author wrote to a court in each federal judicial district and to each
federal circuit court of appeals asking for information concerning the procedures used when
litigants seek to sue pseudonymously, and whether these procedures were established by for-
rnal local rules or informal procedures. None of the forty-eight responding courts indicated
that they had directly pertinent local rules (copy of letters on file with The Hastings Law
Journal). Some court rules disallow the filing of civil complaints by or against fictitiously
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tablished governing pseudonymity requests. 377 The author recommends
that, when a plaintiff seeks to sue pseudonymously, the complaint and
summons should be captioned with a fictitious name substituted for
plaintiff's true name, and that the same fictitious name should be used in
the body of the pleading and summons. At the time the complaint is
filed, or shortly thereafter, 378 plaintiff should file and serve on all other
parties to the litigation a motion requesting leave to proceed pseudony-
mously. In order to enable the court to balance plaintiff's interests in
confidentiality against the public interest in access, plaintiff's motion
should be accompanied by affidavits containing the facts supporting
pseudonymity, and the facts necessary to establish standing and the exist-
ence of a case or controversy, and by a memorandum of law citing perti-
nent legal precedent.379
If plaintiff has no objection to disclosing his identity to co-plaintiffs
or to defendants and their counsel, plaintiff should so indicate in the mo-
tion. Plaintiff's motion should request a protective order specifying the
persons entitled to know plaintiff's identity and prohibiting them from
further disseminating the information. If plaintiff's identity is disclosed
to any other litigant, litigant's counsel, or the court in a filed document,
plaintiff should move that that document be kept under seal. If plaintiff
objects to disclosing his identity either to other litigants and their coun-
sel, or to both the adversaries and the court, plaintiff should again so
indicate in the initial motion and memorandum of law.
The other parties should then file papers indicating their agreement
with or opposition to the relief plaintiff has requested. Insofar as they
named parties unless otherwise ordered. E.g., D. ARIz. R. 10(d); S.D. CAL. R. 200-6 (in
diversity cases).
377. Other possible approaches include those suggested by the courts in Roe v. New York,
49 F.R.D. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (recommending that plaintiff file in true name, and then seek
to amend or seek protective orders); Buxton v. Ullman, 147 Conn. 48, 156 A.2d 508 (1959)
(recommending that, before the case is filed, plaintiff should secure the court's consent to pseu-
donymous filing), appeal dismissed sub nom. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). The former
risks disclosure, both in the interim and in the event pseudonymity is denied. As to the latter,
see infra note 375.
378. Plaintiff's complaint should be filed before, rather than after, plaintiff asks the court's
permission to sue pseudonymously, because otherwise no civil action has been commenced and
the court lacks jurisdiction even to enter an order allowing or disallowing pseudonymity. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 3. The author rejects the court's position in Roe v. New York that no action is
commenced by the filing of such a complaint. Roe v. New York, 49 F.D.R. 279, 282
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
379. All of the federal cases discussed in this Article involved "federal question" jurisdic-
tion, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). If a plaintiff needed to invoke diversity jurisdiction, id. § 1332,
pseudonymity would pose the additional problem of interfering with the defendant's ability to
discover and the court's ability to ascertain plaintiff's citizenship. See supra note 2.
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oppose pseudonymity, the parties should file sworn factual material and
memoranda of law in support of their position. The court should also
permit the press and public to oppose pseudonymity and any related or-
ders proscribing dissemination of identifying information to the public or
press.380
The court should then rule on plaintiff's motion, entering appropri-
ate orders supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law adequate
to justify its decisions and sufficient for appellate review. If the trial
court denies plaintiff permission to sue pseudonymously, it should order
dismissal without prejudice and with leave to amend the complaint to
substitute plaintiff's true name.
If a defendant seeks to be sued pseudonymously, 381 he should move
that the original complaint and summons be put under seal, that an
amended complaint and summons be fied substituting a pseudonym for
his true name, and that a protective order issue prohibiting dissemination
of defendant's identity by the other parties and their counsel. Supporting
affidavits and legal memoranda should accompany the motion. From
this point on, the procedures described above should apply except that, if
the court disallows pseudonymity, the action should proceed. In this cir-
cumstance, it is too late to prevent the other litigants and the court from
learning defendant's identity, so only pseudonymity with respect to the
public is in question.382
380. This position is based on the Supreme Court's holding that, "for a case-by-case ap-
proach to be meaningful, representatives of the press and the general public must be given an
opportunity to be heard on the question of their exclusion." Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596, 609 n.25 (1982) (quoting Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 401
(1979)). Precisely how to afford the opportunity to be heard is an open question. In In re
Herald Co., 734 F.2d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 1984), the court ruled that a motion for courtroom
closure should be docketed promptly in the public docket files in the court clerk's office; the
public docket entries also should reflect that the motion and any supporting or opposing pa-
pers were filed under seal, the time and place of any hearing on the motion, the occurrence of
such hearing, the disposition of the motion, and the fact of courtroom closure, if any. The
court emphasized that it did not intend to foreclose the district courts from supplementing
these procedures by such steps as notification of the news media. Id. at 103. The same proce-
dures could be followed when a litigant moves for leave to sue pseudonymously.
381. See supra note 102.
382. A court might have to decide more than once whether to permit an action to proceed
pseudonymously, first on the mere "cause" standard and then on the "substantial cause" stan-
dard. See supra notes 157, 161-63 & accompanying text.
There is ordinarily no significant problem with appeals. The Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure require that the notice of appeal "specify the party or parties taking the appeal,"
FED. R. App. P. 3(c), and that "[a]n appeal shall be docketed under the title given to the action
in the district court, with the appellant identified as such, but if such title does not contain the
name of the appellant, his name, identified as appellant, shall be added to the title." Id. Rule
12(a). As construed, these Rules allow parties who were permitted to use fictitious names in
the trial court to continue to use them on appeal. When courts of appeal have been asked to
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Conclusion
The public right of access to judicial proceedings and records is es-
sential to public knowledge about the court system and how it handles
challenges to legislative and executive action. These rights of access have
salutary effects upon judicial administration as well. Nevertheless, these
rights are qualified and sometimes yield to other interests.
This Article has demonstrated that pseudonymous litigation is in
tension with the public's right of access. It advocates the use of a multi-
factor balancing test, applied on a case by case basis, to determine when
litigants should be permitted to sue pseudonymously. The courts should
evaluate the grounds urged for keeping a litigant's identity confidential in
light of any public interest in confidentiality and in the litigation. Pseu-
donymity should be permitted only when a litigant demonstrates a rea-
sonable probability of significant injury to important privacy or security
interests, defined to encompass physical, psychological, and economic
well-being, which outweighs the public's interest in access. That public
interest may be the usual minimum of interest in litigant identity, or it
may be greater because of the subject matter of the litigation or the socie-
tal role of the parties.
This Article also has illustrated the application of the proposed bal-
ancing test in each of the nine categories of cases in which litigants most
often have sought pseudonymity in federal court. The Article articulated
the justifications for allowing or disallowing pseudonymity. Based on
these applications of the balancing test, the Article offered some perspec-
tive on the present state of the law and showed that the universe of cases
in which pseudonymity is proper is more diverse than courts have recog-
nized. The Article recommends that, in new situations, the courts should
look beyond the superficial factual similarities and differences of prior
cases to determine whether the circumstances justify pseudonymity. In
particular, courts should clarify when, if ever, stigma and its conse-
quences are sufficient to justify pseudonymity.
As requests for pseudonymity continue to confront the courts, this
Article will help to guide litigants and the courts to a proper resolution of
publish opinions using pseudonyms, though a party previously had been identified, they have
employed an analysis similar to the trial courts'. E.g., United States v. Doe, 655 F.2d 920, 922
n.1 (9th Cir. 1980).
Similarly, although United States Supreme Court Rules require parties to the proceeding
to be listed in the petition for certiorari, the notice of appeal, and jurisdictional statement, S.
CT. R. 10.2, 15.1(b), 21.1(b), if pseudonyms were used below, the parties may continue to use
them in the documents filed with the Supreme Court. R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME
COURT PRACTICE § 6.19 (5th ed. 1978).
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the relevant issues. This discussion should heighten sensitivity both to
the first amendment values at stake and to litigants' competing interests
in privacy and security, and give the courts assistance in their effort to
reconcile these values.

